【摘要】：資產(chǎn)評估在國有資產(chǎn)管理、企業(yè)并購重組的業(yè)務中發(fā)揮著重要的作用。隨著我國國有企業(yè)深化改革、多層次資本市場建立、金融體制改革等一系列國家重大改革的出臺，資產(chǎn)評估日益迸發(fā)出強大的生命力。但我國資產(chǎn)評估也存在著一些問題：由于我國資產(chǎn)評估行業(yè)獨特的誕生背景，資產(chǎn)評估行業(yè)與政府有著與生俱來的天然關聯(lián)。這也導致了目前我國評估市場是一個政府控制下的非充分競爭市場。值得關注的是，通過進一步的研究我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，評估師的選擇是受到政府控制和制度環(huán)境兩個因素影響的。 在我國評估行業(yè)的特殊制度背景下，本文基于政府控制和制度環(huán)境兩個視角來探討其對評估師選擇的作用機制，主要研究了以下三個問題：（1）政府控制的評估市場對上市公司評估師選擇上產(chǎn)生什么影響?國有產(chǎn)權性質(zhì)的上市公司是否也更傾向于選擇具有政治背景的評估機構(gòu)？（2）具有不同國有產(chǎn)權等級的企業(yè)，評估師選擇是否存在差異？（3）在其他因素不變的條件下，制度環(huán)境如何影響不同產(chǎn)權等級控制下國有企業(yè)的評估師選擇？ 在研究方法上，本文首先對以往研究文獻的梳理、歸納和總結(jié)，，找到本文的研究意義。然后從理論上分析政府控制對評估師選擇的作用機制。本文運用probit模型，通過多元回歸來考察政府控制對評估師選擇的影響，從實證的角度分析了政府控制視角下國有企業(yè)評估師選擇的狀況。研究發(fā)現(xiàn)中央政府控制的公司更傾向于選擇中央政府背景的評估機構(gòu)，地方政府控制的公司更傾向于選擇地方政府背景的評估機構(gòu)。同時，引入制度環(huán)境后的進一步研究表明，制度環(huán)境越好(市場化水平越高、政府干預指數(shù)越低和法治化水平越高)，企業(yè)越可能選擇無政治背景的評估機構(gòu)。即良好的地區(qū)制度環(huán)境與公司選擇具有政治背景的評估機構(gòu)顯著負相關。結(jié)合國有產(chǎn)權性質(zhì)發(fā)現(xiàn)，國有產(chǎn)權會削弱制度環(huán)境的這種負相關關系。同時，通過分樣本檢驗發(fā)現(xiàn)，制度環(huán)境對國有企業(yè)評估師選擇的影響，受國有股權終極控制人等級性質(zhì)影響。相比中央政府控制的公司，地方政府控制的公司更容易受到制度環(huán)境的影響。
[Abstract]:Asset evaluation plays an important role in state-owned assets management and M & A business. With the deepening of the reform of state-owned enterprises, the establishment of multi-level capital market, the reform of financial system and a series of important national reforms, asset evaluation has increasingly burst out a strong vitality. However, there are also some problems in asset evaluation in China: because of the unique background of asset appraisal industry, asset appraisal industry has a natural relationship with the government. This also led to the current evaluation market is a government-controlled market under the insufficient competition. It is worth noting that through further research we find that the selection of appraisers is influenced by two factors: government control and institutional environment. Under the background of the special system of evaluation industry in China, this paper discusses the mechanism of the selection of appraisers from the perspectives of government control and institutional environment. This paper mainly studies the following three questions: (1) what impact does the government-controlled evaluation market have on the selection of listed company appraisers? Are listed companies with state-owned property rights more inclined to choose evaluation institutions with political background? (2) with different levels of state-owned property rights, are there any differences between appraisers? (3) under the condition that other factors remain unchanged, How does the institutional environment affect the selection of appraisers in state-owned enterprises under the control of different levels of property rights? In terms of research methods, this paper firstly combs, summarizes and summarizes the previous research documents, and finds the significance of this study. Then it theoretically analyzes the mechanism of government control on the selection of appraisers. This paper uses probit model to investigate the influence of government control on the selection of appraisers through multiple regression, and analyzes the state of selection of appraisers in state-owned enterprises from the perspective of government control. It is found that the companies controlled by the central government are more likely to choose the evaluation agencies with the background of the central government, and the firms controlled by the local governments are more inclined to choose the evaluation agencies of the background of the local government. At the same time, the further research after the introduction of institutional environment shows that the better the institutional environment (the higher the marketization level, the lower the government intervention index and the higher the rule of law level), the more likely enterprises are to choose evaluation institutions without political background. That is, good regional institutional environment is negatively correlated with corporate selection with political background. Combining with the nature of state-owned property right, it is found that state-owned property right weakens the negative correlation of institutional environment. At the same time, it is found that the influence of institutional environment on the selection of appraisers in state-owned enterprises is influenced by the nature of the ultimate controller of state-owned equity. Companies controlled by local governments are more vulnerable to the institutional environment than firms controlled by central government.
【學位授予單位】：浙江財經(jīng)大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F233

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