本文選題：附件B國(guó)家 + 碳排放權(quán)貿(mào)易�。� 參考：《會(huì)計(jì)與經(jīng)濟(jì)研究》2012年05期

【摘要】：文章利用邊際減排成本分析附件B國(guó)家開展碳排放權(quán)貿(mào)易的理論基礎(chǔ);完全競(jìng)爭(zhēng)條件下碳排放權(quán)貿(mào)易預(yù)測(cè)結(jié)果說明,開展碳排放權(quán)貿(mào)易后的減排總成本比不開展貿(mào)易的減排總成本減少了658億美元;不完全競(jìng)爭(zhēng)條件下的附件B國(guó)家間碳排放權(quán)貿(mào)易預(yù)測(cè)結(jié)果說明,進(jìn)口約束情況下,進(jìn)口方之間的利益將出現(xiàn)重新分配,部分收益將從減排成本相對(duì)較高的進(jìn)口方轉(zhuǎn)移到相對(duì)較低的進(jìn)口方,供給壟斷情況下,進(jìn)口方將增加實(shí)現(xiàn)減排目標(biāo)的支出,而出口方則增加收益,整個(gè)市場(chǎng)成本增加。
[Abstract]:This paper uses marginal emission reduction costs to analyze the theoretical basis of carbon emissions trading in Annex B countries. The total cost of reducing emissions after trading in carbon emissions is $65.8 billion less than the total cost of reducing emissions without trade; projections of carbon emissions trade among Annex B countries under incomplete competition indicate that, in the case of import constraints, The benefits among the importers will be redistributed, some of the benefits will be shifted from the relatively high cost of emission reduction to the relatively low ones, and in the case of supply monopolies, the importers will increase their spending to achieve the emission reduction targets. Exports, on the other hand, increased earnings and increased overall market costs.
【作者單位】： 華東師范大學(xué)金融與統(tǒng)計(jì)學(xué)院;上海立信會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)院金融學(xué)院;
【基金】：國(guó)家社會(huì)科學(xué)基金項(xiàng)目(11BGJ036) 教育部人文社會(huì)科學(xué)研究青年基金項(xiàng)目(11YJC790289) 上海市教育委員會(huì)科研創(chuàng)新項(xiàng)目(12YS147) 上海市教育委員會(huì)重點(diǎn)學(xué)科建設(shè)項(xiàng)目(J51703)
【分類號(hào)】：X196;F752.6
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本文編號(hào)：2073934