本文選題：供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào) + 雙邊不對(duì)稱信息��； 參考：《中國管理科學(xué)》2015年03期

【摘要】：非對(duì)稱信息和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)態(tài)度成為影響供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)的重要因素,而契約機(jī)制設(shè)計(jì)是實(shí)現(xiàn)協(xié)調(diào)的一種方法。本文在雙邊成本信息不對(duì)稱情形下研究供應(yīng)鏈契約機(jī)制的設(shè)計(jì)問題。考慮了由一個(gè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)中性的供應(yīng)商和一個(gè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)規(guī)避的銷售商組成的二級(jí)供應(yīng)鏈,供應(yīng)商和銷售商分別擁有私人的生產(chǎn)成本信息和銷售成本信息。在分散決策下,供銷雙方為獲得更好的私人利得從而有隱藏信息的動(dòng)機(jī)。為實(shí)現(xiàn)信息的真實(shí)揭示,文中引入了利他委托人這一概念,從而供應(yīng)鏈成為協(xié)調(diào)主體。借助AGV機(jī)制思想,設(shè)計(jì)了具有激勵(lì)性質(zhì)的轉(zhuǎn)移支付,并且基于均值-方差方法建立了非對(duì)稱信息下的供應(yīng)鏈模型。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)銷售商風(fēng)規(guī)避度在一定范圍時(shí),所設(shè)計(jì)的激勵(lì)機(jī)制能夠?qū)崿F(xiàn)供銷雙方信息的真實(shí)揭示,但并不能完全保證雙方的事后非負(fù)收益。為解決這一問題,給出一種以期望信息租金比為基礎(chǔ)的事后收益分配規(guī)則,設(shè)計(jì)了補(bǔ)償參數(shù)。結(jié)合轉(zhuǎn)移支付和補(bǔ)償參數(shù),提出了一個(gè)契約機(jī)制。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)當(dāng)銷售商風(fēng)規(guī)避度不超過上界kr時(shí),該機(jī)制能真實(shí)的揭示信息,并且能夠保證供銷雙方的事后合理的收益分配。此外,當(dāng)供銷雙方真實(shí)揭示信息時(shí),風(fēng)險(xiǎn)規(guī)避度較大的銷售商組成的供應(yīng)鏈有更低商品交易量和供應(yīng)鏈?zhǔn)找�。最�?給出數(shù)值算例,驗(yàn)證信息揭示的激勵(lì)有效性并對(duì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)規(guī)避度進(jìn)行敏感性分析。本文的研究將對(duì)雙邊不對(duì)稱信息下的供應(yīng)鏈管理提供一定的理論基礎(chǔ)和實(shí)踐指導(dǎo)。
[Abstract]:Asymmetric information and risk attitude are important factors influencing supply chain coordination, and contract mechanism design is a method to achieve coordination. In this paper, we study the design of supply chain contract mechanism in the case of asymmetric cost information. A two-level supply chain consisting of a risk-neutral supplier and a risk-averse vendor is considered. The supplier and seller have private production cost information and sales cost information respectively. Under the decentralized decision, both suppliers and marketers have the motive of hiding information in order to obtain better private gain. In order to realize the true disclosure of information, this paper introduces the concept of altruistic client, thus the supply chain becomes the main body of coordination. With the help of the idea of AGV mechanism, the transfer payment with incentive property is designed, and the supply chain model under asymmetric information is established based on mean-variance method. We find that when the wind-evading degree of the seller is in a certain range, the incentive mechanism designed can realize the true disclosure of the information between the supplier and the seller, but it can not completely guarantee the non-negative return after the event. In order to solve this problem, a compensation parameter is designed, which is based on the expected information rent ratio. Combining the transfer payment and compensation parameters, a contract mechanism is proposed. We find that when the wind-evading degree of the seller does not exceed the upper bound KR, the mechanism can reveal the information truthfully, and can guarantee the reasonable distribution of the profit between the supplier and the seller after the event. In addition, when both suppliers and sellers reveal the information, the supply chain with higher risk aversion has lower commodity trading volume and lower supply chain income. Finally, a numerical example is given to verify the incentive effectiveness revealed by the information and to analyze the sensitivity of risk aversion. The research in this paper will provide some theoretical basis and practical guidance for supply chain management under bilateral asymmetric information.
【作者單位】： 西南民族大學(xué)計(jì)算機(jī)科學(xué)與技術(shù)學(xué)院;四川大學(xué)商學(xué)院;
【基金】：國家自然科學(xué)基金資助項(xiàng)目(71071103) 教育部人文社會(huì)科學(xué)西部和邊疆地區(qū)項(xiàng)目青年項(xiàng)目(13XJC630014) 中央高校青年老師項(xiàng)目(2014NZYQN30)
【分類號(hào)】：F224;F274

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

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本文編號(hào)：1882045