本文選題：會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所 + 財(cái)務(wù)盡職調(diào)查��； 參考：《財(cái)政部財(cái)政科學(xué)研究所》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著社會(huì)主義市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)的逐步建立和完善,我國(guó)企業(yè)并購(gòu)重組等投資行為越來(lái)越普遍,而投資運(yùn)作順利進(jìn)行的基礎(chǔ)是對(duì)商業(yè)市場(chǎng)、資本市場(chǎng)和企業(yè)經(jīng)營(yíng)的全方位周密考察,所有這些考察的內(nèi)容歸根結(jié)底都是屬于被投資公司的一種信息。如果投資雙方在對(duì)包括財(cái)務(wù)信息在內(nèi)的目標(biāo)公司有關(guān)情況存在理解上的偏差,無(wú)疑會(huì)面臨很高的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。財(cái)務(wù)盡職調(diào)查作為投資活動(dòng)中一項(xiàng)重要的工作,對(duì)減少投資雙方的信息不對(duì)稱(chēng)至關(guān)重要。從目前已有的案例來(lái)看,當(dāng)前我國(guó)投資運(yùn)作的成功率并不算高。這背后的原因有很多,但在投資運(yùn)作時(shí),缺乏有效的財(cái)務(wù)盡職調(diào)查卻是一個(gè)不容忽視的原因。 縱觀國(guó)內(nèi)外已有的財(cái)務(wù)盡職調(diào)查研究,多是從實(shí)務(wù)角度對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)盡職調(diào)查的流程方法改進(jìn)和存在合理性進(jìn)行探究。這是因?yàn)闀?huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所的財(cái)務(wù)盡職調(diào)查業(yè)務(wù)本身就是一項(xiàng)具有很強(qiáng)實(shí)踐性的工作,所以從理論上對(duì)其分析具有一定的難度。本文試圖將微觀信息經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的有關(guān)理論與財(cái)務(wù)盡職調(diào)查業(yè)務(wù)相聯(lián)系,運(yùn)用非合作博弈分析方法證明在財(cái)務(wù)盡職調(diào)查缺失的情形下投資雙方財(cái)務(wù)信息不對(duì)稱(chēng)出現(xiàn)的必然性。并論證財(cái)務(wù)盡職調(diào)查對(duì)緩解投資過(guò)程中的財(cái)務(wù)信息不對(duì)稱(chēng)影響所具有的重要意義,以期加快會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所財(cái)務(wù)盡職調(diào)查業(yè)務(wù)在我國(guó)的發(fā)展。 本文首先回顧了與財(cái)務(wù)盡職調(diào)查相關(guān)的基礎(chǔ)理論,然后從整體財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表和具體會(huì)計(jì)事項(xiàng)的維度對(duì)企業(yè)并購(gòu)重組等投資過(guò)程中信息不對(duì)稱(chēng)出現(xiàn)的必然性進(jìn)行考察。并運(yùn)用非合作博弈的有關(guān)分析方法,考察了投資雙方和被投資者之間兩個(gè)維度在財(cái)務(wù)盡職調(diào)查缺失的情形下的占優(yōu)策略,證明財(cái)務(wù)盡職調(diào)查所導(dǎo)致的信息不對(duì)稱(chēng)將產(chǎn)生檸檬問(wèn)題,引起市場(chǎng)失靈,從而造成經(jīng)濟(jì)福利的減少。 本文的研究證明了,會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所財(cái)務(wù)盡職調(diào)查業(yè)務(wù)可以緩解整體財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表和具體會(huì)計(jì)事項(xiàng)所造成的財(cái)務(wù)信息不對(duì)稱(chēng)問(wèn)題,并影響投資雙方在非合作博弈中的占優(yōu)策略,產(chǎn)生帕累托改進(jìn)。所以在企業(yè)進(jìn)行并購(gòu)重組等投資活動(dòng)時(shí),會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所的財(cái)務(wù)盡職調(diào)查可以幫助投資方減少與被投資方之間的信息不對(duì)稱(chēng)劣勢(shì)。財(cái)務(wù)盡職調(diào)查對(duì)幫助投資方做出恰當(dāng)合理的投資決策意義重大。
[Abstract]:With the gradual establishment and improvement of the socialist market economy, investment activities such as mergers and acquisitions and reorganization of enterprises in our country are becoming more and more common. The basis for the smooth operation of investment is a comprehensive and thorough examination of the commercial market, the capital market and the operation of enterprises. The content of all these investigations is ultimately a kind of information belonging to the invested company. If there is a deviation in understanding the situation of the target company, including financial information, there is no doubt that the investors will face a high risk. As an important part of investment activities, financial due diligence is very important to reduce the information asymmetry between investors. From the current existing cases, the current investment operation success rate is not high. There are many reasons behind this, but the lack of effective financial due diligence is an important reason for investment operations. Most of the researches on financial due diligence at home and abroad are focused on the improvement of financial due diligence process and the rationality of its existence from the practical point of view. This is because the financial due diligence of the accounting firm itself is a very practical work, so it is difficult to analyze it theoretically. This paper attempts to link the relevant theories of micro-information economics with the financial due diligence business, and uses the non-cooperative game analysis method to prove the inevitability of asymmetric financial information between investors and investors in the absence of financial due diligence. It also demonstrates the importance of financial due diligence in alleviating the asymmetric influence of financial information in the process of investment in order to accelerate the development of financial due diligence in China. This paper first reviews the basic theories related to financial due diligence, and then examines the inevitability of asymmetric information in the process of investment such as M & A from the perspective of the overall financial statements and specific accounting items. Using the analysis method of non-cooperative game, the dominant strategy of the two dimensions between the investor and the investor in the absence of financial due diligence is investigated. Proving that the information asymmetry caused by financial due diligence will lead to lemon problem, market failure, and thus reduce economic welfare. The research in this paper proves that the financial due diligence business of accounting firms can alleviate the asymmetry of financial information caused by the overall financial statements and specific accounting events, and affect the dominant strategy of both parties in non-cooperative game. Produce Pareto improvements. So the financial due diligence of accounting firms can help the investors to reduce the disadvantage of information asymmetry between them. Financial due diligence is of great significance to help investors make appropriate and reasonable investment decisions.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：財(cái)政部財(cái)政科學(xué)研究所
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F233

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