本文選題：技術(shù)授權(quán)　切入點：技術(shù)創(chuàng)　出處：《暨南大學(xué)》2008年博士論文

【摘要】： 理論上,對技術(shù)授權(quán)的研究多是集中在對技術(shù)授權(quán)契約的研究上,其中,對因不對稱信息所引起的道德風(fēng)險和逆向選擇條件下的授權(quán)契約研究,則成為研究焦點。而這些研究一是忽視了研究信息不對稱下被授權(quán)方的逆向選擇行為對社會福利的影響;二是忽視了研究當(dāng)本國廠商具備創(chuàng)新能力或者合作創(chuàng)新能力時,國外技術(shù)授權(quán)契約的形成及其對國內(nèi)社會福利的影響,更沒有具體結(jié)合國內(nèi)廠商的創(chuàng)新效率、成本、效益來具體研究國內(nèi)創(chuàng)新活動對技術(shù)授權(quán)、社會福利的影響。 本文以現(xiàn)有研究為基礎(chǔ),在區(qū)分不同的市場結(jié)構(gòu)和專利權(quán)人是否參與市場競爭的前提下,探討了技術(shù)被授權(quán)方的私人信息、國內(nèi)廠商的創(chuàng)新能力以及本國政府對創(chuàng)新的鼓勵政策等因素對技術(shù)授權(quán)契約形成的影響,再分析該契約對社會福利的影響。 當(dāng)專利權(quán)人不參與國內(nèi)壟斷市場競爭時,技術(shù)被授權(quán)方存在的私人信息將導(dǎo)致混合費用授權(quán)方式的出現(xiàn)。雖私人信息可使國內(nèi)廠商獲取額外的信息租金,但社會福利將會遭受更多損失。當(dāng)國內(nèi)廠商具備創(chuàng)新能力時,可利用其迫使專利權(quán)人降低技術(shù)授權(quán)價格;另外,不對稱創(chuàng)新效率信息可降低技術(shù)授權(quán)費用,還可以提升國內(nèi)社會福利水平。政府對國內(nèi)廠商的研發(fā)補貼可激勵國內(nèi)廠商創(chuàng)新的積極性,增加國內(nèi)社會福利水平。 當(dāng)專利權(quán)人參與國內(nèi)壟斷市場競爭時,信息對稱情況下的授權(quán)方式是提成費用方式;當(dāng)國內(nèi)廠商存在私人信息時,混同均衡策略或擇優(yōu)授權(quán)策略將出現(xiàn)。當(dāng)國內(nèi)廠商具備創(chuàng)新能力時,專利權(quán)人最優(yōu)授權(quán)策略仍采取提成費用的授權(quán)策略,但將降低提成費用。政府對國外廠商進行征稅可增加國內(nèi)廠商的市場份額和利潤,但對授權(quán)方式?jīng)]影響;對研發(fā)補貼則可增強國內(nèi)廠商的研發(fā)動機,降低技術(shù)授權(quán)的價格;另外,這兩種政策措施都可以增進社會福利。 當(dāng)專利權(quán)人不參與國內(nèi)寡頭市場競爭時,在信息對稱的條件下,較小的市場規(guī)模將使專利權(quán)人采用固定費用方式只對低成本廠商進行授權(quán);而較大的市場規(guī)模將使其采用提成費用方式對兩個國內(nèi)廠商同時授權(quán)。在信息不對稱的條件下,授權(quán)方式與信息對稱時相似,但優(yōu)勢成本廠商的低成本類型可獲得額外的信息租金。當(dāng)一個國內(nèi)廠商具備研發(fā)能力時,專利權(quán)人對另一廠商的授權(quán)可增加國內(nèi)消費者剩余,但自主研發(fā)廠商的利潤減少了。當(dāng)兩國內(nèi)廠商都具有創(chuàng)新能力時,其最優(yōu)的合作創(chuàng)新方式取決于彼此間技術(shù)外溢程度。合作創(chuàng)新不僅可以提升廠商利潤和社會福利,而且當(dāng)其考慮技術(shù)授權(quán)時可以進一步降低技術(shù)授權(quán)中的價格。 當(dāng)專利權(quán)人參與國內(nèi)寡頭市場競爭時,對于兩個無研發(fā)能力的國內(nèi)廠商,專利權(quán)人將采用提成費用方式對其同時授權(quán),此時國內(nèi)社會福利水平?jīng)]有發(fā)生任何改變。若有一國內(nèi)廠商具有研發(fā)能力,固定費用的授權(quán)方式將被用來對另一廠商授權(quán),使得國內(nèi)的消費者剩余增加了,選擇創(chuàng)新廠商的利潤減少了。若兩國內(nèi)廠商都具備創(chuàng)新能力,存在最優(yōu)的合作創(chuàng)新方式,彼此間的技術(shù)外溢程度和創(chuàng)新效率將決定其利潤和社會福利,同時還可以提高國內(nèi)廠商在技術(shù)授權(quán)中的談判砝碼。 最后,以國內(nèi)高新技術(shù)產(chǎn)業(yè)1995-2005年的數(shù)據(jù)對技術(shù)授權(quán)、技術(shù)創(chuàng)新與企業(yè)效益之間的關(guān)系作了一個經(jīng)驗分析。發(fā)現(xiàn)國內(nèi)企業(yè)的RD投入與技術(shù)引進之間存在著一個相互依賴、相互促進的關(guān)系。國內(nèi)企業(yè)的RD投入對企業(yè)效益的影響具有直接的、明顯的推動作用;技術(shù)引進對當(dāng)期的企業(yè)效益影響具有輕微的抑制作用,但技術(shù)引進對企業(yè)效益的影響是通過間接的、滯后的方式顯示出來,通過形成固定資產(chǎn)和刺激RD投入而提高企業(yè)效益。
[Abstract]:On the other hand , the research on technical authorization is focused on the research of technical authorization contract , which is the focus of research on the research of authorization contract under the conditions of moral hazard and adverse selection caused by asymmetric information .


On the basis of the existing research , this paper discusses the influence of the private information of the authorized party , the innovation ability of the domestic manufacturers and the encouragement policy of the government to the innovation , and analyzes the effect of the contract on the social welfare under the premise of distinguishing whether different market structures and patent owners are involved in the market competition .


When the patent owner does not participate in the domestic monopoly market competition , the private information of the authorized party of the technology will lead to the appearance of the mixed fee authorization mode . Although the private information can make the domestic manufacturers obtain extra information rent , the social welfare will suffer more losses . When the domestic manufacturers have the creative ability , they can be used to force the patent holder to lower the technical authorization price . In addition , the asymmetric innovation efficiency information can reduce the technical authorization fees and improve the domestic social welfare level . The government ' s R & D subsidies for domestic manufacturers can stimulate the initiative of domestic manufacturers to innovate , and increase the domestic social welfare level .


When the patent owner participates in the competition of the domestic monopoly market , the authorization mode under the information symmetry condition is the expense mode ; when the domestic manufacturer has the creative ability , the mixed equilibrium strategy or the preferential authorization strategy will appear . When the domestic manufacturer has the innovation ability , the patent owner ' s optimal authorization policy still adopts the authorization strategy of raising the cost , but it will reduce the cost of authorization . The government can increase the domestic manufacturers ' market share and profit , but it has no effect on the authorization mode ; and the R & D subsidy can enhance the R & D motivation of the domestic manufacturers and reduce the price of technical authorization ; besides , both policy measures can improve social welfare .


When the patent owner does not participate in the domestic oligopolistic market competition , under the condition of information symmetry , the smaller market size will enable the patent owner to use fixed cost method only to authorize the low - cost manufacturers . When the information is asymmetric , the authorization mode is similar to the information symmetry , but the profit of the independent R & D manufacturers is reduced . When a domestic manufacturer has the capability of developing innovation , the optimal cooperative innovation mode depends on the degree of technology overflow with each other . The cooperation innovation can not only improve the profit and social welfare of the manufacturer , but also can further reduce the price in the technical authorization when considering the technical authorization .


When the patent owner participates in the domestic oligopolistic market competition , in the case of two domestic manufacturers that have no R & D capability , the patent owner will authorize the two countries without R & D capability at the same time . At this time , there is no change in the domestic social welfare level . If a domestic manufacturer has the R & D capability , the authorization mode of the fixed fee will be used to authorize another manufacturer , so that the surplus of the domestic consumer is reduced . If both domestic manufacturers have the innovation ability , there is an optimal cooperative innovation mode , the technology spillover degree and the innovation efficiency of each other will determine its profit and social welfare , and meanwhile , the negotiation weight of the domestic manufacturers in the technical authorization can be improved .


At last , the relationship between technology authorization , technological innovation and enterprise benefit is analyzed with the data of domestic high - tech industry in 1995 - 2005 .

【學(xué)位授予單位】：暨南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2008
【分類號】：F224;F062.4

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