本文選題：商業(yè)賄賂　切入點(diǎn)：賄賂治理　出處：《陜西師范大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文　論文類(lèi)型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：商業(yè)賄賂作為經(jīng)濟(jì)活動(dòng)中的一種現(xiàn)象,通常是指經(jīng)營(yíng)者在市場(chǎng)經(jīng)營(yíng)活動(dòng)中向能為他提供交易機(jī)會(huì)的單位或者個(gè)人給予財(cái)物或者非財(cái)產(chǎn)性利益的行為。商業(yè)賄賂產(chǎn)生的根源比較清晰：通過(guò)犧牲一小部分的利益來(lái)獲得較大一部分的利益。但是,這一簡(jiǎn)單的逐利動(dòng)機(jī),造成的危害卻能影響整個(gè)社會(huì)。首先,商業(yè)賄賂會(huì)破壞正常的市場(chǎng)交易秩序,打破市場(chǎng)良性運(yùn)行的交易規(guī)范,損害社會(huì)誠(chéng)信原則,會(huì)導(dǎo)致市場(chǎng)失靈,扭曲市場(chǎng)對(duì)資源的配置。同時(shí),動(dòng)搖了公平、公正的社會(huì)價(jià)值觀念。商業(yè)賄賂還會(huì)加重消費(fèi)者負(fù)擔(dān),降低了消費(fèi)者的福利。另外造成質(zhì)次價(jià)高商品或服務(wù)充斥市場(chǎng)。商業(yè)賄賂會(huì)阻礙企業(yè)技術(shù)進(jìn)步,妨礙經(jīng)濟(jì)的健康發(fā)展。政府公職人員涉及到的商業(yè)賄賂則危害更甚,首先會(huì)滋長(zhǎng)權(quán)力尋租現(xiàn)象,賄賂腐敗互為因果。再次,公務(wù)人員的職務(wù)廉潔性被玷污,危害政府威望,腐蝕統(tǒng)治基礎(chǔ)。 隨著我國(guó)市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)的發(fā)展,商業(yè)賄賂已經(jīng)滲透到經(jīng)濟(jì)生活相關(guān)的各行各業(yè),涉及的人員眾多,范圍非常廣泛。自2006年,我國(guó)將商業(yè)賄賂的治理提高到整個(gè)國(guó)家的層面。但是,商業(yè)賄賂也在隨著市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)的發(fā)展而“進(jìn)化”,賄賂手段越來(lái)越新,越來(lái)越隱蔽,這給政府執(zhí)法部門(mén)的執(zhí)法治理帶來(lái)很大的難度。并且,商業(yè)賄賂的“界定難”問(wèn)題也給賄賂犯罪的定罪帶來(lái)很多不確定和可操作的因素。另外,執(zhí)法力度不足的問(wèn)題,執(zhí)法的主體混亂、缺少銜接的機(jī)制以至于合力不足,還有執(zhí)法手段并不多樣化的問(wèn)題都是商業(yè)賄賂治理難的原因。 商業(yè)賄賂作為經(jīng)濟(jì)機(jī)制上的一顆毒瘤,并不是一種簡(jiǎn)單的社會(huì)現(xiàn)象。在其背后隱藏著多種力量的博弈。它之所以產(chǎn)生,是因?yàn)榇嬖谥m合它生在的環(huán)境、土壤和條件。如果不探求其背后的根源,只是被動(dòng)打擊,那么層次不窮、各種各樣的商業(yè)賄賂形態(tài)還將不斷涌現(xiàn),治理最終只能是治標(biāo)不治本。本文就我國(guó)商業(yè)賄賂立法法律現(xiàn)狀及治理困境做出說(shuō)明,試圖找出商業(yè)賄賂治理難以取得成效的關(guān)鍵因素。本文通過(guò)辨析了商業(yè)賄賂與其相似易混淆的概念,如回扣、傭金、附贈(zèng),試圖為治理的偵破環(huán)節(jié)提供參考。結(jié)合對(duì)商業(yè)賄賂行為的參與主體、運(yùn)行模式,與監(jiān)管者博弈等方面進(jìn)行經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的剖析,目的在于了解商業(yè)賄賂的運(yùn)行機(jī)理,梳理利益相關(guān)者之間的關(guān)系,找出破解其利益鏈條的關(guān)鍵節(jié)點(diǎn)。并針對(duì)現(xiàn)行的法律規(guī)則進(jìn)行思考及提出宏觀層面、中觀層面及微觀層面的建議。希望能夠?qū)ξ覈?guó)的商業(yè)賄賂的有效治理有所幫助。 文章使用了經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)中博弈的方法再現(xiàn)了監(jiān)管者與經(jīng)營(yíng)者之間完全信息靜態(tài)博弈、監(jiān)管者與經(jīng)營(yíng)者之間兩階段的動(dòng)態(tài)博弈過(guò)程,以及分析了商業(yè)賄賂的賄賂空間。發(fā)現(xiàn)監(jiān)管力度在一定程度上能夠遏制商業(yè)賄賂的發(fā)生,懲罰力度對(duì)商業(yè)賄賂的發(fā)生也有打擊作用。因此,政府的執(zhí)法機(jī)關(guān)必須要提供有力的監(jiān)管、打擊力度,立法部門(mén)也應(yīng)結(jié)合實(shí)際情況與商業(yè)賄賂現(xiàn)狀調(diào)整賄賂法規(guī)的懲罰力度。然而,執(zhí)法部門(mén)由于經(jīng)費(fèi)等原因,不可能無(wú)限制的投入人力、財(cái)力,并且研究表明,即使監(jiān)管力度大到百分百監(jiān)管,商業(yè)賄賂也不會(huì)有效減少。所以,僅僅依靠政府的監(jiān)管是不可能實(shí)現(xiàn)有效治理的,還需要社會(huì)輿論、社會(huì)風(fēng)氣、行為人自身修養(yǎng)等方面的共同提高。 文章從刑罰對(duì)行賄、受賄處罰的輕重程度來(lái)看以及是否享受“特別自首”條款,根據(jù)我國(guó)現(xiàn)行法律規(guī)定建立囚徒困境模型。發(fā)現(xiàn)如果處罰力度設(shè)置不當(dāng),雙方甚至都有可能從這種處罰中獲利；或者雙方都對(duì)罪行百般抵賴(lài),增加了監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)的處罰成本和偵查投入。最后,提出對(duì)商業(yè)賄賂行為的懲治與治理、構(gòu)建全方位商業(yè)賄賂懲治體系的思考與建議。
[Abstract]:Commercial bribery is a kind of phenomenon in economic activities, usually refers to the operators in the market and business activities to provide trading opportunities for his units or individuals to give property or non property interests. Sources of commercial bribe produces relatively clear: to obtain a large part of the interests at the expense of a small part of the interest. However, this simple profit motive, the harm can affect the whole society. Firstly, commercial bribery will disrupt the normal market order, breaking the benign operation of the market transaction, harm the principle of good faith, will lead to market failure, distorting the market allocation of resources. At the same time, a fair shake, social value the concept of justice. Commercial bribery will increase the burden on consumers, reduce the welfare of consumers. In addition to causing zhicijiagao goods or services market is full of commercial bribery will hinder the enterprise. Technological progress hinders the healthy development of the economy. The commercial bribery related to government officials is more dangerous. First, the phenomenon of power rent seeking is first increased. Bribery and corruption are mutually causative. Once again, the integrity of public servants is smear, endangering the prestige of the government, and corrupting the ruling base.
With the development of our market economy, commercial bribery has penetrated into the economic life related industries, many personnel involved in a wide range. Since 2006, our country will improve the governance of commercial bribery to the national level. However, commercial bribery is also with the development of market economy and the "evolution", means of bribery and more new, more subtle, which brought great difficulties to the enforcement of law enforcement and government governance. Commercial bribery, definition of "difficult" problem for the crime of bribery conviction and bring a lot of uncertainty and operational factors. In addition, the lack of law enforcement, law enforcement of the main confusion, lack of cohesion mechanism that force insufficient, as well as the law enforcement means not diversified problems are the reason of commercial bribery is difficult.
Commercial bribery as a cancer of economic mechanism, is not a simple social phenomenon. In the hidden behind a variety of power game. It arises because there exists for it in the environment, soil and conditions. If the root does not seek behind it, just passive combat, then level poor, various forms of commercial bribery will continue to emerge, governance can only be a temporary solution. This paper explains the current situation and Governance Dilemma of legislation of commercial bribery, trying to find out the key factors of commercial bribery governance is difficult to achieve results. In this paper, through the analysis of the concept of commercial bribery and similar confusing such as rebates a Commission, bonus, trying to provide a reference for the detection of link management. Combined with the subject of commercial bribery, participation mode, economics analysis and game regulators etc.,. The operation is to understand the mechanism of commercial bribery, analysis of the relationship between stakeholders, to find the key nodes to break its chain of interests. And according to the current rules of legal thinking and put forward the macro level, meso level and micro level suggestions. Hope to effective governance of commercial bribery in China's help.
This paper uses the methods of economics in reproduction of the game between the regulator and the operators of complete information static game, dynamic game process between regulators and operators of the two stage, as well as the analysis of the commercial bribery bribery space. That supervision can curb commercial bribery in a certain extent, the punishment of commercial bribery has hit the role of law enforcement agencies. Therefore, the government must provide effective supervision, punishment, punishment legislation departments should also be combined with the actual situation of commercial bribery and bribery status adjustment regulations. However, the law enforcement departments due to financial reasons, can not be unlimited investment in manpower, financial resources, and studies show that, even if the supervision of large to 100 supervision, commercial bribery is not reduced. Therefore, it is impossible to realize the effective governance rely solely on government supervision, social need The common improvement of public opinion, social atmosphere and the self-cultivation of the perpetrator.
This article from the penalty of bribery, bribery punishment view severity and whether to enjoy "special surrender" clause, the establishment of the prisoner's dilemma model according to the current laws and regulations. If the punishment is set properly, the two sides might benefit from this punishment; or both of crime denials, increased regulatory the investigation and punishment cost investment. Finally, put forward the punishment and governance of commercial bribery, thoughts and suggestions on building a full range of commercial bribery punishment system.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：陜西師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F203;D922.294;D924.392

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 陳國(guó)英;;建立和完善企業(yè)內(nèi)部審計(jì)制度[J];當(dāng)代經(jīng)濟(jì);2006年04期

2 賈一然;;商業(yè)賄賂犯罪及其立法完善[J];法制與社會(huì);2008年01期

3 付立忠;;刑法修正案(六) 對(duì)商業(yè)賄賂犯罪之改進(jìn)問(wèn)題研究[J];中國(guó)人民公安大學(xué)學(xué)報(bào)(社會(huì)科學(xué)版);2006年04期

4 黃華平;張偉珂;;教師之商業(yè)賄賂犯罪研究——兼議“兩高”《關(guān)于辦理商業(yè)賄賂刑事案件適用法律若干問(wèn)題的意見(jiàn)》[J];中國(guó)人民公安大學(xué)學(xué)報(bào)(社會(huì)科學(xué)版);2009年04期

5 楊婷,胡曉登;西部欠發(fā)達(dá)地區(qū)社會(huì)誠(chéng)信體系建設(shè)[J];貴州社會(huì)科學(xué);2004年06期

6 盧勤忠;;《刑法修正案(六)》視野下我國(guó)商業(yè)賄賂犯罪的立法完善[J];華東政法學(xué)院學(xué)報(bào);2006年05期

7 張小路;現(xiàn)代社會(huì)誠(chéng)信體系及其建設(shè)[J];河北學(xué)刊;2004年03期

8 李秀娟;;參研國(guó)際司法準(zhǔn)則 打擊商業(yè)賄賂犯罪[J];中國(guó)監(jiān)察;2006年08期

9 揚(yáng)鵬;;關(guān)于治理商業(yè)賄賂若干問(wèn)題的思考[J];中國(guó)監(jiān)察;2006年09期

10 鄒德萍;鐵金偉;;2006,中國(guó)向商業(yè)賄賂開(kāi)刀[J];決策探索;2006年02期

，

本文編號(hào)：1595331