本文選題：建設(shè)項(xiàng)目管理 + 委托代理關(guān)系�。� 參考：《山東建筑大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：在現(xiàn)代項(xiàng)目管理領(lǐng)域中,業(yè)主和其他的項(xiàng)目參與方通過簽訂合同形成了“委托一代理”關(guān)系。但是,在這種關(guān)系下,業(yè)主和其他的參與方的目標(biāo)各不相同,并且存在著利益沖突。由于雙方的信息不對(duì)稱,將會(huì)引發(fā)道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)問題,即其他的參與方會(huì)因?yàn)槠渥陨砝婵紤]而做出損害業(yè)主利益的行為。因此,業(yè)主應(yīng)建立適當(dāng)?shù)募?lì)機(jī)制來驅(qū)使其他參與方幫助自己實(shí)現(xiàn)項(xiàng)目目標(biāo)。 在研究過程中綜合運(yùn)用的組織行為學(xué)、博弈論與信息經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)、項(xiàng)目管理理論中的“激勵(lì)理論”、“委托代理理論”等理論,針對(duì)項(xiàng)目各參與方(設(shè)計(jì)單位、承包商、專業(yè)咨詢單位、供應(yīng)商、監(jiān)理單位等)在質(zhì)量、進(jìn)度、安全和費(fèi)用四個(gè)方面的表現(xiàn)進(jìn)行分析,選取其中有關(guān)激勵(lì)的因素進(jìn)行研究。這四個(gè)方面是項(xiàng)目管理中非常重要的四個(gè)目標(biāo),因此針對(duì)這四個(gè)方面進(jìn)行研究能夠提高激勵(lì)的有效性。 在質(zhì)量管理方面首先確定影響質(zhì)量的因素和各項(xiàng)目參與方在質(zhì)量管理過程中的責(zé)任,業(yè)主根據(jù)各參與方質(zhì)量管理的績(jī)效進(jìn)行激勵(lì)。并且通過決策樹建立了數(shù)學(xué)模型并對(duì)模型求解,研究業(yè)主是否應(yīng)該進(jìn)行全過程質(zhì)量控制。 在進(jìn)度控制方面,研究的目的是在保證質(zhì)量、不增加人力和物力的前提下,盡量縮短工期的方法。在研究過程中,引入了網(wǎng)絡(luò)圖,確定了最低費(fèi)用曲線,通過對(duì)網(wǎng)絡(luò)圖的計(jì)算主要解決了以下問題,是否應(yīng)該壓縮工期,應(yīng)該壓縮哪道或者哪些工序的工期以及如何確定激勵(lì)強(qiáng)度的問題。 在安全管理的方面,確定要落實(shí)安全生產(chǎn)責(zé)任制,各參與方要進(jìn)行安全教育與培訓(xùn),并且要進(jìn)行安全檢查。在項(xiàng)目建設(shè)過程中及項(xiàng)目完成后,業(yè)主要根據(jù)參與方在安全管理中的表現(xiàn)進(jìn)行評(píng)價(jià),根據(jù)評(píng)價(jià)結(jié)果對(duì)其進(jìn)行激勵(lì)。 在費(fèi)用控制方面,主要對(duì)有關(guān)的激勵(lì)機(jī)制報(bào)酬方案的確定進(jìn)行研究。在研究中,以委托代理理論為基礎(chǔ),建立了業(yè)主的收益函數(shù)和約束條件,并且引入了一個(gè)外部環(huán)境變量,從而降低了錯(cuò)誤激勵(lì)的可能,提高激勵(lì)的有效性。此外,將其他參與方的收益分為兩部分,固定部分與激勵(lì)部分,固定部分是不隨項(xiàng)目的實(shí)際費(fèi)用而發(fā)生改變的,而激勵(lì)部分則要根據(jù)項(xiàng)目的實(shí)際費(fèi)用而定,將委托一代理理論的基本模型與成本加百分比酬金的計(jì)價(jià)方式相結(jié)合,提出了分區(qū)間獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)的激勵(lì)方案。 最后對(duì)前文四個(gè)方面的激勵(lì)方案進(jìn)行總結(jié),提出了激勵(lì)機(jī)制的內(nèi)容和具體的激勵(lì)措施。對(duì)研究的不足進(jìn)行總結(jié)及對(duì)研究的前景進(jìn)行展望。
[Abstract]:In the field of modern project management, owners and other project participants form a "principal-agent" relationship by signing contracts. However, in this relationship, owners and other participants have different goals and conflicts of interest. Because of the asymmetric information between the two parties, moral hazard will be caused, that is, other participants will do harm to the interests of the owner because of their own interests. Therefore, owners should establish appropriate incentives to motivate other participants to help themselves achieve project objectives. The theories of organization behavior, game theory and information economics, project management theory, principal-agent theory and so on, which are used in the research process, are aimed at the project participants (design unit, contractor, contractor, etc.) Professional consulting units, suppliers, supervision units, etc.) in the quality, progress, safety and cost of four aspects of the performance analysis, select the relevant incentive factors to study. These four aspects are very important objectives in project management, so the research on these four aspects can improve the effectiveness of incentive. In the aspect of quality management, the factors affecting quality and the responsibility of the project participants in the process of quality management are first determined, and the owner motivates the participants according to the performance of the quality management. And through the decision tree to establish the mathematical model and solve the model to study whether the owner should carry out the whole process quality control. In the aspect of schedule control, the aim of the study is to shorten the time limit without increasing manpower and material resources. In the course of the research, the network diagram is introduced, and the lowest cost curve is determined. Through the calculation of the network diagram, the following problems are mainly solved: should the time limit be compressed, The question of which or which processes should be compressed and how to determine the incentive intensity. In the aspect of safety management, the participants should carry out safety education and training, and carry out safety inspection. In the process of project construction and after the completion of the project, the owner shall evaluate the performance of the participants in the safety management and motivate them according to the evaluation results. In the aspect of cost control, the determination of incentive compensation scheme is studied. In the study, based on the principal-agent theory, the income function and constraint conditions of the owner are established, and an external environment variable is introduced, which reduces the possibility of false incentive and improves the effectiveness of incentive. In addition, the benefits of other participants are divided into two parts, the fixed portion and the incentive part, which do not change with the actual cost of the project, while the incentive component is based on the actual cost of the project, The basic model of principal-agent theory is combined with the pricing method of cost plus percentage gratuity, and the incentive scheme of incentive is put forward. Finally, the paper summarizes the four incentive schemes, and puts forward the contents of the incentive mechanism and the specific incentive measures. The deficiency of the research is summarized and the prospect of the research is prospected.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：山東建筑大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F284;TU712

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