【摘要】： 產(chǎn)業(yè)集群作為一種新興的組織形式,它的出現(xiàn)和發(fā)展掀起了生產(chǎn)組織革命的高潮。關(guān)于產(chǎn)業(yè)集群的理論和實踐研究成為近年來經(jīng)濟學(xué)、管理學(xué)、社會學(xué)領(lǐng)域研究的熱點問題。然而,不能忽視的問題是,產(chǎn)業(yè)集群雖然是一種相對穩(wěn)定的組織形式,但集群也并非沒有風(fēng)險,產(chǎn)業(yè)集群的市場失靈、創(chuàng)新系統(tǒng)失靈以及各種外部沖擊需要集群成員采取積極的、協(xié)調(diào)成員利益沖突的集體行動。而作為具有多重聯(lián)結(jié)的網(wǎng)絡(luò)組織,其協(xié)同效應(yīng)的產(chǎn)生,一個不可回避的問題就是集群治理。此外,發(fā)達國家產(chǎn)業(yè)集群的演進過程中,企業(yè)和政府包括中介組織在內(nèi),在比較完善的市場經(jīng)濟條件下,已經(jīng)形成了一定程度的動態(tài)均衡,多元化治理相對而言比較成熟。而在發(fā)展中國家產(chǎn)業(yè)集群的演進中,集群治理結(jié)構(gòu)尚不合理、治理機制尚不健全。這些都需要展開對集群治理的系統(tǒng)研究,探討實現(xiàn)集群良好治理的途徑,以實現(xiàn)對集群風(fēng)險的規(guī)避和化解,促進產(chǎn)業(yè)集群保持競爭優(yōu)勢和可持續(xù)發(fā)展。 產(chǎn)業(yè)集群治理是通過一系列正式或非正式的、內(nèi)部或外部的機制和制度,旨在協(xié)調(diào)集群行為主體之間關(guān)系,建立和維護集群競爭優(yōu)勢并采取集體行動的持續(xù)的過程。基于集群剩余的關(guān)系、互動與協(xié)同創(chuàng)新構(gòu)成集群治理的邏輯,特別是,互動形成以后又受到整體互動模式和規(guī)則的支配和約束,也即集群成員之間的互動行為往往發(fā)生在一定的規(guī)則框架之內(nèi),這個規(guī)則框架既包括正式規(guī)則也包括非正式規(guī)則,也即我們通常所說的治理機制。集群成員之間的互動能否產(chǎn)生協(xié)同創(chuàng)新效應(yīng),能否帶來集群剩余的增加,能否保持持久的競爭力,關(guān)鍵在于,其治理機制能否保證各方同步互動高效協(xié)作。因此,治理機制是產(chǎn)業(yè)集群治理的依據(jù),從而將集群治理落腳到治理邏輯之上,也決定了治理機制是集群治理的核心內(nèi)容。 產(chǎn)業(yè)集群治理結(jié)構(gòu)是基于權(quán)力及權(quán)力配置的集群治理主體之間的關(guān)系,它是集群治理主體在參與、互動、協(xié)調(diào)過程中相互博弈的結(jié)果。集群網(wǎng)絡(luò)權(quán)力的產(chǎn)生基礎(chǔ)是集群網(wǎng)絡(luò)的存在,其配置狀況既決定集群剩余的規(guī)模也決定集群剩余的分配。集群網(wǎng)絡(luò)權(quán)力體現(xiàn)出相互分離又相互聯(lián)系交叉式的權(quán)力結(jié)構(gòu),具有相對分散性、上下互動性、相互依賴性、中心性、結(jié)構(gòu)性以及動態(tài)性的特點。集群網(wǎng)絡(luò)權(quán)力關(guān)系和治理模式的演進往往與治理主體資源、能力的演進及其所處環(huán)境和規(guī)則的變化聯(lián)結(jié)在一起。基于網(wǎng)絡(luò)權(quán)力基礎(chǔ)的集群剩余分配機制有可能由于缺乏公平性而導(dǎo)致集群效率的損失。如果集群治理不能實現(xiàn)集群剩余分配的公平和效率的有機結(jié)合,就可能導(dǎo)致集群的解體。因此,必須重視集群剩余的合理分配。 產(chǎn)業(yè)集群治理行動是旨在建立和維護集群可持續(xù)競爭優(yōu)勢的集群治理主體共同參與的集體行動。所有的有利于增加集群剩余,提升集群整體競爭力的集體行動都可以看作是集群治理行動。影響產(chǎn)業(yè)集群集體行動的因素包括領(lǐng)導(dǎo)型企業(yè)、社會資本、集群代理機構(gòu)和公共服務(wù)機構(gòu)、地方政府行為、團體討論和個體聲音等。集體行動的實現(xiàn)條件是非常復(fù)雜的,本文基于異質(zhì)性偏好的假設(shè),建立了一個涵蓋聲譽機制要素的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)-追隨者模型,指出,聲譽機制的存在提高了集體行動的可能性,不論是對組織集體行動還是參與集體行動,良好的聲譽機制都會對集體行動的形成起到促進作用。 產(chǎn)業(yè)集群治理績效是指集群治理行為主體投入各自資源而實現(xiàn)的集群總體產(chǎn)出。產(chǎn)業(yè)集群治理績效涵蓋了經(jīng)濟因素和制度因素兩個方面。影響集群治理績效的因素主要包括：投入要素、機制要素、結(jié)構(gòu)要素、環(huán)境要素等,不同的因素有不同的影響力,每個因素的變化都會對集群治理績效產(chǎn)生直接的影響。在產(chǎn)業(yè)集群生命周期的不同階段,由于競爭力和治理力的差異,導(dǎo)致集群治理績效呈現(xiàn)不同的水平。 產(chǎn)業(yè)集群治理不是萬能的,也存在失靈問題,包括治理機制的不確定、治理結(jié)構(gòu)的不均衡、集體行動的困境、共同治理的低效率等,產(chǎn)業(yè)集群治理實踐中,也存在諸多問題限制了集群治理績效的提高。為了促進產(chǎn)業(yè)集群競爭力的提高,集群企業(yè)治理層面要提高互動合作意識、增加社會資本存量、增強社會責(zé)任意識、提高自主創(chuàng)新能力；行業(yè)協(xié)會治理層面要依照章程開展活動、建立健全監(jiān)督機制、完善行業(yè)協(xié)會職能、完善內(nèi)部激勵機制；地方政府治理層面要轉(zhuǎn)變政府職能,建設(shè)服務(wù)型政府、扶持集群代理機構(gòu)和公共服務(wù)機構(gòu)發(fā)展、健全產(chǎn)業(yè)集群治理機制、建立跨行政區(qū)域協(xié)調(diào)機制、建立集群治理績效考評制度、制定“基于事實”的集群政策等。
[Abstract]:As a new form of organization, industrial cluster has raised the climax of the revolution of the production organization. The research on the theory and practice of industrial cluster has become a hot issue in the field of economics, management and sociology in recent years. However, the problem that cannot be ignored is that, while the industrial cluster is a relatively stable organization form, the cluster is not free of risks, the market failure of the industrial cluster, the failure of the innovation system and the various external shocks require the cluster members to take positive action, Collective action to coordinate the conflicts of interest among members. As a network organization with multiple connections, the generation of the synergistic effect, an unavoidable problem is cluster governance. In addition, in the course of the evolution of the industrial cluster of developed countries, the enterprises and the government, including the intermediary organization, have formed a certain degree of dynamic equilibrium under the condition of the more perfect market economy, and the diversified governance is relatively mature. In the evolution of industrial clusters in developing countries, the structure of cluster governance is not reasonable yet, and the governance mechanism is not sound. It is necessary to study the system of cluster governance, to explore the ways to realize the good governance of the cluster, so as to avoid and resolve the risk of the cluster, and to promote the competitive advantage and the sustainable development of the industrial cluster. Industrial cluster governance is a series of formal or informal, internal or external mechanisms and systems, which are designed to coordinate the relationship between the cluster behavior subjects, establish and maintain the competitive advantage of the cluster and take collective action The process of the cluster governance based on the relationship, interaction and collaborative innovation of the cluster, especially after the interaction is formed, is subject to the overall interaction mode and the rule, that is, the interaction behavior among the members of the cluster often occurs in a certain rule frame. Within the framework, this rule framework includes both formal rules and informal rules, that is, what we usually call The key point is whether the interaction between the members of the cluster can produce a collaborative innovation effect, can bring the surplus of the cluster, and can maintain the lasting competitiveness. The key point is whether the governance mechanism of the cluster can ensure that the synchronous interaction of the parties is high Therefore, the governance mechanism is the basis of the industrial cluster governance, so that the cluster governance is put on the management logic, and the governance mechanism is the core of the cluster governance. The industrial cluster governance structure is based on the relationship between the power and the power-based cluster governance body, which is the subject of the cluster governance in the process of participation, interaction and coordination. The result of mutual game is that the generation of the power of the cluster network is the existence of the cluster network, and the configuration condition of the cluster is not only the size of the remaining cluster of the cluster, but also the decision of the cluster network. The cluster network power embodies the power structure of mutual separation and cross-connection, and has the relative dispersibility, the up-and-down interaction, the mutual dependence, the central nature and the structure. The evolution of the power relationship and the governance model of the cluster is often related to the management subject resources, the evolution of the ability and the environment and rules. The cluster residual distribution mechanism based on the network power is likely to be caused by the lack of fairness The loss of cluster efficiency. If the cluster governance does not achieve an organic combination of fairness and efficiency of the remaining distribution of the cluster, it may This leads to the disintegration of the cluster. Therefore, the cluster must be paid attention to The remaining reasonable distribution. Industrial cluster governance is the cluster governance to build and maintain the sustainable competitive advantage of the cluster The collective action of the main body. All collective action to increase the remaining of the cluster and improve the overall competitiveness of the cluster The factors that affect the collective action of the industrial cluster include the leading enterprise, the social capital, the cluster agency, the public service institution, the local government behavior, The realization condition of collective action is very complicated. This paper, based on the hypothesis of heterogeneous preference, establishes a leader-follower model covering the elements of the reputation mechanism, and points out that the existence of the reputation mechanism The possibility of collective action, whether collective action or collective action, will be a good reputation for the collective The performance of industrial cluster governance refers to the management behavior of the cluster. The overall output of the cluster realized by the entry of the respective resources. The performance of industrial cluster governance The factors that affect the performance of the cluster governance include: input factors, mechanism elements, structural elements, environmental factors, etc., different factors have different influence, and the change of each factor It will have a direct impact on the performance of the cluster governance. In the different stages of the life cycle of the industrial cluster, due to the difference of the competitiveness and the governance force, The management of the industrial cluster is not universal and the problem of failure, including the uncertainty of the governance mechanism, the imbalance of the governance structure, the dilemma of collective action, the low efficiency of the common governance, etc., and the practice of industrial cluster governance, There are many problems that limit the improvement of the performance of the cluster governance. In order to improve the competitiveness of the industrial cluster, the management level of the cluster enterprises should improve the awareness of the interaction cooperation, increase the social capital stock, enhance the sense of social responsibility and improve the independent innovation ability, and the trade association governance layer The face is to carry out activities in accordance with the Articles of Association, establish and improve the supervision mechanism, improve the function of the trade association, and improve the internal incentive mechanism; the local government should change the government function, build the service-oriented government, support the development of the cluster agency and the public service institution, and improve the production The mechanism of cluster governance, the establishment of a cross-administrative region coordination mechanism, the establishment of a cluster governance performance evaluation system, and the development of the "trunk>" on the basis of t
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華中科技大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2010
【分類號】：F062.9

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