決策問責與糾錯機制的新制度經濟學分析
發(fā)布時間:2018-03-30 10:24
本文選題:糾錯機制 切入點:問責主體 出處:《人民論壇》2013年33期
【摘要】:正對我國決策問責與糾錯機制現(xiàn)狀進行分析可以發(fā)現(xiàn),當前我國決策問責與糾錯制度雖已建立,但并不能有效約束政府權力。新制度經濟學國家理論表明,只有權力才能控制權力,所以應引入多元問責主體,既充分發(fā)揮黨的紀律檢查機構的監(jiān)督作用,又強化人民代表大會的監(jiān)督權,同時鼓勵和拓展社會問責。另外,還需要加大對問責對象的懲罰力度,提高政府決策效率。
[Abstract]:Through the analysis of the present situation of decision-making accountability and error correction mechanism in China, we can find that although the system of decision-making accountability and error correction has been established, it can not restrain government power effectively. Only power can control power, so we should introduce multiple subjects of accountability, not only give full play to the supervisory role of the party's disciplinary inspection organs, but also strengthen the supervisory power of the people's congresses, and at the same time encourage and expand social accountability. We also need to increase the punishment of accountability objects and improve the efficiency of government decision-making.
【作者單位】: 中央財經大學中國發(fā)展和改革研究院;中央財經大學;桂林師范高等?茖W校;
【分類號】:D630;F014
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