政府控制、制度環(huán)境與評(píng)估師選擇
發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-09-11 08:37
【摘要】：資產(chǎn)評(píng)估在國(guó)有資產(chǎn)管理、企業(yè)并購(gòu)重組的業(yè)務(wù)中發(fā)揮著重要的作用。隨著我國(guó)國(guó)有企業(yè)深化改革、多層次資本市場(chǎng)建立、金融體制改革等一系列國(guó)家重大改革的出臺(tái)，資產(chǎn)評(píng)估日益迸發(fā)出強(qiáng)大的生命力。但我國(guó)資產(chǎn)評(píng)估也存在著一些問題：由于我國(guó)資產(chǎn)評(píng)估行業(yè)獨(dú)特的誕生背景，資產(chǎn)評(píng)估行業(yè)與政府有著與生俱來的天然關(guān)聯(lián)。這也導(dǎo)致了目前我國(guó)評(píng)估市場(chǎng)是一個(gè)政府控制下的非充分競(jìng)爭(zhēng)市場(chǎng)。值得關(guān)注的是，通過進(jìn)一步的研究我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，評(píng)估師的選擇是受到政府控制和制度環(huán)境兩個(gè)因素影響的。 在我國(guó)評(píng)估行業(yè)的特殊制度背景下，本文基于政府控制和制度環(huán)境兩個(gè)視角來探討其對(duì)評(píng)估師選擇的作用機(jī)制，主要研究了以下三個(gè)問題：（1）政府控制的評(píng)估市場(chǎng)對(duì)上市公司評(píng)估師選擇上產(chǎn)生什么影響?國(guó)有產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)的上市公司是否也更傾向于選擇具有政治背景的評(píng)估機(jī)構(gòu)？（2）具有不同國(guó)有產(chǎn)權(quán)等級(jí)的企業(yè)，評(píng)估師選擇是否存在差異？（3）在其他因素不變的條件下，制度環(huán)境如何影響不同產(chǎn)權(quán)等級(jí)控制下國(guó)有企業(yè)的評(píng)估師選擇？ 在研究方法上，本文首先對(duì)以往研究文獻(xiàn)的梳理、歸納和總結(jié)，，找到本文的研究意義。然后從理論上分析政府控制對(duì)評(píng)估師選擇的作用機(jī)制。本文運(yùn)用probit模型，通過多元回歸來考察政府控制對(duì)評(píng)估師選擇的影響，從實(shí)證的角度分析了政府控制視角下國(guó)有企業(yè)評(píng)估師選擇的狀況。研究發(fā)現(xiàn)中央政府控制的公司更傾向于選擇中央政府背景的評(píng)估機(jī)構(gòu)，地方政府控制的公司更傾向于選擇地方政府背景的評(píng)估機(jī)構(gòu)。同時(shí)，引入制度環(huán)境后的進(jìn)一步研究表明，制度環(huán)境越好(市場(chǎng)化水平越高、政府干預(yù)指數(shù)越低和法治化水平越高)，企業(yè)越可能選擇無政治背景的評(píng)估機(jī)構(gòu)。即良好的地區(qū)制度環(huán)境與公司選擇具有政治背景的評(píng)估機(jī)構(gòu)顯著負(fù)相關(guān)。結(jié)合國(guó)有產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)發(fā)現(xiàn)，國(guó)有產(chǎn)權(quán)會(huì)削弱制度環(huán)境的這種負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系。同時(shí)，通過分樣本檢驗(yàn)發(fā)現(xiàn)，制度環(huán)境對(duì)國(guó)有企業(yè)評(píng)估師選擇的影響，受國(guó)有股權(quán)終極控制人等級(jí)性質(zhì)影響。相比中央政府控制的公司，地方政府控制的公司更容易受到制度環(huán)境的影響。
[Abstract]:Asset evaluation plays an important role in state-owned assets management and M & A business. With the deepening of the reform of state-owned enterprises, the establishment of multi-level capital market, the reform of financial system and a series of important national reforms, asset evaluation has increasingly burst out a strong vitality. However, there are also some problems in asset evaluation in China: because of the unique background of asset appraisal industry, asset appraisal industry has a natural relationship with the government. This also led to the current evaluation market is a government-controlled market under the insufficient competition. It is worth noting that through further research we find that the selection of appraisers is influenced by two factors: government control and institutional environment. Under the background of the special system of evaluation industry in China, this paper discusses the mechanism of the selection of appraisers from the perspectives of government control and institutional environment. This paper mainly studies the following three questions: (1) what impact does the government-controlled evaluation market have on the selection of listed company appraisers? Are listed companies with state-owned property rights more inclined to choose evaluation institutions with political background? (2) with different levels of state-owned property rights, are there any differences between appraisers? (3) under the condition that other factors remain unchanged, How does the institutional environment affect the selection of appraisers in state-owned enterprises under the control of different levels of property rights? In terms of research methods, this paper firstly combs, summarizes and summarizes the previous research documents, and finds the significance of this study. Then it theoretically analyzes the mechanism of government control on the selection of appraisers. This paper uses probit model to investigate the influence of government control on the selection of appraisers through multiple regression, and analyzes the state of selection of appraisers in state-owned enterprises from the perspective of government control. It is found that the companies controlled by the central government are more likely to choose the evaluation agencies with the background of the central government, and the firms controlled by the local governments are more inclined to choose the evaluation agencies of the background of the local government. At the same time, the further research after the introduction of institutional environment shows that the better the institutional environment (the higher the marketization level, the lower the government intervention index and the higher the rule of law level), the more likely enterprises are to choose evaluation institutions without political background. That is, good regional institutional environment is negatively correlated with corporate selection with political background. Combining with the nature of state-owned property right, it is found that state-owned property right weakens the negative correlation of institutional environment. At the same time, it is found that the influence of institutional environment on the selection of appraisers in state-owned enterprises is influenced by the nature of the ultimate controller of state-owned equity. Companies controlled by local governments are more vulnerable to the institutional environment than firms controlled by central government.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：浙江財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F233
本文編號(hào)：2236178
[Abstract]:Asset evaluation plays an important role in state-owned assets management and M & A business. With the deepening of the reform of state-owned enterprises, the establishment of multi-level capital market, the reform of financial system and a series of important national reforms, asset evaluation has increasingly burst out a strong vitality. However, there are also some problems in asset evaluation in China: because of the unique background of asset appraisal industry, asset appraisal industry has a natural relationship with the government. This also led to the current evaluation market is a government-controlled market under the insufficient competition. It is worth noting that through further research we find that the selection of appraisers is influenced by two factors: government control and institutional environment. Under the background of the special system of evaluation industry in China, this paper discusses the mechanism of the selection of appraisers from the perspectives of government control and institutional environment. This paper mainly studies the following three questions: (1) what impact does the government-controlled evaluation market have on the selection of listed company appraisers? Are listed companies with state-owned property rights more inclined to choose evaluation institutions with political background? (2) with different levels of state-owned property rights, are there any differences between appraisers? (3) under the condition that other factors remain unchanged, How does the institutional environment affect the selection of appraisers in state-owned enterprises under the control of different levels of property rights? In terms of research methods, this paper firstly combs, summarizes and summarizes the previous research documents, and finds the significance of this study. Then it theoretically analyzes the mechanism of government control on the selection of appraisers. This paper uses probit model to investigate the influence of government control on the selection of appraisers through multiple regression, and analyzes the state of selection of appraisers in state-owned enterprises from the perspective of government control. It is found that the companies controlled by the central government are more likely to choose the evaluation agencies with the background of the central government, and the firms controlled by the local governments are more inclined to choose the evaluation agencies of the background of the local government. At the same time, the further research after the introduction of institutional environment shows that the better the institutional environment (the higher the marketization level, the lower the government intervention index and the higher the rule of law level), the more likely enterprises are to choose evaluation institutions without political background. That is, good regional institutional environment is negatively correlated with corporate selection with political background. Combining with the nature of state-owned property right, it is found that state-owned property right weakens the negative correlation of institutional environment. At the same time, it is found that the influence of institutional environment on the selection of appraisers in state-owned enterprises is influenced by the nature of the ultimate controller of state-owned equity. Companies controlled by local governments are more vulnerable to the institutional environment than firms controlled by central government.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：浙江財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F233
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本文編號(hào)：2236178
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