發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-05-01 08:16

  本文選題：回購契約 + 創(chuàng)新投入��； 參考：《華南理工大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著經(jīng)濟(jì)全球化的加深，信息技術(shù)的發(fā)展，，企業(yè)之間的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)已經(jīng)發(fā)展為供應(yīng)鏈之間的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。技術(shù)創(chuàng)新通過降低成本、創(chuàng)新產(chǎn)品和服務(wù)，不斷提高企業(yè)的綜合競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力，單個(gè)企業(yè)的創(chuàng)新投入將會(huì)使整個(gè)供應(yīng)鏈?zhǔn)芤�。但供�?yīng)鏈的成員企業(yè)對(duì)各自追求的目標(biāo)有不同評(píng)價(jià)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，所做的決策往往與供應(yīng)鏈整體最大利益相沖突。供應(yīng)鏈本身就是需要協(xié)調(diào)的系統(tǒng)。供應(yīng)鏈契約是協(xié)調(diào)供應(yīng)鏈的主要方法，其中，以回購契約最為常見，在供應(yīng)鏈契約協(xié)調(diào)中占據(jù)著非常重要的位置。因此，如何通過回購契約來約束和協(xié)調(diào)供應(yīng)鏈成員，以提高供應(yīng)鏈整體利益一直是供應(yīng)鏈管理研究的熱點(diǎn)問題。傳統(tǒng)研究中大多假設(shè)決策者為完全理性，即決策者總以利益最大化作為決策準(zhǔn)則，而行為研究卻發(fā)現(xiàn)在現(xiàn)實(shí)生活中人們往往對(duì)公平表現(xiàn)出極大關(guān)注，即公平關(guān)切。但關(guān)于公平關(guān)切行為傾向的供應(yīng)鏈契約的研究卻是很少。 本文在分析和總結(jié)大量國內(nèi)外關(guān)于供應(yīng)鏈契約協(xié)調(diào)研究成果的基礎(chǔ)上，以一個(gè)由單個(gè)供應(yīng)商和單個(gè)零售商組成的兩級(jí)供應(yīng)鏈作為研究對(duì)象，討論了當(dāng)零售商同時(shí)存在創(chuàng)新投入和公平關(guān)切行為傾向時(shí)回購契約對(duì)兩級(jí)供應(yīng)鏈的協(xié)調(diào)問題。 本文首先研究了在零售商創(chuàng)新投入下，供應(yīng)鏈在分散決策和集中決策下的最優(yōu)決策行為。其次，分析了供應(yīng)商利用回購契約協(xié)調(diào)供應(yīng)鏈的決策過程。通過模型計(jì)算，發(fā)現(xiàn)回購契約可以實(shí)現(xiàn)完美的協(xié)調(diào)，且零售商創(chuàng)新投入下的回購契約的批發(fā)價(jià)格、回購價(jià)格、最優(yōu)訂貨量均大于傳統(tǒng)回購契約。進(jìn)一步，通過算例分析發(fā)現(xiàn)，經(jīng)回購契約協(xié)調(diào)后，零售商創(chuàng)新投入的整體供應(yīng)鏈利潤高于決策者不存在創(chuàng)新投入的整體供應(yīng)鏈利潤。最后考慮了零售商具有不公平厭惡的供應(yīng)鏈回購契約協(xié)調(diào)問題。發(fā)現(xiàn)回購契約依然能夠?qū)崿F(xiàn)協(xié)調(diào)，且與零售商的不公平厭惡程度無關(guān)。進(jìn)一步，通過算例分析發(fā)現(xiàn)，隨著零售商不利不公平厭惡和有利不公平厭惡程度的增加，零售商的效用在不斷降低，當(dāng)零售商效用低于其能承受的效用時(shí)，零售商會(huì)拒絕供應(yīng)商所提供的回購契約，導(dǎo)致供應(yīng)鏈不能實(shí)現(xiàn)協(xié)調(diào)。
[Abstract]:With the deepening of economic globalization and the development of information technology, competition among enterprises has developed into competition between supply chains. By reducing costs and innovating products and services, technological innovation can continuously improve the comprehensive competitiveness of enterprises. The innovation input of individual enterprises will benefit the whole supply chain. However, the members of the supply chain have different evaluation criteria for their respective objectives, and the decisions they make often conflict with the best interests of the supply chain as a whole. The supply chain itself is a system that needs to be coordinated. Supply chain contract is the main method to coordinate supply chain, among which buyback contract is the most common one, which occupies a very important position in supply chain contract coordination. Therefore, how to restrict and coordinate supply chain members through repurchase contracts to improve the overall interests of supply chain has always been a hot issue in supply chain management. In the traditional research, it is assumed that the decision-maker is completely rational, that is, the decision-maker always takes the maximization of profits as the decision criterion, but the behavior research finds that people often pay great attention to the fairness in the real life, that is, the fair concern. However, the research on the supply chain contract about the tendency of fair concern behavior is rare. On the basis of analyzing and summarizing a large number of domestic and foreign researches on supply chain contract coordination, this paper takes a two-level supply chain composed of a single supplier and a single retailer as the research object. This paper discusses the coordination of two levels of supply chain by repurchase contract when the retailer has both innovation input and fair concern behavior tendency. In this paper, the optimal decision behavior of supply chain under decentralized and centralized decision is studied. Secondly, the decision process of supply chain coordination by repurchase contract is analyzed. Through the model calculation, it is found that the repo contract can achieve perfect coordination, and the wholesale price, repo price and optimal order quantity of the repurchase contract under the innovation input of the retailer are all larger than the traditional repo contract. Further, through the example analysis, it is found that after the repurchase contract coordination, the overall supply chain profit of the retailer innovation input is higher than that of the decision maker without innovation input. Finally, the supply chain repurchase contract coordination problem of retailers with unfair aversion is considered. It is found that the repurchase contract can still be coordinated and has nothing to do with the retailer's unfair aversion. Further, through the example analysis, it is found that with the increase of unfavorable unfair aversion and favorable unfair aversion, the retailer's utility is decreasing, when the retailer's utility is lower than it can bear. Retailers reject repo contracts offered by suppliers, resulting in uncoordinated supply chains.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華南理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F713.32;F274;F224

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