我國上市商業(yè)銀行公司治理、高管薪酬與績效研究
發(fā)布時間：2018-08-31 21:03
【摘要】：銀行業(yè)作為金融領(lǐng)域的核心，已經(jīng)成為現(xiàn)代經(jīng)濟(jì)最重要的組成部分。我國政府對銀行業(yè)的轉(zhuǎn)型改革始于上個世紀(jì)九十年代中期，其中眾多商業(yè)銀行的改革核心都是要健全和完善公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)以及高管薪酬體系。我國在加入世界貿(mào)易組織（WTO）后，很多境外投資者都參與到投資我國金融市場。為了提高我國金融市場在國際金融大環(huán)境下的競爭能力，我國商業(yè)銀行一直不斷的加速發(fā)展。從2004年開始，商業(yè)銀行的股權(quán)所有制的形式也在不斷的改變，我國政府采取了包括完善董事會治理結(jié)構(gòu)、健全公司治理機(jī)制、優(yōu)化高管薪酬體制等一系列深化改革措施。雖然目前我國存在眾多競爭性質(zhì)的商業(yè)銀行，例如國有商業(yè)銀行，股份制商業(yè)銀行以及地方性商業(yè)銀行，但是披露制度還尚未完善，所以我們主要研究A股上市的商業(yè)銀行，希望對我國的銀行業(yè)提高績效方面起到借鑒意義。本文對我國商業(yè)銀行公司治理與經(jīng)營績效以及高管薪酬與經(jīng)營績效之間的關(guān)系進(jìn)行研究，既可以宏觀地了解我國商業(yè)銀行公司治理與高管薪酬的現(xiàn)狀及存在的弊端，，還可以對所存在的不當(dāng)之處提出有針對性的建議與改進(jìn)措施。這在優(yōu)化我國商業(yè)銀行的公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)和健全高管薪酬體制以及提高我國商業(yè)銀行在國際的市場競爭力方面都具有極為重要的理論研究意義和現(xiàn)實(shí)實(shí)踐意義。 本文以國內(nèi)外商業(yè)銀行公司治理與高管薪酬的相關(guān)研究依據(jù)作為理論基礎(chǔ)，以國內(nèi)16家A股上市的商業(yè)銀行作為研究目標(biāo)，將其2007年—2012年的年度報(bào)告數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行搜集整理并校對，運(yùn)用描述性統(tǒng)計(jì)分析與線性回歸分析的方法，其中在高管薪酬方面用了二次回歸的方法，分別從公司治理與高管薪酬兩個方面對目前我國商業(yè)銀行的公司治理與績效及高管薪酬與績效之間的關(guān)系進(jìn)行實(shí)證研究。其中，本文用凈資產(chǎn)收益率（ROE）來衡量商業(yè)銀行的績效。實(shí)證結(jié)果顯示，獨(dú)立董事比例與凈資產(chǎn)收益率顯著正相關(guān)，董事會持股比例與凈資產(chǎn)收益率沒有顯著的相關(guān)性，第一大股東性質(zhì)與凈資產(chǎn)收益率顯著正相關(guān)，股權(quán)集中度與凈資產(chǎn)收益率顯著負(fù)相關(guān)，高管薪酬與凈資產(chǎn)收益率呈倒U型關(guān)系，高管持股比例與凈資產(chǎn)收益率負(fù)相關(guān)。最后提出建議以及研究展望。
[Abstract]:As the core of financial field, banking has become the most important part of modern economy. The transformation and reform of the banking industry in our country began in the middle of 1990s. The core of the reform of many commercial banks is to perfect the corporate governance structure and the executive compensation system. After China's entry into (WTO), many foreign investors participate in China's financial market. In order to improve the competitiveness of our financial market in the international financial environment, Chinese commercial banks have been accelerating the development. Since 2004, the form of stock ownership of commercial banks has been changing constantly. Our government has adopted a series of deepening reform measures, including perfecting the governance structure of the board of directors, perfecting the corporate governance mechanism, optimizing the executive compensation system, and so on. Although there are many competitive commercial banks in our country at present, such as state-owned commercial banks, joint-stock commercial banks and local commercial banks, the disclosure system is not yet perfect, so we mainly study commercial banks listed on A-shares. Hope to improve the performance of China's banking sector to play a reference. This paper studies the relationship between corporate governance and business performance of commercial banks in China, and the relationship between executive compensation and business performance. It can understand the current situation and drawbacks of corporate governance and executive compensation in commercial banks in China macroscopically. It is also possible to put forward targeted suggestions and improvement measures for the existence of malpractice. This is of great theoretical and practical significance in optimizing the corporate governance structure of Chinese commercial banks, perfecting the executive compensation system and improving the competitiveness of Chinese commercial banks in the international market. This paper takes the relevant research basis of corporate governance and executive compensation of domestic and foreign commercial banks as the theoretical basis, and takes 16 domestic A-share listed commercial banks as the research objectives. The annual report data from 2007 to 2012 were collected and proofread, and the methods of descriptive statistical analysis and linear regression analysis were used, in which the method of quadratic regression was used in executive compensation. This paper makes an empirical study on the relationship between corporate governance and performance and the relationship between executive compensation and performance of Chinese commercial banks from two aspects of corporate governance and executive compensation. Among them, this paper uses (ROE) to measure the performance of commercial banks. The empirical results show that the proportion of independent directors is significantly positively correlated with the return on net assets, the proportion of board holding has no significant correlation with the return on net assets, and the nature of the largest shareholder is significantly positively correlated with the rate of return on net assets. There is a negative correlation between equity concentration and net asset return, a negative correlation between executive compensation and net asset return, and a negative correlation between executive ownership and net asset return. Finally, suggestions and research prospects are put forward.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：吉林財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F832.33;F271;F272.92;F830.42
本文編號：2216156
[Abstract]:As the core of financial field, banking has become the most important part of modern economy. The transformation and reform of the banking industry in our country began in the middle of 1990s. The core of the reform of many commercial banks is to perfect the corporate governance structure and the executive compensation system. After China's entry into (WTO), many foreign investors participate in China's financial market. In order to improve the competitiveness of our financial market in the international financial environment, Chinese commercial banks have been accelerating the development. Since 2004, the form of stock ownership of commercial banks has been changing constantly. Our government has adopted a series of deepening reform measures, including perfecting the governance structure of the board of directors, perfecting the corporate governance mechanism, optimizing the executive compensation system, and so on. Although there are many competitive commercial banks in our country at present, such as state-owned commercial banks, joint-stock commercial banks and local commercial banks, the disclosure system is not yet perfect, so we mainly study commercial banks listed on A-shares. Hope to improve the performance of China's banking sector to play a reference. This paper studies the relationship between corporate governance and business performance of commercial banks in China, and the relationship between executive compensation and business performance. It can understand the current situation and drawbacks of corporate governance and executive compensation in commercial banks in China macroscopically. It is also possible to put forward targeted suggestions and improvement measures for the existence of malpractice. This is of great theoretical and practical significance in optimizing the corporate governance structure of Chinese commercial banks, perfecting the executive compensation system and improving the competitiveness of Chinese commercial banks in the international market. This paper takes the relevant research basis of corporate governance and executive compensation of domestic and foreign commercial banks as the theoretical basis, and takes 16 domestic A-share listed commercial banks as the research objectives. The annual report data from 2007 to 2012 were collected and proofread, and the methods of descriptive statistical analysis and linear regression analysis were used, in which the method of quadratic regression was used in executive compensation. This paper makes an empirical study on the relationship between corporate governance and performance and the relationship between executive compensation and performance of Chinese commercial banks from two aspects of corporate governance and executive compensation. Among them, this paper uses (ROE) to measure the performance of commercial banks. The empirical results show that the proportion of independent directors is significantly positively correlated with the return on net assets, the proportion of board holding has no significant correlation with the return on net assets, and the nature of the largest shareholder is significantly positively correlated with the rate of return on net assets. There is a negative correlation between equity concentration and net asset return, a negative correlation between executive compensation and net asset return, and a negative correlation between executive ownership and net asset return. Finally, suggestions and research prospects are put forward.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：吉林財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F832.33;F271;F272.92;F830.42
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