本文選題：會計(jì)職業(yè)判斷 + 會計(jì)職業(yè)判斷立場��； 參考：《中國海洋大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著全球各國之間的經(jīng)濟(jì)聯(lián)系的日益密切，全球經(jīng)濟(jì)一體化的趨勢不可避免，，會計(jì)造假事件也在“全球一體化”的道路上越走越遠(yuǎn)，從美國的安然事件到日本的奧林巴斯丑聞，再到如今中國的萬福生科造假事件，個個觸目驚心，引起了會計(jì)界對會計(jì)職業(yè)判斷的重新思考。從一系列的會計(jì)造假事件中，我們看到的確是會計(jì)職業(yè)判斷作為會計(jì)信息的處理和生成工具出了問題——會計(jì)職業(yè)判斷主體違背了當(dāng)初與企業(yè)簽訂契約時所做出的客觀公正反映企業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)交易或者事項(xiàng)的承諾，而操縱會計(jì)職業(yè)判斷這一行為的“舵手”就是會計(jì)職業(yè)判斷的立場，因此本文以會計(jì)職業(yè)判斷的立場作為研究起點(diǎn)。 對于會計(jì)職業(yè)判斷的立場，以往研究側(cè)重于以委托代理理論作為工具進(jìn)行理論分析，也有學(xué)者回歸到人性假設(shè)——經(jīng)濟(jì)人或道德人的假設(shè)來分析會計(jì)職業(yè)判斷的立場，本文區(qū)別于以往研究，運(yùn)用對立于傳統(tǒng)的“股東至上主義”的利益相關(guān)者理論，系統(tǒng)而全面的對利益相關(guān)者和會計(jì)職業(yè)判斷的相關(guān)概念、基于利益相關(guān)者的會計(jì)職業(yè)判斷立場的理論基礎(chǔ)、會計(jì)職業(yè)判斷立場的現(xiàn)狀及存在問題進(jìn)行了分析和闡述，將基于利益相關(guān)者的會計(jì)職業(yè)判斷立場及其影響因素和實(shí)現(xiàn)會計(jì)公正立場的保護(hù)機(jī)制作為文章的框架展開全文。 企業(yè)是不同利益相關(guān)者為追求自身利益最大化而相互之間簽訂契約的集合，契約簽訂各方本應(yīng)該是平等的地位，但是由于利益相關(guān)者付出資源的數(shù)量及稀缺性的差異產(chǎn)生的不同的契約角色，他們所各自認(rèn)同的會計(jì)職業(yè)判斷的立場也是各不相同，本文在綜述利益相關(guān)者利益要求的基礎(chǔ)上，從哲學(xué)上個體的角度闡述幾類不同的利益相關(guān)者所認(rèn)可的會計(jì)職業(yè)判斷立場，在此基礎(chǔ)上回歸到哲學(xué)整體的角度，分析并得出基于利益相關(guān)者的會計(jì)職業(yè)判斷立場是最終實(shí)現(xiàn)會計(jì)公正的立場，本文最后一部分為了建立對基于利益相關(guān)者的會計(jì)職業(yè)判斷的公正立場的保護(hù)機(jī)制，分別從對管理當(dāng)局這一特殊的判斷主體的監(jiān)管、對會計(jì)人員這一傳統(tǒng)的判斷主體的激勵和企業(yè)內(nèi)部監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)中利益相關(guān)者利益平衡機(jī)制方面提出三點(diǎn)建議。 本文除了用利益相關(guān)者理論作為分析會計(jì)職業(yè)判斷立場之外，認(rèn)為會計(jì)人員并不是會計(jì)職業(yè)判斷的唯一主體，應(yīng)該將管理層作為更高一級的會計(jì)職業(yè)判斷主體。然而由于筆者時間和能力有限，本文也存在一定的研究局限性，希望以后研究能更加全面考慮基于利益相關(guān)者的會計(jì)職業(yè)判斷立場的影響因素。
[Abstract]:With the increasingly close economic ties among various countries in the world, the trend of global economic integration is inevitable. Accounting fraud has also gone further and further along the road of "global integration," from the Enron incident in the United States to the Olympus scandal in Japan. Now, China's Wanfusheng Science falsification incident, all startling, caused the accounting profession to reconsider the judgment of the accounting profession. From a series of accounting fraud incidents, We can see that it is the accounting professional judgment that is the processing and generating tool of accounting information that goes wrong: the main body of accounting professional judgment violates the objective and fair reflection of the enterprise economic transaction that was made when signing the contract with the enterprise at the beginning. Or a commitment to something, The "helmsman" who manipulates the behavior of accounting professional judgment is the position of accounting professional judgment, so this paper takes the position of accounting professional judgment as the starting point. For the standpoint of accounting professional judgment, previous studies have focused on the theoretical analysis with the principal-agent theory as a tool, and some scholars have returned to the assumption of human nature-the assumption of economic person or moral person to analyze the standpoint of accounting professional judgment. Different from previous studies, this paper uses the stakeholder theory, which is opposite to the traditional "shareholder supremacy", to systematically and comprehensively define the relevant concepts of stakeholder and accounting professional judgment. Based on the theoretical basis of accounting professional judgment position of stakeholders, the present situation and existing problems of accounting professional judgment stand are analyzed and expounded. This paper takes the position of accounting professional judgment based on stakeholders and its influencing factors as well as the protection mechanism to realize the position of accounting justice as the frame of the article. Enterprises are a collection of contracts signed between different stakeholders in pursuit of maximizing their own interests, and all parties to the contract should have equal status. However, due to the different contractual roles caused by the difference in the amount of resources and the scarcity of the stakeholders, their respective positions of accounting professional judgment are also different. This paper summarizes the interests of the stakeholders on the basis of a summary of the requirements. From the point of view of individual in philosophy, this paper expounds several kinds of accounting professional judgment positions recognized by different stakeholders, and on this basis returns to the angle of philosophy as a whole. This paper analyzes and draws the conclusion that the position of accounting professional judgment based on stakeholders is the final position to realize accounting justice. The last part of this paper is to establish a mechanism to protect the fair position of accounting professional judgment based on stakeholders. Three suggestions are put forward respectively from the supervision of the special judgment subject of the management authority, the incentive of the accountant, the traditional judgment subject, and the interest balance mechanism of the stakeholders in the internal regulatory organization of the enterprise. In addition to using stakeholder theory as the standpoint of accounting professional judgment, this paper holds that the accountant is not the only subject of accounting professional judgment, and the management should be regarded as the higher level of accounting professional judgment. However, due to the limited time and ability of the author, there are some limitations in this paper. It is hoped that the future research will take into account the influence factors of the position of accounting professional judgment based on stakeholders.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：中國海洋大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F233

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