本文選題：國(guó)企高管薪酬 + 薪酬粘性��； 參考：《東北農(nóng)業(yè)大學(xué)》2015年碩士論文

【摘要】：中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)的快速發(fā)展伴隨著個(gè)人薪酬的不斷增長(zhǎng),薪酬水平的評(píng)定也逐漸與其工作績(jī)效相關(guān),趨于合理化公開(kāi)化,但國(guó)有企業(yè)高管薪酬的“居高不下”卻一直備受熱議。鑒于理論界研究,將這種薪酬隨著業(yè)績(jī)變化而變化的相關(guān)性稱之為業(yè)績(jī)敏感性。而后研究進(jìn)一步發(fā)現(xiàn)上述業(yè)績(jī)敏感性呈現(xiàn)一定的非對(duì)稱性,具體表現(xiàn)為國(guó)有企業(yè)高管業(yè)績(jī)上升時(shí)薪酬變化幅度與比例與業(yè)績(jī)下降時(shí)薪酬變化幅度與比例不一致,并總結(jié)這種現(xiàn)象為薪酬粘性特征。針對(duì)于高管薪酬粘性的衍生推理學(xué)術(shù)界已有較多研究,而對(duì)于薪酬粘性具備怎樣的特征規(guī)律,對(duì)高管起到怎樣的作用,對(duì)公司績(jī)效又產(chǎn)生何種影響等內(nèi)容卻少有涉及。本文希冀通過(guò)對(duì)國(guó)企高管薪酬業(yè)績(jī)敏感性、粘性特征及薪酬粘性影響的實(shí)證研究,總結(jié)規(guī)律并提出相關(guān)建議以指導(dǎo)于實(shí)踐。為了對(duì)薪酬粘性問(wèn)題有一個(gè)較為清晰的認(rèn)識(shí),通過(guò)引言闡述論題的重要性和必要性,并羅列相關(guān)薪酬粘性的國(guó)內(nèi)外前沿研究,再加上第二章節(jié)的相關(guān)概述構(gòu)建對(duì)薪酬粘性問(wèn)題的直觀理解與理性認(rèn)識(shí),為文章接下來(lái)的論證奠定基礎(chǔ)。在第三章節(jié)由表及里的先對(duì)國(guó)有制造業(yè)上市公司薪酬粘性的外化表現(xiàn)形式進(jìn)行描述,再深入挖掘薪酬粘性產(chǎn)生的原由。而后在對(duì)國(guó)內(nèi)外制造業(yè)上市公司高管薪酬粘性研究為鋪墊,利用面板數(shù)據(jù),確立回歸方程。本文在實(shí)證環(huán)節(jié)選用凈利潤(rùn)和Tobin's Q值作為業(yè)績(jī)變量,將高管薪酬定義為貨幣薪酬,從粘性系數(shù)、年度變化與薪酬差距三方面驗(yàn)證了粘性的規(guī)律特征,并研究了薪酬粘性反作用于未來(lái)業(yè)績(jī)的影響。研究發(fā)現(xiàn)業(yè)績(jī)變化對(duì)高管薪酬變化影響較為顯著,且呈現(xiàn)不穩(wěn)定的粘性特征,并得出以下結(jié)論:(1)高管薪酬與企業(yè)規(guī)模正相關(guān);高管薪酬與企業(yè)負(fù)債水平負(fù)相關(guān);高管薪酬與企業(yè)控股持股比例負(fù)相關(guān);董事長(zhǎng)與總經(jīng)理職位是否分離與高管薪酬關(guān)系不顯著。(2)當(dāng)選用內(nèi)部指標(biāo)凈利潤(rùn)作為業(yè)績(jī)指標(biāo)時(shí),薪酬粘性較大;而選用市場(chǎng)化指標(biāo)Tobin's Q值時(shí),粘性較小甚至不具備粘性特征。(3)薪酬粘性隨時(shí)間推演成不規(guī)律增大,未隨時(shí)間而消失。(4)相對(duì)于高管薪酬,同企業(yè)的普通職工薪酬業(yè)績(jī)敏感性較低,基本不具有薪酬粘性。這種高管與普通員工薪酬粘性存在的不統(tǒng)一可能是導(dǎo)致薪酬差距拉大的原因之一。(5)相對(duì)于未來(lái)的業(yè)績(jī)情況,薪酬粘性的存在對(duì)未來(lái)業(yè)績(jī)產(chǎn)生不利影響,同時(shí)削弱了業(yè)績(jī)敏感性。所以薪酬粘性的合理化勢(shì)在必行。文章通過(guò)提出提升薪酬業(yè)績(jī)敏感性、弱化粘性形成的薪酬差距、抑制薪酬粘性對(duì)未來(lái)業(yè)績(jī)的不利影響以及加強(qiáng)對(duì)高管薪酬及業(yè)績(jī)管理的監(jiān)督等建議使高管薪酬粘性問(wèn)題能夠揚(yáng)長(zhǎng)避短。
[Abstract]:The rapid development of Chinese economy is accompanied by the continuous increase of individual compensation, and the evaluation of salary level is gradually related to its work performance and tends to be rationalized and open. However, the "high level" of executive compensation in state-owned enterprises has always been the subject of heated discussion. In view of the theoretical research, the correlation of this kind of compensation with the change of performance is called performance sensitivity. Then it is found that the above performance sensitivity shows certain asymmetry, which is reflected in the inconsistency between the range and proportion of salary change when the performance of state-owned enterprise executives rises and the range and proportion of salary change when the performance drops. And summarizes this kind of phenomenon is the salary stickiness characteristic. There has been more research on the derivative reasoning of executive pay stickiness, but there is little research on the characteristics of salary stickiness, how to play a role on executives, and what impact on corporate performance. This paper hopes to sum up the rules and put forward some suggestions to guide the practice through the empirical research on the performance sensitivity, stickiness and the effect of salary viscosity on the executive compensation performance of SOEs. In order to have a clear understanding of the problem of salary stickiness, the importance and necessity of the topic are expounded through the introduction, and the relevant domestic and international frontier research on salary stickiness is listed. In addition, the second chapter of the related overview to build the intuitive understanding and rational understanding of the issue of pay viscosity, for the next article to lay the foundation for the argument. In the third chapter, we describe the externalized form of salary stickiness of state-owned manufacturing listed companies, and then dig into the original reasons of salary stickiness. Then, the paper establishes the regression equation by using panel data in the research of executive compensation stickiness of domestic and foreign manufacturing listed companies. This paper selects net profit and Tobin's Q as performance variables, defines executive compensation as monetary compensation, verifies the characteristics of stickiness in terms of viscosity coefficient, annual change and pay gap. The paper also studies the effect of salary viscosity reaction on future performance. The study found that the change of performance had a significant impact on the change of executive compensation and showed the characteristics of instability and viscosity, and reached the following conclusions: 1) the executive compensation is positively correlated with the scale of the enterprise, and the executive compensation is negatively correlated with the level of corporate debt; Executive compensation is negatively related to the proportion of holding shares in enterprises; whether the position of chairman and general manager is separated is not significantly related to executive compensation.) when the net profit of internal index is chosen as the performance indicator, the salary is more viscous; However, when the market-oriented index Tobin's Q value is selected, the viscosity is small or even does not have the viscosity characteristic. 3) the salary viscosity increases irregularly with time and does not disappear with time. 4) compared with the executive compensation, the performance sensitivity of the ordinary employees in the same enterprise is lower. Basically no pay stickiness. One of the reasons for the widening pay gap may be the inconsistency between the pay stickiness of executives and ordinary employees.) compared with the future performance, the existence of salary stickiness has a negative impact on future performance and weakens the performance sensitivity. So the rationalization of pay stickiness is imperative. By raising the sensitivity of salary performance and weakening the pay gap formed by stickiness, the paper puts forward that, Suggestions such as curbing the adverse impact of pay stickiness on future performance and strengthening supervision of executive compensation and performance management make the issue of executive pay stickiness take advantage of strengths and circumvent weaknesses.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：東北農(nóng)業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類號(hào)】：F406.7;F272.92

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