區(qū)域海洋漁業(yè)合作博弈研究
發(fā)布時間：2019-01-11 08:02
【摘要】：近年來隨著世界經(jīng)濟與科學技術(shù)的發(fā)展，世界漁業(yè)迅速發(fā)展，各國捕撈能力不斷增強。而海洋漁業(yè)資源屬于公共資源，各國對其利用忽視其再生能力，導致捕撈量大于漁業(yè)資源再生能力，造成漁業(yè)資源的衰退。此外，經(jīng)濟全球化一體化和區(qū)域化進程加快，，國家間越來越相互依賴、相互依存和相互認同。然而各國間海洋漁業(yè)糾紛亦不斷增加。在此背景下，實行海洋漁業(yè)合作是管理養(yǎng)護海洋漁業(yè)資源、加強經(jīng)濟一體化、解決漁業(yè)糾紛的重要措施。 從簡要概述我國和世界海洋漁業(yè)資源概況以及我國與他國的海洋漁業(yè)合作及糾紛入手，強調(diào)海洋漁業(yè)資源的稀缺性及其可持續(xù)發(fā)展，系統(tǒng)分析在一次性博弈和永久性博弈中各參與國采取不同策略時所能獲得的利益，判斷短期和長期不同情況下各國最優(yōu)策略，論證海洋漁業(yè)合作必要性。 假定各國間達成合作協(xié)議所需成本為零，且競爭成本僅在兩國確定漁獲量之和大于區(qū)域內(nèi)海洋漁業(yè)資源總量時才出現(xiàn)時。博弈分析結(jié)果顯示一次性博弈，初始時各國由于技術(shù)水平等限制，根據(jù)自身情況確定最優(yōu)漁獲量之和小于漁業(yè)可持續(xù)發(fā)展所能允許的最大捕撈量，此時兩國合作與否對利益不產(chǎn)生影響；隨技術(shù)發(fā)展，各國確定的最佳漁獲量將不斷增加，而區(qū)域內(nèi)漁業(yè)資源總量無法增加，兩國最佳漁獲量終將大于漁業(yè)可持續(xù)發(fā)展所能允許的最大捕撈量，此時在各種不同情況下兩國最終確定的策略組合所代表的漁獲量之和都會大于漁業(yè)可持續(xù)發(fā)展所能允許的最大捕撈量，導致漁業(yè)資源退化；永久性博弈，因短期過度捕撈導致漁業(yè)資源退化，使未來所獲收益下降，即在長期各國采取不合作策略總收益較小，則合作為各國占優(yōu)策略，即使得各國漁獲量之和維持在區(qū)域海洋漁業(yè)可持續(xù)發(fā)展所允許最大捕撈量之內(nèi)，以獲得更大的長期收益。 對于海洋漁業(yè)合作模式，本文根據(jù)實際區(qū)域海洋漁業(yè)合作過程中各國受限制程度、對漁業(yè)資源保護力度等特征，將其分為松散型、半松散型、跨國自由漁業(yè)區(qū)、過渡型、股份公司和聯(lián)合國管理六類。其中政治互信度和海洋漁業(yè)實力對比是影響海洋漁業(yè)合作模式選擇的重要因素。針對海洋漁業(yè)實力，從漁業(yè)支持、漁業(yè)投入、漁業(yè)產(chǎn)出、漁業(yè)對經(jīng)濟發(fā)展的促進作用四方面構(gòu)建評價體系進行評價。主成分分析法評價結(jié)果顯示近年來我國海洋漁業(yè)實力有所上升,若不考慮他國海洋漁業(yè)實力變化，則我國相對海洋漁業(yè)實力將不斷增強，那么我國在海洋漁業(yè)合作模式選擇中將更加傾向于自由化的合作模式，即跨國自由漁業(yè)區(qū)。 綜上所述，區(qū)域各國間應堅持可持續(xù)發(fā)展原則，不斷接洽海洋漁業(yè)相關(guān)法律及行業(yè)標準，并建立漁業(yè)統(tǒng)一管理機構(gòu)和相應爭議解決機制以促進各國間海洋漁業(yè)合作，對區(qū)域海洋漁業(yè)資源進行養(yǎng)護管理。
[Abstract]:In recent years, with the development of world economy and science and technology, the fishing capacity of all countries has been strengthened. But the marine fishery resources belong to the public resources, the countries ignore their regeneration ability, which leads to the fishing amount is larger than the fishery resources regeneration ability, resulting in the decline of fishery resources. In addition, the process of economic globalization and regionalization is accelerating, and countries are becoming increasingly interdependent, interdependent and mutually identified. However, maritime fishery disputes among countries are also increasing. Under this background, the implementation of marine fishery cooperation is an important measure to manage and conserve marine fishery resources, strengthen economic integration and resolve fishery disputes. Starting with a brief overview of marine fishery resources in China and the world, as well as the cooperation and disputes between China and other countries in marine fisheries, the scarcity and sustainable development of marine fishery resources are emphasized. This paper systematically analyzes the benefits that each participating country can obtain when adopting different strategies in one-off game and permanent game, judges the optimal strategy of each country under different circumstances in the short and long term, and proves the necessity of cooperation in marine fishery. It is assumed that the cost of a cooperation agreement between countries is zero and that the cost of competition occurs only when the sum of catches is greater than the total amount of marine fishery resources in the region. The result of game analysis shows that the sum of the optimal catch is less than the maximum allowable catch for the sustainable development of the fishery at the beginning of the game because of the limitation of technical level and the sum of the optimal catch is determined according to their own conditions. At this time, whether the two countries cooperate or not does not have an impact on the interests of the two countries; With the development of technology, the best catches determined by States will continue to increase and the total amount of fisheries resources in the region will not increase, and the best catches of both countries will eventually be greater than the maximum allowable catch for sustainable development of fisheries, At this time, the sum of the catch represented by the final strategic combination of the two countries in different circumstances will be larger than the maximum allowable catch for the sustainable development of fisheries, resulting in the degradation of fishery resources; Permanent game, because short-term overfishing leads to the degradation of fishery resources, which results in the decline of future income, that is, if the total income of non-cooperative strategy is small in the long run, then cooperation is the dominant strategy for each country. Even if the total catch of each country is maintained within the maximum allowable catch for sustainable development of regional marine fisheries for greater long-term benefits. For the cooperation model of marine fishery, this paper divides the cooperation model of marine fishery into loose type, semi-loose type, transnational free fishery area and transitional type according to the characteristics of the limited degree of the States in the process of the actual regional marine fishery cooperation and the intensity of the protection of fishery resources. Joint stock companies and the United Nations manage six categories. Among them, the degree of political mutual trust and the contrast of marine fishery strength are the important factors that influence the choice of cooperation mode of marine fishery. In view of the strength of marine fishery, the evaluation system is constructed from four aspects: fishery support, fishery input, fishery output and fishery promoting effect on economic development. The results of principal component analysis (PCA) show that China's marine fishery strength has increased in recent years, and if other countries' marine fishery strength is not taken into account, China's relative marine fishery strength will be continuously enhanced. Then China will be more inclined to liberalize the cooperation mode in marine fishery cooperation mode, that is, transnational free fishery area. In the light of the foregoing, the States of the region should adhere to the principle of sustainable development, keep in touch with relevant laws and industry standards relating to marine fisheries, and establish unified fisheries management bodies and corresponding dispute resolution mechanisms to promote cooperation among States in marine fisheries, Conservation and management of regional marine fishery resources.
【學位授予單位】：中國海洋大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F326.4;F224.32
本文編號：2406885
[Abstract]:In recent years, with the development of world economy and science and technology, the fishing capacity of all countries has been strengthened. But the marine fishery resources belong to the public resources, the countries ignore their regeneration ability, which leads to the fishing amount is larger than the fishery resources regeneration ability, resulting in the decline of fishery resources. In addition, the process of economic globalization and regionalization is accelerating, and countries are becoming increasingly interdependent, interdependent and mutually identified. However, maritime fishery disputes among countries are also increasing. Under this background, the implementation of marine fishery cooperation is an important measure to manage and conserve marine fishery resources, strengthen economic integration and resolve fishery disputes. Starting with a brief overview of marine fishery resources in China and the world, as well as the cooperation and disputes between China and other countries in marine fisheries, the scarcity and sustainable development of marine fishery resources are emphasized. This paper systematically analyzes the benefits that each participating country can obtain when adopting different strategies in one-off game and permanent game, judges the optimal strategy of each country under different circumstances in the short and long term, and proves the necessity of cooperation in marine fishery. It is assumed that the cost of a cooperation agreement between countries is zero and that the cost of competition occurs only when the sum of catches is greater than the total amount of marine fishery resources in the region. The result of game analysis shows that the sum of the optimal catch is less than the maximum allowable catch for the sustainable development of the fishery at the beginning of the game because of the limitation of technical level and the sum of the optimal catch is determined according to their own conditions. At this time, whether the two countries cooperate or not does not have an impact on the interests of the two countries; With the development of technology, the best catches determined by States will continue to increase and the total amount of fisheries resources in the region will not increase, and the best catches of both countries will eventually be greater than the maximum allowable catch for sustainable development of fisheries, At this time, the sum of the catch represented by the final strategic combination of the two countries in different circumstances will be larger than the maximum allowable catch for the sustainable development of fisheries, resulting in the degradation of fishery resources; Permanent game, because short-term overfishing leads to the degradation of fishery resources, which results in the decline of future income, that is, if the total income of non-cooperative strategy is small in the long run, then cooperation is the dominant strategy for each country. Even if the total catch of each country is maintained within the maximum allowable catch for sustainable development of regional marine fisheries for greater long-term benefits. For the cooperation model of marine fishery, this paper divides the cooperation model of marine fishery into loose type, semi-loose type, transnational free fishery area and transitional type according to the characteristics of the limited degree of the States in the process of the actual regional marine fishery cooperation and the intensity of the protection of fishery resources. Joint stock companies and the United Nations manage six categories. Among them, the degree of political mutual trust and the contrast of marine fishery strength are the important factors that influence the choice of cooperation mode of marine fishery. In view of the strength of marine fishery, the evaluation system is constructed from four aspects: fishery support, fishery input, fishery output and fishery promoting effect on economic development. The results of principal component analysis (PCA) show that China's marine fishery strength has increased in recent years, and if other countries' marine fishery strength is not taken into account, China's relative marine fishery strength will be continuously enhanced. Then China will be more inclined to liberalize the cooperation mode in marine fishery cooperation mode, that is, transnational free fishery area. In the light of the foregoing, the States of the region should adhere to the principle of sustainable development, keep in touch with relevant laws and industry standards relating to marine fisheries, and establish unified fisheries management bodies and corresponding dispute resolution mechanisms to promote cooperation among States in marine fisheries, Conservation and management of regional marine fishery resources.
【學位授予單位】：中國海洋大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F326.4;F224.32
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