本文選題：國(guó)際會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則變遷 + 國(guó)家利益　； 參考：《重慶理工大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文

【摘要】：國(guó)際金融資本市場(chǎng)高速發(fā)展、日臻成熟，會(huì)計(jì)全球化進(jìn)程加速已經(jīng)成為不爭(zhēng)的事實(shí)。國(guó)際會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則理事會(huì)自2001年重組至今地位日益提升，而由其制定的國(guó)際財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告準(zhǔn)則正日益成為全球統(tǒng)一的財(cái)務(wù)會(huì)計(jì)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，為各國(guó)具體會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則制定的“風(fēng)向標(biāo)”。會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則屬于制度范疇，同其他制度一樣具有經(jīng)濟(jì)后果，既有的會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則是其制定者利益的化身，它的不同必然導(dǎo)致利益格局的差異。國(guó)際會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則作為會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則的子集之一，直接影響經(jīng)濟(jì)利益在世界各國(guó)間轉(zhuǎn)移。因此，可以說(shuō)誰(shuí)掌握了當(dāng)今國(guó)際會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則的制度權(quán)，誰(shuí)就能分得最多的利益，由此一場(chǎng)利益博弈就此拉開(kāi)。 縱觀國(guó)際會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則的發(fā)展，已儼然呈現(xiàn)出一條明晰的制度變遷路徑。各國(guó)都本著自身利益最大化的目的參與該場(chǎng)博弈，爭(zhēng)奪國(guó)際會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則的制定權(quán)、希冀國(guó)際會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則能夠更多地呈現(xiàn)出本國(guó)準(zhǔn)則的特點(diǎn)，于是國(guó)際會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則作為該場(chǎng)利益博弈中的納什均衡不斷地形成、變遷，演化前行。 本文采用規(guī)范研究的方法。以新制度經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的相關(guān)理論作為利益分析的立論支持，借鑒青木昌彥的比較制度分析范式對(duì)國(guó)際會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則變遷路徑中的典型化事實(shí)予以回望，歸納總結(jié)了不同時(shí)期國(guó)際會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則呈現(xiàn)出不同特點(diǎn)所對(duì)應(yīng)的時(shí)代背景和經(jīng)濟(jì)背景；在此基礎(chǔ)上，運(yùn)用經(jīng)典博弈論和演化博弈論，分別從靜態(tài)的時(shí)點(diǎn)角度和動(dòng)態(tài)的歷史期間角度解釋這一路徑的形成和變遷，通過(guò)具體的數(shù)學(xué)模型進(jìn)行詳細(xì)分析，將國(guó)際會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則變遷路徑的真正成因理性化、直觀化；最后，借鑒量子理論領(lǐng)域的相關(guān)知識(shí)，將經(jīng)典的國(guó)際會(huì)計(jì)信息轉(zhuǎn)化成量子信息，借鑒J.Eisert的量子博弈模型，對(duì)量子糾纏這一量子力學(xué)領(lǐng)域的核心概念重新定義為“國(guó)家自利系數(shù)”，，分類討論在不同的國(guó)家自利系數(shù)下的均衡情況以及對(duì)應(yīng)的各國(guó)利益情況，以期為進(jìn)一步的深入研究開(kāi)拓全新視野。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development and maturity of international financial capital market, the acceleration of accounting globalization has become an indisputable fact. Since the reorganization of IASB in 2001, the status of IASB has been rising day by day, and the International Financial reporting Standards (IFRS) formulated by the IASB are increasingly becoming the global uniform financial accounting standards, which are "wind vane" for the specific accounting standards of various countries. Accounting standards belong to the category of system and have economic consequences as other systems. The existing accounting standards are the embodiment of the interests of its framers, and their differences will inevitably lead to differences in the pattern of interests. As a subset of accounting standards, international accounting standards have a direct impact on the transfer of economic interests among countries in the world. Therefore, it can be said that who grasps the system right of international accounting standards, who can get the most benefits, thus a benefit game is opened. Looking at the development of international accounting standards, there has been a clear path of institutional change. In order to maximize their own interests, all countries participate in the game and compete for the right to formulate international accounting standards, hoping that the international accounting standards can more show the characteristics of their own standards. As a result, international accounting standards as the Nash equilibrium in the interest game are constantly formed, changed and evolved. This paper adopts the method of normative research. Taking the relevant theories of new institutional economics as the theoretical support of interest analysis, using Aoki's comparative institutional analysis paradigm as reference, the paper looks back at the typical facts in the changing path of international accounting standards. This paper summarizes the background and economic background corresponding to the different characteristics of international accounting standards in different periods, and on this basis, applies the classical game theory and evolutionary game theory. Explain the formation and change of this path from the angle of static point of time and dynamic historical period respectively, through the detailed analysis of the concrete mathematical model, the real cause of the change path of international accounting standards is rational and intuitionistic; finally, Referring to the relevant knowledge of quantum theory, the classical international accounting information is transformed into quantum information, and J.Eisert 's quantum game model is used to redefine the core concept of quantum entanglement as "national self-interest coefficient". This paper discusses the equilibrium situation under different national self-interest coefficients and the corresponding national interests in order to open up a new field of vision for further research.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：重慶理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：F233

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 任爽;;會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則國(guó)際趨同的演化博弈分析[J];北方經(jīng)濟(jì);2011年10期

2 毛圓圓;尉京紅;楊s

本文編號(hào)：1811752