【摘要】：隨著油藏經(jīng)營管理在油田企業(yè)的逐步推廣和完善,油藏經(jīng)營管理機制設計已經(jīng)成為油田企業(yè)管理研究的熱點之一。在國內(nèi)油藏經(jīng)營管理體系中,采油廠是油藏經(jīng)營管理的責任主體,油藏經(jīng)營管理區(qū)直接對采油廠負責,既是獨立核算主體,也是油氣生產(chǎn)操作主體和成本中心,其行為策略直接影響和制約著油田企業(yè)的整體投資收益。在缺乏規(guī)范的投資激勵機制的情況下,油田企業(yè)內(nèi)部各采油廠、油藏經(jīng)營管理區(qū)重項目前期立項,輕后期投資管理現(xiàn)象突出。因此,有必要對油藏經(jīng)營管理體系下的投資激勵機制問題進行深入研究,從而提高石油項目的投資收益率。 本文以機制設計理論、委托代理理論為基礎,采取數(shù)理方法,以油田企業(yè)管理組織結構為基本框架,分別研究了雙重委托代理、油藏經(jīng)營管理區(qū)和行為主體的不同風險偏好對激勵機制的影響。首先,本文構建雙重委托代理模型,研究油田企業(yè)、采油廠以及油藏經(jīng)營管理區(qū)之間的投資激勵機制設計結果,探討油田企業(yè)的投資信息價值和代理成本；其次,本文構建由單個采油廠和兩個油藏經(jīng)營管理區(qū)組成的委托代理模型,研究油藏經(jīng)營管理區(qū)之間的競爭關系對投資激勵機制設計結果的影響,分析采油廠的投資信息價值和代理成本,并探討油藏經(jīng)營管理區(qū)之間可能的合謀行為和采油廠的防范措施對投資激勵機制設計結果的影響；再次,本文研究不同風險類型對激勵機制設計結果、采油廠投資信息價值以及代理成本的影響。 研究發(fā)現(xiàn)：一是油田企業(yè)可以通過技能培訓、技術支持等方式,幫助下屬采油廠和油藏經(jīng)營管理區(qū)降低生產(chǎn)成本,提高石油項目產(chǎn)出效率,從而激勵后者在石油項目上更加努力地工作。二是油田企業(yè)不應該對下屬采油廠和油藏經(jīng)營管理區(qū)一味地強調(diào)風險規(guī)避,應該努力去收集與石油投資項目相關的市場信息,以降低投資市場不確定性,從而獲取更多投資收益。三是采油廠能夠從油藏經(jīng)營管理區(qū)的激烈競爭中獲得“漁翁之利”,而通過采取額外罰款、降職等其他手段,采油廠可以達到威懾油藏經(jīng)營管理區(qū)合謀行為的作用。
[Abstract]:With the gradual promotion and improvement of reservoir management in oil field enterprises, the design of reservoir management mechanism has become one of the hot spots in the research of oil field enterprise management. In the domestic reservoir management system, the oil production plant is the main body responsible for the reservoir management, and the reservoir management area is directly responsible to the oil production plant, which is not only the independent accounting body, but also the main body and cost center of oil and gas production and operation. Its behavior strategy directly affects and restricts the overall investment income of oil field enterprises. In the absence of a standardized investment incentive mechanism, various oil production plants in oil field enterprises, reservoir management area heavy projects in the early stage, light of the late investment management phenomenon is prominent. Therefore, it is necessary to deeply study the investment incentive mechanism under the reservoir management system in order to improve the investment return rate of oil projects. Based on the theory of mechanism design, principal-agent theory and mathematical method, this paper studies the dual principal-agent theory by taking the management structure of oil field enterprises as the basic framework. The influence of different risk preference of reservoir management area and behavior on incentive mechanism. First of all, this paper constructs a dual principal-agent model to study the design results of investment incentive mechanism between oil field enterprises, oil production plants and reservoir management areas, and discusses the investment information value and agency cost of oil field enterprises. In this paper, a principal-agent model consisting of a single oil production plant and two reservoir management areas is constructed to study the influence of the competitive relationship between the reservoir management areas on the design results of the investment incentive mechanism. This paper analyzes the investment information value and agency cost of oil production plant, and discusses the possible collusion between reservoir management areas and the influence of preventive measures on the design results of investment incentive mechanism. This paper studies the effects of different risk types on the design results of incentive mechanism, the value of investment information and agency cost of oil extraction plants. It is found that: first, oil field enterprises can help subordinate oil production plants and reservoir management areas to reduce production costs and improve oil project output efficiency by means of skill training and technical support. This encourages the latter to work harder on oil projects. Second, oil field enterprises should not blindly emphasize risk aversion to subordinate oil production plants and reservoir management areas, and should strive to collect market information related to oil investment projects in order to reduce the uncertainty of the investment market. In order to gain more investment income. The third is that the oil production plant can obtain the profit from the fierce competition in the reservoir management area, and by adopting additional fines, demotion and other means, the oil production plant can achieve the function of deterring collusion in the reservoir management area.
【學位授予單位】：西南石油大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F426.22;F406.7

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