本文選題：招投標演化 + 低價中標�。� 參考：《大連理工大學》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：招投標作為國際通用的建設工程項目采購制度在我國的應用日益廣泛,引入招投標制度能夠促進公平競爭,促進資源的最優(yōu)配置,為業(yè)主帶來顯著的經(jīng)濟效益。自2000年招投標法頒布以來,我國的關于招投標的法律制度不斷完善,針對必須招標的工程范圍、招投標監(jiān)督的職責分工、評標委員會的構成、評標方法的選擇、招標代理機構的資質(zhì)認定等問題逐一頒布實施及管理辦法。然而招投標在我國的應用過程中存在很多問題,最低價格招標導致競爭加劇,過低的價格產(chǎn)生了許多劣質(zhì)工程。綜合評價招標中存在投標人賄賂評標專家的問題。以上問題與投標人參加招投標時的行為動機密切相關,因此有必要從招標人和投標人決策的視角,研究現(xiàn)行招投標制度中存在上述問題的內(nèi)在原因及如何通過制度設計激勵投標人遵守規(guī)章制度以改善上述非效率問題。 針對建設工程項目的招投標制度,本文分為三個部分進行分析,第一部分從制度演化角度對我國招投標發(fā)展路徑進行分析,總結招投標引入我國以來的發(fā)展歷程,每個階段的歷史背景、制度規(guī)定、存在的問題及下一階段的制度改進,在此基礎上分析現(xiàn)行招投標制度的有效性。第二部分分析承包商和監(jiān)理合謀導致最低價格招標中惡意報價發(fā)生的內(nèi)在機制。研究發(fā)現(xiàn)當監(jiān)理發(fā)現(xiàn)由于承包商的偷工減料而引起的工程質(zhì)量問題時,承包商可以選擇與監(jiān)理合謀以逃避返修或返工成本,因此承包商可以通過事后和監(jiān)理合謀彌補事前低價中標造成的損失。分析指出監(jiān)理的有限責任導致對其罰款可以但無法完全抑制其與承包商之間的合謀,提出罰款結合監(jiān)理的資質(zhì)管理政策能夠有效地抑制合謀,從而解決最低價格招標中存在的惡意報價問題。第三部分基于拍賣的機制設計理論構建綜合評價招標模型,通過分析招標人和投標人之間的博弈過程,發(fā)現(xiàn)在招標人的評標準則完全體現(xiàn)社會價值時,綜合評價招標法能實現(xiàn)資源的有效配置并使社會收益最大化。在此基礎上論證引入設置最低分數(shù)的綜合評價招標法能夠在維持社會收益不變的同時提高招標人的財務效率。
[Abstract]:Bidding, as an international common construction project procurement system, is widely used in our country. The introduction of bidding system can promote fair competition, promote the optimal allocation of resources and bring significant economic benefits for the owners. Since the enactment of Bidding Law in 2000, the legal system of bidding in China has been perfected continuously. The project scope of tendering, the division of duties and responsibilities of the supervision of bidding, the composition of the bid evaluation committee, the selection of bid evaluation methods, the qualification of the agency for bidding and other problems are promulgated and managed one by one. However, there are many problems in the application process of bidding in our country, the lowest price bidding leads to the intensification of competition and the low price is produced. There are many poor quality projects. The problem of bidder bribe evaluation experts in comprehensive evaluation of tender. The above problems are closely related to the behavior motivation of the bidder in the bidding. Therefore, it is necessary to study the internal causes of the problems in the current bidding system and how to adopt the system from the Perspective of the tenderer and the bidder's decision making. The bidders are encouraged to comply with the rules and regulations to improve the above non efficiency issues.
In view of the tendering and bidding system for construction projects, this paper is divided into three parts. The first part analyzes the development path of bidding in China from the perspective of institutional evolution, summarizes the development course since the introduction of our country, the historical background of each stage, the regulations of the system, the existing problems and the system improvement in the next stage. On the basis of the analysis of the validity of the current bidding system. The second part analyses the inherent mechanism of the malicious quotation occurring in the lowest price bidding by the contractor and the supervision conspiracy. The study finds that the contractor may choose to avoid rework or rework when the supervisor finds the quality of the project caused by the Contractor's work loss. The cost of rework is reworked, so the contractor can make up for the losses caused by the bid before and by the supervisor. Analysis points out that the limited liability of the supervisor can lead to a fine but can not completely restrain the conspiracy between the contractor and the contractor. In the third part, a comprehensive evaluation bidding model is constructed based on the mechanism design theory of auction. By analyzing the game process between the tenderer and the bidder, it is found that the comprehensive evaluation bidding method can realize the effective allocation of the resources and make the society be able to realize the effective allocation of the resources and make the society be able to achieve the social value by analyzing the game between the tenderer and the bidder. On the basis of this, it is proved that the comprehensive evaluation bidding method of introducing the lowest score can improve the financial efficiency of the tenderer while maintaining the social income.
【學位授予單位】：大連理工大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F284

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