本文關鍵詞：上市公司董事會特征對會計穩(wěn)健性的影響研究　出處：《西南大學》2013年碩士論文　論文類型：學位論文

  更多相關文章： 董事會特征 會計穩(wěn)健性 股權性質(zhì) Basu模型

【摘要】：董事會是公司內(nèi)部治理機制的核心部分,是一個重要的決策和監(jiān)督機構。董事會作為聯(lián)結股東和經(jīng)理層的紐帶,對股東負責,對會計信息的提供主體—經(jīng)理層的經(jīng)營行為負有監(jiān)督和控制責任。一直以來,會計穩(wěn)健性是會計確認與計量的傳統(tǒng)和原則,是會計信息質(zhì)量要求的一個重要特征。倘若董事會能夠充分有效地發(fā)揮其監(jiān)督控制職能,就能減少經(jīng)理層違背股東目標而進行的會計盈余操縱行為,增加經(jīng)理層提供不穩(wěn)健會計信息的成本,改善公司治理效果,從而提高會計穩(wěn)健性。因此,董事會與會計穩(wěn)健性有著密不可分的關系。我國上市公司董事會特征對會計穩(wěn)健性的影響值得深入研究,并且這種影響是否會因為上市公司股權性質(zhì)的不同而產(chǎn)生差異,這是本文希望解決的問題。 在規(guī)范分析方面,本文在文獻回顧的基礎上,對董事會特征和會計穩(wěn)健性分別進行了理論分析,并且綜合運用委托代理理論、信息不對稱理論、契約理論闡述了董事會與會計穩(wěn)健性之間的關系。在實證分析方面,本文以2007—2011年我國A股共6793家上市公司為樣本,選取了董事會規(guī)模、董事長與總經(jīng)理兩職設置狀態(tài)、獨立董事比例、審計委員會設置情況、董事會持股比例、董事會會議次數(shù)這六個董事會特征作為解釋變量,運用SPSS17.0軟件,首先對董事會特征變量進行描述性統(tǒng)計和相關性分析,然后借鑒Basu基本模型構建本文的回歸模型,實證檢驗了董事會特征對會計穩(wěn)健性的影響,并且將上市公司按照股權性質(zhì)分為國有控股公司和非國有控股公司,分別比較了這種影響的差異性。 本文得出研究結論：(1)整體上我國上市公司董事會規(guī)模、董事長與總經(jīng)理兩職分離、審計委員會的設立、董事會持股比例、董事會會議次數(shù)對會計穩(wěn)健性具有正向顯著影響,而獨立董事比例對會計穩(wěn)健性沒有顯著影響。(2)在不同股權性質(zhì)下,董事會特征對會計穩(wěn)健性的影響存在一定的差異性：①國有控股公司董事會規(guī)模對會計穩(wěn)健性具有正向顯著影響,而非國有控股公司董事會規(guī)模對會計穩(wěn)健性沒有顯著影響；②無論是在國有控股公司還是在非國有控股公司,獨立董事比例都對會計穩(wěn)健性沒有顯著影響；③與國有控股公司相比,非國有控股公司董事長與總經(jīng)理兩職分離、審計委員會的設立、董事會持股比例對會計穩(wěn)健性的影響更為顯著；④國有控股公司董事會會議次數(shù)對會計穩(wěn)健性的影響程度大于非國有控股公司董事會會議次數(shù)對會計穩(wěn)健性的影響程度。 針對實證研究結果,本文提出了一些改善董事會治理效果、提高會計穩(wěn)健性的政策建議以供參考：①根據(jù)上市公司實際情況選擇合適的董事會規(guī)模；②改進和完善上市公司獨立董事制度；③大力推進審計委員會的設立和完善；④適當提高董事會持股比例；⑤合理安排董事會會議次數(shù)并改善會議質(zhì)量。
[Abstract]:The board of directors is the core part of the corporate governance mechanism and an important decision-making and supervision body. As a link between shareholders and managers, the board of directors is responsible to shareholders. Accounting conservatism is the tradition and principle of accounting recognition and measurement. It is an important characteristic of accounting information quality requirement. If the board of directors can give full play to its function of supervision and control, it can reduce the behavior of accounting earnings manipulation by managers against shareholders' objectives. Increase the cost of managers to provide unsound accounting information, improve the effectiveness of corporate governance, thereby improving accounting conservatism. The board of directors is closely related to accounting conservatism. The influence of the characteristics of the board of directors of listed companies on accounting conservatism is worthy of further study. And whether this kind of influence will have the difference because of the listed company's equity nature, this is the question which this article hopes to solve. In the normative analysis, based on the literature review, this paper makes theoretical analysis on the characteristics of the board of directors and accounting conservatism, and synthetically applies the principal-agent theory and the information asymmetry theory. Contract theory illustrates the relationship between the board of directors and accounting conservatism. In the empirical analysis, this paper selects the size of the board of directors as a sample of 6793 A-share listed companies in China from 2007-2011. The two positions of chairman and general manager, the proportion of independent directors, the setting of audit committee, the proportion of board holding shares, the number of board meetings are the six characteristics of the board of directors as explanatory variables. By using SPSS17.0 software, the paper firstly carries on descriptive statistics and correlation analysis to the characteristic variables of the board of directors, and then uses the basic model of Basu to construct the regression model of this paper. This paper empirically tests the influence of board characteristics on accounting conservatism and divides listed companies into state-owned holding companies and non-state-owned holding companies according to the nature of equity. The conclusion of this paper is: (1) on the whole, the size of the board of directors of listed companies in China, the separation of the two positions of chairman and general manager, the establishment of audit committee, and the proportion of board holding shares. The number of board meetings has a significant positive impact on accounting conservatism, while the proportion of independent directors has no significant impact on accounting conservatism. There are some differences between the characteristics of the board of directors and the accounting conservatism. The size of the board of directors of the state-owned holding company has a positive and significant effect on the accounting conservatism. However, the size of the board of directors of non-state-owned holding companies has no significant effect on accounting conservatism. (2) whether in state-owned holding companies or non-state-owned holding companies, the proportion of independent directors has no significant influence on accounting conservatism; 3Compared with the state-owned holding company, the non-state-owned holding company chairman and general manager are separated, the establishment of audit committee and the proportion of board of directors have more significant influence on accounting conservatism; 4the influence of the number of board meetings of state-owned holding company on accounting conservatism is greater than that of non-state-owned holding company board meeting on accounting conservatism. According to the empirical research results, this paper puts forward some policy suggestions to improve the governance effect of the board of directors and improve the accounting conservatism for reference: 1 to select the appropriate board size according to the actual situation of the listed company; (2) improving and perfecting the system of independent directors of listed companies; (3) vigorously promoting the establishment and perfection of the audit committee; (4) to increase the proportion of the board of directors; Arrange the number of board meetings and improve the quality of meetings.
【學位授予單位】：西南大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F233;F271;F276.6

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