本文關(guān)鍵詞： 負(fù)債融資債務(wù)期限結(jié)構(gòu) 債務(wù)存量水平 過度投資行為國有控股控制權(quán)和現(xiàn)金流權(quán)分離　出處：《西南財經(jīng)大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：投資和融資是企業(yè)的兩項基本的財務(wù)活動,它們既相互獨立,又休戚相關(guān),是企業(yè)資金運動中不可分割的兩個方面。市場經(jīng)濟條件下,負(fù)債即是企業(yè)的一種重要的融資來源,同時也是一種重要的治理機制,其與企業(yè)投資之間的關(guān)系成為許多學(xué)者研究的熱點。不同于西方國家比較完善的市場經(jīng)濟體制下發(fā)達的信貸體制和債券市場,我國的市場經(jīng)濟發(fā)展還在初級階段,其債券市場還處在一個探索和發(fā)展的時期,加之我國銀行的發(fā)展歷程和發(fā)展模式也不同于西方國家,使得我國的信貸市場也區(qū)別與發(fā)達的信貸市場�？傮w來說,我國企業(yè)的債務(wù)融資渠道還不健全,銀企關(guān)系也比較復(fù)雜,將外國的研究理論和成果直接移植到我國缺乏說服力。 目前也有許多學(xué)者結(jié)合我國特殊的投融資環(huán)境來闡述負(fù)債是否能夠發(fā)揮其治理機制,起到抑制過度投資的作用。但遺憾的是,目前實證結(jié)果存在諸多矛盾之處,相關(guān)結(jié)論仍然有待檢驗。本文擬在在梳理國內(nèi)外相關(guān)文獻的基礎(chǔ)上,借鑒他們的理論模型和研究方法,以我國制造業(yè)上市公司的數(shù)據(jù)為樣本來實證檢驗負(fù)債融資對企業(yè)過度投資行為的治理作用。 本文的主要研究內(nèi)容如下： 第一部分為導(dǎo)論。這部分主要介紹研究背景和研究意義,引出本文研究的主要問題。目前我國的債務(wù)融資環(huán)境如債券市場、銀行貸款制度等雖然有所發(fā)展,但是還不夠完善,預(yù)算軟約束等問題導(dǎo)致我國上市公司特別是國有上市公司可能存在過度投資的問題。研究我國目前負(fù)債治理的現(xiàn)狀對于改善企業(yè)資源合理配置,提高企業(yè)價值有著深刻的意義。本文主要研究負(fù)債治理的三個關(guān)鍵問題：一是對比過度投資樣本和投資不足樣本,驗證不同期限的債務(wù)對過度投資的影響；二是研究過度投資的企業(yè)樣本,驗證負(fù)債融資是否有效抑制了企業(yè)的過度投資行為；三是研究不同的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)是否會影響負(fù)債的治理作用,驗證在國有控股和股權(quán)集中背景下大股東控制權(quán)和現(xiàn)金流權(quán)的分離是否會阻礙負(fù)債的治理作用得到發(fā)揮。 第二部分為文獻綜述。在這一部分本文分別整理總結(jié)了國內(nèi)和國外的學(xué)者在負(fù)債融資與企業(yè)投資行為領(lǐng)域的研究成果。在國外研究中,本文分別就負(fù)債的代理成本問題、負(fù)債的相機治理作用、負(fù)債期限與企業(yè)投資行為的關(guān)系進行了研究綜述；在國內(nèi)研究中,學(xué)者的研究主要集中在研究我國目前的債務(wù)融資環(huán)境下過度投資現(xiàn)象是否存在,以及負(fù)債融資是否能夠發(fā)揮對過度投資的治理作用,本文對相關(guān)文獻做了歸納和總結(jié)后遺憾的發(fā)現(xiàn),對于這個問題實證研究沒有定論。在文獻綜述的最后一部分,本文對國內(nèi)外文獻做了進一步的評述,歸納了目前國內(nèi)外學(xué)者對負(fù)債融資與企業(yè)投資行為關(guān)系的研究成果。 第三部分為本文的理論分析。這一部分本文對涉及到的主要理論基礎(chǔ)進行了闡述,并在此基礎(chǔ)上分析了負(fù)債融資作用于企業(yè)投資行為的機理。按照代理理論,企業(yè)內(nèi)部股東——經(jīng)理之間的沖突容易引起過度投資行為,而公司與外部負(fù)債之間的沖突則會導(dǎo)致投資不足和資產(chǎn)替代的產(chǎn)生。在股東和經(jīng)理代理問題嚴(yán)重的公司中,負(fù)債可以通過增加利息、信貸配給以及簽訂嚴(yán)格的債務(wù)契約等措施加強治理,使得由此產(chǎn)生的投資不足傾向可以抵消債務(wù)人過度投資的動機,抑制過度投資。另外,投資不足的企業(yè)還會傾向選擇短期債務(wù)進行融資,由此緩解企業(yè)與外部負(fù)債之間的沖突產(chǎn)生的投資不足問題。在發(fā)達國家中,由于債券評級制度健全,銀行放貸較為謹(jǐn)慎,法律法規(guī)比較健全等原因,一般學(xué)者研究負(fù)債的代理成本引起投資不足的假設(shè)；而對于發(fā)展中國家的新興市場,由于債券和銀行市場不發(fā)達,預(yù)算軟約束存在,一般學(xué)者研究負(fù)債的治理效應(yīng)抑制過度投資假設(shè)。我國屬于發(fā)展中國家新興市場,加之銀行和國有企業(yè)的產(chǎn)權(quán)同源性可能使得過度投資問題更加嚴(yán)重,所以負(fù)債對過度投資行為是否起到抑制作用成為研究焦點。 第四部分為本文的實證檢驗部分。首先,提出本文的四個假設(shè)。假設(shè)1：在我國普遍存在長期負(fù)債引發(fā)的過度投資問題。假設(shè)2：在我國,負(fù)債融資對過度投資的約束作用較弱。假設(shè)3：在國有控股企業(yè)中,長期負(fù)債引起的過度投資問題更嚴(yán)重,同時負(fù)債融資對過度投資的約束作用更弱。假設(shè)4：控股股東控制權(quán)和現(xiàn)金流權(quán)分離的公司,長期負(fù)債引起的過度投資問題更嚴(yán)重,同時負(fù)債融資對過度投資的約束作用較弱。其次,以2007——2012年制造業(yè)上市公司的數(shù)據(jù)為樣本,用債務(wù)期限結(jié)構(gòu)模型和債務(wù)存量水平模型對提出的假設(shè)進行了實證檢驗。最后,對檢驗結(jié)果進行的分析和歸納。 第五部分通過分析實證結(jié)果給出了本文的研究結(jié)論以及政策建議,提出了相關(guān)領(lǐng)域研究的進一步展望。結(jié)論如下：在我國,企業(yè)普遍存在著長期負(fù)債引起的過度投資行為,同時債務(wù)的存量水平與過度投資規(guī)模之間的負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系不顯著,說明負(fù)債融資對過度投資行為的治理作用較弱,負(fù)債的預(yù)算軟約束現(xiàn)象在某種程度上仍然存在；在區(qū)分企業(yè)控制權(quán)性質(zhì)后,發(fā)現(xiàn)國有控股企業(yè)中負(fù)債融資對過度投資行為的約束作用更弱；在股權(quán)集中背景下,考察控股股東控制權(quán)和現(xiàn)金流權(quán)的分離對負(fù)債治理作用的影響,發(fā)現(xiàn)在控制權(quán)和現(xiàn)金流權(quán)分離的公司,負(fù)債融資對過度投資的約束作用更弱。根據(jù)此結(jié)論,本文提出提高我國負(fù)債融資對過度投資行為約束作用的建議。第一,應(yīng)減少國家對負(fù)債治理作用的干預(yù),減少國有股份在企業(yè)中的比例,特別減少國家控股公司的數(shù)量。第二,應(yīng)規(guī)范上市公司控股股東的行為,防止大股東利用金字塔結(jié)構(gòu)進行過度投資,損害中小股東利益,阻礙公司的健康發(fā)展。 本文的創(chuàng)新之處在于：第一,從國內(nèi)的研究現(xiàn)狀來看,人們普遍認(rèn)為負(fù)債融資會影響到企業(yè)的投資行為,研究比較多的是負(fù)債融資水平與企業(yè)投資規(guī)模的負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系,這并不同于本文所研究的負(fù)債融資對過度投資行為的治理作用。本文利用最優(yōu)投資預(yù)測模型擬合出企業(yè)的過度投資水平,在此基礎(chǔ)上研究債務(wù)存量水平對過度投資規(guī)模的約束作用,驗證負(fù)債融資的治理作用在我國是否有效。第二,目前很少有研究從債務(wù)期限結(jié)構(gòu)角度探討負(fù)債融資與企業(yè)過度投資的關(guān)系。根據(jù)Myers(1977)的理論,長期負(fù)債更容易引起企業(yè)過度投資行為,而短期負(fù)債則可以緩解負(fù)債融資導(dǎo)致的代理成本。因此在負(fù)債對過度投資的治理作用弱時,企業(yè)應(yīng)該可以更多地利用長期負(fù)債進行融資。本文利用債務(wù)期限結(jié)構(gòu)模型對這一假設(shè)進行了檢驗,證明長期負(fù)債的增加加劇了過度投資的規(guī)模。第三,在目前上市公司股權(quán)集中的背景下,通過理論推導(dǎo)證明了股權(quán)集中背景下大股東——中小股東沖突和股權(quán)分散背景下股東——經(jīng)理沖突的一致性。并利用控股股東控制權(quán)和現(xiàn)金流權(quán)是否分離來度量大股東——中小股東沖突的程度,證明了股權(quán)集中背景下控股股東控制權(quán)和現(xiàn)金流權(quán)的分離會導(dǎo)致負(fù)債融資對過度投資行為的約束作用更弱。 本文的不足之處在于：第一,企業(yè)的投資行為表現(xiàn)是多方面的,如投資過度、投資不足、資產(chǎn)替代等。介于我國債權(quán)市場的不發(fā)達,國有股權(quán)的存在導(dǎo)致的預(yù)算軟約束問題嚴(yán)重,企業(yè)普遍存在過度投資的行為,因此本文僅研究了負(fù)債融資對投資過度的治理作用,并沒有分析負(fù)債融資的產(chǎn)生代理成本對企業(yè)投資不足和資產(chǎn)替代行為的影響。第二,企業(yè)投資規(guī)模的度量也是多方面的,不僅如本文研究的,表現(xiàn)為投資支出的絕對量,還會體現(xiàn)在投資波動性等方面,這些都是本文沒有涉及到的。第三,研究樣本問題。本文研究樣本的局限性體現(xiàn)在以下幾個方面：選擇2007——2012年制造業(yè)公司的數(shù)據(jù)作為樣本,雖然在一定程度上避免了研究宏觀政策(如房地產(chǎn)企業(yè)很容易受到宏觀經(jīng)濟調(diào)控而產(chǎn)生投資規(guī)模的變化,新興行業(yè)也比較容易受到市場不穩(wěn)定性的影響)變動的影響,但是也造成了對其他行業(yè)的忽略；本文所用的大股東控制權(quán)和現(xiàn)金流權(quán)分離度直接取自CSMAR數(shù)據(jù)庫,此變量的缺失也導(dǎo)致了一部分研究樣本的損失,使得回歸結(jié)果可能會受到影響；上市公司一般為大型企業(yè),相比中小型企業(yè)來說,比較容易得到信貸資源的支持,由于其他大量非上市的中小型民營企業(yè)并沒有納入本文樣本,使得研究成果存在偏差。
[Abstract]:Investment and financing are two basic financial activities of enterprises, they are both independent and bound together in a common cause is two aspects, indivisible enterprise capital movement. Under the condition of market economy, debt is an important source of financing for enterprises, but also an important governance mechanism, the relationship between it and business investment has become the focus of many scholars. Different from western countries relatively perfect market economy developed credit system and the bond market, still in the primary stage of development of market economy in our country, the bond market is still in a period of exploration and development, coupled with the development process and development mode of China's banks is also different in western countries, making China's credit market is different with developed credit markets. Overall, our corporate debt financing channel is not perfect, the relationship between banks and enterprises is relatively complex, foreign The research theories and achievements are directly transplanted to our country's lack of persuasion.
At present, there are many scholars, combined with China's special financing environment to explain whether the debt can play its governance mechanism to curb excessive investment. But unfortunately, there exist many contradictions in the empirical results, the conclusion remains to be tested. This paper based on the literature at home and abroad, reference the theoretical model and their research methods, empirical test sample to governance effect of debt financing on corporate over investment behavior in listed companies of China's manufacturing industry data.
The main contents of this paper are as follows:
The first part is the introduction. This part mainly introduces the research background and significance of the research, this study leads to major problems. China's current debt financing environment such as bond market, bank loan institution, although some development, but is still not perfect, the soft budget constraint problem in the listed companies especially the state-owned listed companies there may be excessive the issue of investment research. China's current status of debt governance to improve the rational allocation of corporate resources, it has profound significance to improve enterprise value. This paper mainly studies three key problems of Debt Governance: a comparison of excessive investment and insufficient investment in sample sample, verify the different period of the debt of over investment; two is the sample study on over investment of enterprises, verify whether debt financing can effectively restrain the excessive investment behavior of enterprises; the three is whether the ownership structure of different It will affect the governance function of liabilities, and verify whether the separation of control rights and cash flow rights of large shareholders under the state holding and ownership concentration background will hinder the governance role of liabilities.
The second part is literature review. In this part, this paper summarizes the research achievements in the field of domestic and foreign scholars to invest in debt financing and corporate behavior. In the research abroad, this paper respectively on the agency cost of debt, debt governance role, the relationship between debt maturity and corporate investment behavior are reviewed; in the domestic research, scholars mainly focus on the excessive in the study of China's current debt financing environment investment phenomenon exists, and whether debt financing can play a role in corporate governance of over investment, this paper found and summarized after the regret of the relevant literature, the empirical research in an inconclusive. The last part of the literature review, the literature at home and abroad were further reviewed, summarized the current domestic and foreign scholars on debt financing and investment bank Research results for the relationship.
The third part is the analysis of the theory of this paper. This part of the paper elaborates the main theoretical basis involved, and based on the analysis of the mechanism of the role of debt financing on corporate investment behavior. According to the agency theory, the internal conflict between shareholders, managers easily lead to excessive investment behavior, and the conflict between the company and the external debt it will lead to insufficient investment and asset substitution. The shareholders and the manager agency problems in the company, debt can be increased through interest rate, credit rationing and signed a strict debt contract and other measures to strengthen governance, so that the resulting underinvestment tendency can be offset by the debtor of excessive investment, to curb excessive investment. In addition, investment the lack of enterprises will tend to choose short-term debt financing, thus alleviate the conflict between the enterprise and the external liabilities of investment is not Foot problem. In developed countries, the bond rating system, bank loans are more cautious, sound laws and regulations and other reasons, the agency cost of general scholars liabilities caused by lack of investment assumptions; and for emerging markets in developing countries, because the bonds and bank market is not developed, there are soft budget constraints, the governance effect of general scholars the debt to curb excessive investment assumptions. China is a developing country and emerging market, coupled with the bank and the state-owned enterprise's property right homology may make the over investment problem is more serious, so the debt of over investment behavior is to restrain become the focus of research.
The fourth part is the empirical part of this paper. First, then put forward four hypotheses. Hypothesis 1: overinvestment problem in our country exists generally long-term liabilities caused. Hypothesis 2: in our country, weak restriction effect of debt financing on excessive investment. Hypothesis 3: in state-owned enterprises, long-term over investment caused by the debt is more serious, at the same time restriction effect of debt financing on excessive investment is weaker. Hypothesis 4: controlling shareholders' control rights and cash flow rights separation company, over investment of long-term liabilities caused by more serious, at the same time, the debt financing on excessive investment constraint is weak. Secondly, from 2007 to 2012 listed companies in the manufacturing industry as the sample data, an empirical test on the hypothesis of the debt maturity structure of debt stock model and level model. Finally, analysis and summary of the test results.
The fifth part presents the conclusion and policy recommendations of this study empirical analysis results, put forward the prospect of further research in the related field. The conclusions are as follows: in our country, enterprises generally exist over investment behavior of long-term liabilities caused by the negative correlation between the debt stock level and over investment scale is not significant, so the debt financing the governance effect is weaker over investment behavior, the phenomenon of soft budget constraint debt still exists in some extent; in distinguishing the nature of the right of corporate control, found in state-owned enterprises debt financing constraint on over investment behavior is weaker; in the ownership context, the influence of the separation of controlling shareholders' control rights and cash flow rights on the governance role of debt, flow right in the separation of control rights and cash, debt financing constraint on over investment is weak. The root According to the conclusion, this paper puts forward to improve China's debt financing on the over investment behavior constraint suggestions. First, should reduce the state intervention in the governance role of debt, reduce the proportion of state-owned shares in the enterprise, especially to reduce the number of state-controlled companies. Second, the controlling shareholder of listed companies should standardize the behavior, prevent the use of large shareholders the structure of Pyramid excessive investment, damage the interests of minority shareholders, and hinder the healthy development of the company.
The innovation of this paper lies in: first, from the domestic research, people generally believe that debt financing will affect the investment behavior of enterprises, study is a negative correlation between the level of debt financing and corporate investment, this is different to the research on debt financing governance over investment behavior. In this paper, using the optimal investment model fitted over the level of investment enterprises, on the basis of the research on the debt stock level constraint on excessive investment scale, the governance role of debt financing in our country to verify whether it is effective. Second, there have been few studies from the perspective of relationship between the debt maturity structure of debt financing and corporate over investment. According to the Myers (1977) the theory of long-term liabilities is more likely to cause excessive investment behavior of enterprises, while the short-term debt can reduce the agency costs of debt financing lead. Because In the governance role of debt of over investment is weak, the enterprise should make more use of long-term debt financing. This hypothesis is tested by using the model of debt maturity structure, that long-term debt exacerbated by increased excessive investment scale. In third, the shares of listed companies concentrated in the background, through theoretical derivation proof of ownership concentration consistency of large shareholders and small shareholders conflict under the background of shareholder, manager of dispersed ownership conflict under the background. And the controlling shareholders' control rights and cash flow rights are separated to measure large shareholders, small shareholders of the extent of the conflict, proof of ownership concentration under the background of controlling shareholders separation of control rights and cash flow rights the causes of debt financing constraint on over investment behavior is weaker.
The inadequacies of this article are: first, the investment behavior of enterprises is expressed in many aspects, such as excessive investment, insufficient investment, asset substitution. Between China's market is not developed, the soft budget constraint of state-owned shares due to the existence of serious, enterprises generally have over investment behavior, so the paper only studies the governance role of debt financing on excessive investment, and has no influence analysis of the agency costs of debt financing on corporate investment and asset substitution behavior. Second, measure the investment scale of the enterprise is in many aspects, such as not only the absolute amount, for the performance of the investment expenditure, but also reflected in the fluctuation of investment etc. These are not involved in this paper. Third, the research sample. The limitations of this study sample is reflected in the following aspects: 2007 - Industry Company in 2012 manufacturing data As a sample, although to a certain extent to avoid the study of macro policy (change, such as real estate enterprises are vulnerable to macroeconomic regulation and the scale of investment in emerging industries are more likely to be influenced by market instability) changes, but also caused the neglect of other industries; the control of large shareholders right and the separation of cash flow rights directly from the CSMAR database, the absence of this variable has lead to a partial loss of samples, the regression results may be affected; listed companies generally compared to large enterprises, small and medium enterprises, easier access to credit resources to support, because many other unlisted small and medium private enterprises are not included in the sample, the research results of the deviation.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南財經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F832.51;F271;F406.7

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