本文選題：穩(wěn)健會(huì)計(jì)信息　切入點(diǎn)：公司治理　出處：《昆明理工大學(xué)》2013年博士論文

【摘要】：會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健主義作為會(huì)計(jì)信息系統(tǒng)確認(rèn)和計(jì)量的傳統(tǒng)原則已經(jīng)存在于各國(guó)會(huì)計(jì)實(shí)務(wù)中幾個(gè)世紀(jì)。一般認(rèn)為,會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健原則在會(huì)計(jì)實(shí)務(wù)中廣泛地運(yùn)用對(duì)于解決現(xiàn)代公司機(jī)制設(shè)置中“天然”存在的信息非對(duì)稱問題、保護(hù)投資者特別是債權(quán)人的利益以及提高契約的簽訂效率扮演了重要的角色。 鑒于會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健原則對(duì)會(huì)計(jì)理論和會(huì)計(jì)實(shí)務(wù)持續(xù)產(chǎn)生著深遠(yuǎn)和重要地影響,本文首先基于現(xiàn)代企業(yè)的委托代理理論分析框架及信息經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)中的信號(hào)傳遞思想,從公司治理的角度分析了公司治理的有效程度如何影響管理者關(guān)于穩(wěn)健會(huì)計(jì)政策地選擇。本文分析了資本市場(chǎng)中高質(zhì)量(預(yù)期經(jīng)營(yíng)前景好)的上市公司主動(dòng)地引入有成本的扭曲(會(huì)計(jì)信息穩(wěn)健度),以此作為媒介間接地向外部投資者發(fā)送管理者關(guān)于上市公司預(yù)期經(jīng)營(yíng)狀況的私人信息以區(qū)分于市場(chǎng)中質(zhì)量差(預(yù)期經(jīng)營(yíng)業(yè)績(jī)不好)的公司。國(guó)內(nèi)學(xué)者以我國(guó)資本市場(chǎng)為背景的相關(guān)研究基本一致地表明我國(guó)上市公司披露的財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告是具有一定會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性特征的。因此,本文基于中國(guó)資本市場(chǎng)實(shí)證地研究了中國(guó)上市公司所披露的財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告中會(huì)計(jì)信息整體的穩(wěn)健程度與預(yù)期的資產(chǎn)盈利水平的相關(guān)關(guān)系,會(huì)計(jì)信息穩(wěn)健程度的信息含量以及會(huì)計(jì)信息穩(wěn)健度與預(yù)期盈利水平相關(guān)性的影響因素等一系列問題,實(shí)證結(jié)果基本支持了本文關(guān)于公司治理的有效程度對(duì)管理者穩(wěn)健會(huì)計(jì)政策選擇影響的理論分析結(jié)果。 具體而言,首先,本文借鑒Spence (1974)的信號(hào)傳遞模型的思想,在Bagnoli和watts (2005)提出的穩(wěn)健會(huì)計(jì)信息信號(hào)傳遞的理論模型基礎(chǔ)上進(jìn)一步地拓展了關(guān)于穩(wěn)健會(huì)計(jì)信息信號(hào)傳遞的分析,即本文考慮了公司治理機(jī)制對(duì)管理者信息披露行為的約束作用從而影響到管理者通過報(bào)告穩(wěn)健地會(huì)計(jì)信息做為信號(hào)發(fā)送的行為。分析結(jié)果表明：若公司治理機(jī)制與會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性間具有互補(bǔ)的關(guān)系,則在公司治理相對(duì)不健全時(shí),那些預(yù)期經(jīng)營(yíng)業(yè)績(jī)好的公司為降低信息非對(duì)稱程度,管理者會(huì)相應(yīng)地報(bào)告穩(wěn)健的會(huì)計(jì)信息；但是,對(duì)于那些預(yù)期經(jīng)營(yíng)業(yè)績(jī)差的公司選擇模仿業(yè)績(jī)好的公司報(bào)告過于穩(wěn)健會(huì)計(jì)信息的成本巨大以至于不得不放棄模仿好公司,此時(shí),市場(chǎng)存在分離均衡,即會(huì)計(jì)信息穩(wěn)健度具有信息傳遞的作用。接著,本文實(shí)證地考察了會(huì)計(jì)信息穩(wěn)健程度是否在公開披露的盈余信息的基礎(chǔ)上向市場(chǎng)傳遞了增量的信息,研究結(jié)果顯示上市公司管理者穩(wěn)健地報(bào)告會(huì)計(jì)盈余并不會(huì)導(dǎo)致會(huì)計(jì)信息的扭曲,而是向外部投資者提供了更多關(guān)于公司當(dāng)期和預(yù)期盈余的增量信息。然后,本文以2004-2011年期間在上海證券交易所和深圳證券交易所A股上市的公司作為主要研究樣本。首先針對(duì)當(dāng)期會(huì)計(jì)盈余信息的穩(wěn)健程度與公司預(yù)期的資產(chǎn)收益率之間的相關(guān)關(guān)系進(jìn)行了實(shí)證研究,研究結(jié)果表明,樣本公司滯后一期的會(huì)計(jì)信息穩(wěn)健程度與當(dāng)期經(jīng)營(yíng)業(yè)績(jī)間具有統(tǒng)計(jì)意義上顯著的正相關(guān)關(guān)系。再接著,本文考察了公司治理與穩(wěn)健會(huì)計(jì)信息的相關(guān)關(guān)系,研究發(fā)現(xiàn)在我國(guó)資本市場(chǎng),管理者對(duì)于穩(wěn)健會(huì)計(jì)信息、的披露的一個(gè)重要的原因來自于公司治理的約束作用,即公司治理綜合水平越高的上市公司其披露的會(huì)計(jì)信息的穩(wěn)健程度越高。最后,論文結(jié)合我國(guó)資本市場(chǎng)的法律、制度背景,主要從上市公司的產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)、外部審計(jì)質(zhì)量、高管持股等三個(gè)方面實(shí)證地檢驗(yàn)了影響上市公司管理者通過會(huì)計(jì)信息穩(wěn)健程度發(fā)送信號(hào)的因素。 全文共由七章構(gòu)成： 第一章為緒論；包括研究背景與研究問題、研究?jī)?nèi)容、研究方法、技術(shù)路線以及論文的主要改進(jìn)和創(chuàng)新之處： 第二章為研究所涉及到的主要概念的界定、文獻(xiàn)評(píng)述與制度背景分析；主要針對(duì)穩(wěn)健會(huì)計(jì)原則的起源、定義和理論解釋進(jìn)行了文獻(xiàn)回顧。同時(shí),結(jié)合我國(guó)資本市場(chǎng)的法律、制度背景分析了中國(guó)上市公司管理者通過間接媒介進(jìn)行信號(hào)傳遞的動(dòng)機(jī)和可能性。這為我們進(jìn)一步地理解穩(wěn)健會(huì)計(jì)原則長(zhǎng)期存在于各國(guó)會(huì)計(jì)實(shí)務(wù)提供一種可能的理論解釋。 第三章為基于公司治理視角的穩(wěn)健會(huì)計(jì)信息信號(hào)傳遞的機(jī)理分析：本章基于經(jīng)典的信號(hào)傳遞模型,參照Venugopalan (2001)、Gigler和Hemmer (2001)、 Kwon等(2001)的分析方法,進(jìn)一步拓展了Bagnoli和Watts (2005)關(guān)于穩(wěn)健會(huì)計(jì)信息的信號(hào)傳遞作用的分析。本章從公司治理的效果好、壞的角度分情況討論了管理者的穩(wěn)健會(huì)計(jì)報(bào)告均衡策略。 第四章為會(huì)計(jì)信息穩(wěn)健度的信息含量研究；管理者最終披露的會(huì)計(jì)盈余是受其具體財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告策略選擇的影響的,管理者主觀地具體會(huì)計(jì)政策選擇有可能導(dǎo)致報(bào)告盈余信息地扭曲；也有可能向資本市場(chǎng)傳遞信息。本章基于中國(guó)上市公司的財(cái)務(wù)數(shù)據(jù)并使用Collins、Kothari等(1994)所提出的度量股票價(jià)格對(duì)預(yù)期盈余反映程度的預(yù)期盈余反應(yīng)系數(shù)實(shí)證地對(duì)穩(wěn)健會(huì)計(jì)信息的信息含量問題進(jìn)行了實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)。 第五章為上市公司會(huì)計(jì)信息穩(wěn)健度與預(yù)期盈利能力的相關(guān)性研究；以往對(duì)穩(wěn)健會(huì)計(jì)原則的研究主要關(guān)注了上市公司使用穩(wěn)健的會(huì)計(jì)信息能夠帶給報(bào)告主體哪些潛在“收益”,而一定程度地忽略了過于穩(wěn)健的財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告策略對(duì)于公司是有“成本”(如：證券市場(chǎng)價(jià)格下跌的風(fēng)險(xiǎn))的。本章認(rèn)為不同上市公司的管理者在綜合權(quán)衡穩(wěn)健地報(bào)告會(huì)計(jì)信息可能帶來的潛在“收益”與“成本”之后,理性選擇最優(yōu)的會(huì)計(jì)信息穩(wěn)健度作為財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告策略。本章的研究提供了會(huì)計(jì)信息穩(wěn)健度與預(yù)期盈利能力相關(guān)關(guān)系的實(shí)證證據(jù)。 第六章是公司治理機(jī)制對(duì)會(huì)計(jì)信息穩(wěn)健度的業(yè)績(jī)預(yù)測(cè)作用的影響的實(shí)證研究；本章主要基于公司微觀層面研究具體的公司治理機(jī)制的設(shè)置對(duì)企業(yè)管理者穩(wěn)健會(huì)計(jì)處理方法選擇的利益動(dòng)機(jī)的約束作用。首先,本章基于中國(guó)資本市場(chǎng)實(shí)證地檢驗(yàn)了穩(wěn)健會(huì)計(jì)信息與公司治理的相關(guān)關(guān)系,接著借鑒Spence (1974)的信號(hào)傳遞模型的思想,從公司治理的角度實(shí)證地檢驗(yàn)了產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)、外部審計(jì)質(zhì)量和高管持股比例等具體的公司治理機(jī)制對(duì)管理者利用穩(wěn)健會(huì)計(jì)信息信號(hào)傳遞行為的影響。 第七章為全文的結(jié)論部分。本章總結(jié)了主要的研究結(jié)論與啟示,針對(duì)研究的問題提出了相關(guān)的政策建議,最后對(duì)研究存在的不足和局限性進(jìn)行了討論。
[Abstract]:Accounting conservatism principle as the traditional accounting information system already exists in the recognition and measurement of accounting practice in many countries for centuries. Generally, the accounting conservatism principle in the accounting practice is widely used for solving the modern company mechanism set up in the "natural" existing problems of asymmetric information, the protection of investors especially the interests of creditors and improve the contract the signing of efficiency has played an important role.
In view of the accounting conservatism of accounting theory and practice continuously has a profound and important influence, based on the principal-agent theory of modern enterprise signal analysis framework and information economics in the transfer of ideas, from the perspective of corporate governance and analyzes how to influence the effectiveness of management on prudent accounting policy choice of corporate governance in this paper. Analysis of high quality in the capital market (expected good business prospects) listed companies actively introduce cost distortions (accounting information robustness), as the media management indirectly to send external investors private information about the expected operating conditions of Listed Companies in order to distinguish the poor quality of the market (the expected operating performance is not good) company. The domestic scholars on the Chinese capital market is consistent with the relevant research background that China's listed companies to disclose the financial report is out There are some characteristics of accounting conservatism. Therefore, the correlation between the empirical Chinese based on the capital market to study the soundness and expectations of accounting information disclosure of listed companies China financial report of the overall profitability of assets, a series of problems of accounting information robustness of information content and influence of accounting information robustness and the expected level of profit the correlation factors, the empirical results support the effectiveness of corporate governance analysis results on the impact of managers robust accounting policy choice theory.
Specifically, first of all, this paper uses Spence (1974) of the signal transmission model, in Bagnoli and watts (2005) model based robust accounting information signal transfer proposed on the further development of a robust accounting information signal, the paper considers the mechanism of corporate governance on the binding behavior of managers the disclosure of information which affects the managers by reporting accounting information as the steady signal transmission behavior. Analysis results show that if the complementary relationship between corporate governance and accounting conservatism, the corporate governance is not perfect, the company expected good performance in order to reduce the degree of information asymmetry, managers the report of conservative accounting information; however, for those companies expected operating performance are chosen to mimic the good performance of the company report too robust accounting information The huge cost that had to give up the imitation of good company, at this time, the market exists separate equilibrium that accounting information robustness has the effect of information transmission. Then, this paper demonstrated the soundness of accounting information based on whether public disclosure of earnings information to the market provides incremental information, research results show that managers of listed companies robust reporting accounting earnings will not lead to the distortion of accounting information, but the outside investors to provide more incremental information on current and expected earnings of the company. Then, based on the 2004-2011 years at the Shanghai stock exchange and Shenzhen stock exchange A share listed companies as the research sample. Firstly, the relationship between the current accounting earnings information the steady and firm expected asset returns for the empirical research, the results show that the Sample Firms The lag has a significant positive correlation between the issue of accounting information and the soundness of the current operating results. Then, this paper examines the relationship between corporate governance and soundness of accounting information, the study found in the capital market of our country, for the sound management of accounting information, the constraint effect is an important reason why disclosure from the corporate governance, the higher the degree that is robust with higher levels of corporate governance of Listed Companies in the disclosure of accounting information. Finally, the combination of China's capital market legal system, the background, mainly from the property rights of listed companies, the quality of external audit, managerial ownership and other three aspects of empirical tests managers of listed companies through the influence factor of the transmitted signal of accounting information robust degree.
The full text consists of seven chapters.
The first chapter is an introduction, including research background and research issues, research contents, research methods, technical routes, and the main improvements and innovations of the paper.
The second chapter is the definition of key concepts involved in the research, the literature review and analysis of the system background; the main origin in the robust accounting principles, definition and theoretical explanation of the literature review. At the same time, combined with China's capital market legal system, analyzes the background of Chinese listed company managers motivation and the possibility of signal transmission through the indirect media. It is further our understanding of accounting conservatism principle has long existed in the accounting practice in many countries to provide a possible explanation.
The third chapter is the analysis of the mechanism of sound signal of accounting information from the perspective of corporate governance based on the classic transfer: this chapter based on signal transmission model, according to Venugopalan (2001), Gigler and Hemmer (2001), Kwon (2001) analysis method, to further expand the Bagnoli and Watts (2005) analysis of accounting information about sound signal transfer function. This chapter from the corporate governance effect is good, bad point of view to discuss the steady equilibrium strategy of accounting report management.
The fourth chapter is the research on the information content of accounting information robustness; managers eventually disclosure of accounting earnings is affected by the specific financial reporting strategies affect the managers subjective specific accounting policy choice may lead to earnings information distortion; may also convey information to the capital market. The financial data of listed companies Chinese based on the use of Collins and Kothari, etc. (1994) the information content of accounting information on robust measure stock by the price to earnings reflect the empirical expected earnings response coefficient degree to conduct the empirical test.
The fifth chapter is the correlation of accounting information of listed companies and the soundness of the expected profitability of the previous research on accounting conservatism principle; the main concern of the listed companies to use conservative accounting information can bring the body of the report which potential "returns", to a certain extent, ignored too sound financial reporting strategy is "cost to the company (" for example: the stock market prices risk). In this chapter that managers of Listed Companies in the comprehensive accounting information report steady potential "profits" and "costs" after the rational choice of accounting information, the optimal robust strategy. As the financial report provides empirical evidence related to accounting information robustness with the expected profitability of this chapter.
The sixth chapter is the empirical research on the influence of corporate governance on the performance prediction of the soundness of accounting information; this chapter mainly studies the company specific micro level corporate governance mechanism based on the setting of enterprise managers prudent choice of accounting processes of interest motivation constraints. Firstly, this chapter based on the empirical China capital market test the correlation between robust accounting information and corporate governance, then from Spence (1974) of the signal transmission model, from the perspective of Corporate Governance: An Empirical Test of the nature of property rights, affect the company's external audit quality and high tube stake concrete governance mechanism robust accounting information to managers by signal transfer behavior.
The seventh chapter is the conclusion of this paper. This chapter summarizes the main findings and implications, and puts forward relevant policy recommendations for the research problems. Finally, the shortcomings and limitations of the research are discussed.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：昆明理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：F233

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