PPP項(xiàng)目中政府套牢社會(huì)資本問(wèn)題分析
[Abstract]:PPP (Public-Private Partnership) mode is called public-private partnership, which is a long-term partnership between government and private investors in order to provide a certain product or service to the public. With the economic development of our country, the contradiction between a large number of infrastructure and public service demand and the limited financial ability of the government becomes more and more prominent, and the introduction of social capital in the field of infrastructure and public service becomes an effective way to solve this contradiction. As early as the 1980s, private capital participated in the infrastructure construction of our country in the mode of BOT and so on. With the coming into power of the new government, in order to cope with the debt crisis of local governments and the downward pressure of the economy, the government's push to the PPP has been continuously increased. However, the market reflects the "uneven balance of cold and heat". Compared with the initiative of the government, social capital is hesitant. And the risk of the government is one of the important reasons of social capital hesitancy. Based on the previous research and analysis, this paper firstly combs the PPP model and the relevant theory of the problem. Then it analyzes the mechanism of the problem of government entrapment in the PPP project from the aspects of the specificity of the assets the incompleteness of the contract and the opportunistic behavior of the government in the PPP project. On the basis of the previous analysis, using the method of dynamic game, this paper constructs a game locking model between the government and private investors in PPP project, and discusses the conditions for the government to choose to hold private investors. Compare the efforts of private investors under different equilibrium paths. Combined with the analysis results and the classical governance of the locking problem, the corresponding countermeasures are provided for solving the latch problem. Under the background of popularizing the PPP model in China, it is of positive significance to study the "pain point" of "government holding private investors" in the PPP project.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:西南交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2015
【分類號(hào)】:F283
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