本文關(guān)鍵詞：基于經(jīng)濟學視角的商業(yè)欺詐防范問題研究　出處：《陜西師范大學》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 商業(yè)欺詐 成本收益 演化博弈 政府監(jiān)管

【摘要】：古語曰：“民無信不立”、“人而無信,不知其可也”。誠信美德一直是中國的優(yōu)良傳統(tǒng)。但在21世紀的今天,市場卻面臨著誠信危機。商業(yè)領(lǐng)域不斷曝出弄虛作假、隱瞞真相的欺詐事件,欺詐手段層出不窮、欺詐花樣也不斷翻新,欺詐之風盛行已被視為常態(tài),社會公眾與監(jiān)管部門的底線在不斷被突破。從商品買賣的質(zhì)量欺詐、價格欺詐到商品流通環(huán)節(jié)的合同欺詐、信用證欺詐,再到商業(yè)投資中的特許經(jīng)營欺詐,欺詐行為已貫穿市場交易的各個階段,不僅嚴重的破壞了經(jīng)濟秩序,還徹底打擊了人們對市場的信任。破壞社會主義市場經(jīng)濟秩序案件依舊每年呈增長趨勢,其中涉及食品安全的欺詐甚至危害到人們的生命安全。商業(yè)欺詐形式多樣,范圍極廣,搜集數(shù)據(jù)時滯性大,統(tǒng)計難,監(jiān)管部門疏漏防范,欺詐的市場包容力也在不斷擴大,建立有效的商業(yè)欺詐防范路徑刻不容緩。 本文首先對國內(nèi)外現(xiàn)有的文獻綜述進行整理和總結(jié),基于商業(yè)欺詐內(nèi)涵,從信息不對稱理論、制度經(jīng)濟學理論和博弈論三個理論基礎(chǔ)分析了防范商業(yè)欺詐的理論可行性。其次分析了商業(yè)欺詐表現(xiàn)形式、特征和成因,從經(jīng)濟視角對商業(yè)欺詐本質(zhì)進行更深的探索。在此基礎(chǔ)上,本文構(gòu)建了商業(yè)欺詐的成本收益模型和欺詐者與政府的演化博弈矩陣。在成本收益分析中得出單次欺詐凈收益公式和多次欺詐的欺詐半徑極值,認為受害者容忍度和欺詐者信譽是降低商業(yè)欺詐范圍的關(guān)鍵因素。在欺詐者和監(jiān)管者的演化博弈分析中,通過政府和欺詐者之間的博弈矩陣建立復制動態(tài)方程,結(jié)合實際情況分析了欺詐者和政府間的三個策略穩(wěn)定點和監(jiān)管狀態(tài)的意義所在。根據(jù)我國商業(yè)欺詐防范的現(xiàn)狀,發(fā)現(xiàn)仍存在諸多問題,如監(jiān)管主體欠缺職能執(zhí)行力度,監(jiān)管領(lǐng)域混亂；缺少信息共享平臺、信息傳遞機制效率低；反商業(yè)欺詐的相關(guān)立法不完善；反商業(yè)欺詐動力不足；防范機制中缺少利益相關(guān)體參與等等。那么結(jié)合模型結(jié)論,本文認為：監(jiān)管部門應建立欺詐信息庫,對各種類型欺詐分類監(jiān)管,設(shè)定處罰標準；短期內(nèi)加大監(jiān)管成本,長期內(nèi)降低并維持穩(wěn)定的監(jiān)管成本；約束監(jiān)管者行為,制定激勵機制。而市場力量應重在,明確產(chǎn)權(quán)制度,塑造信譽經(jīng)濟；提升信譽機制,擴大信譽傳遞效應；提高聲譽效益,優(yōu)化監(jiān)管策略；加大市場約束效力。同時市場交易者需降低對欺詐的包容度,增強受害保護意識。 對商業(yè)欺詐的理論研究是為了更好的了解商業(yè)欺詐的動機、現(xiàn)狀和如何防范商業(yè)欺詐行為,從而落實到解決實際的防范問題上。本文期望通過經(jīng)濟學理論的規(guī)范分析方法,從新的視角解讀商業(yè)欺詐的經(jīng)濟本質(zhì),為反商業(yè)欺詐路徑提供一些建議。
[Abstract]:As the old saying goes, "the people have no faith and no faith." the virtue of good faith has always been a fine tradition in China, but today in 21th century. However, the market is facing a crisis of integrity. The commercial field has been exposed fraud, hide the truth of fraud, fraud means emerge in endlessly, fraud patterns are constantly renovated, the prevailing trend of fraud has been regarded as the normal. The bottom line of the public and the supervision department is constantly broken through, from quality fraud of commodity sale, price fraud to contract fraud in commodity circulation, letter of credit fraud, to franchise fraud in commercial investment. Fraud has run through the various stages of market transactions, not only seriously undermine the economic order, but also a thorough blow to the trust of the market. Damage to the socialist market economic order cases are still growing every year. Among them, the fraud involving food safety even endangers people's life safety. Commercial fraud has a variety of forms, very wide scope, large data collection delay, difficult statistics, regulatory oversight oversight to prevent. The market tolerance of fraud is also expanding, it is urgent to establish effective commercial fraud prevention path. Firstly, this paper summarizes the existing literature review at home and abroad, based on the connotation of commercial fraud, from the information asymmetry theory. This paper analyzes the theoretical feasibility of preventing commercial fraud on the basis of institutional economics theory and game theory. Secondly, it analyzes the manifestation, characteristics and causes of commercial fraud. From the economic point of view, the essence of commercial fraud is further explored. On this basis. In this paper, the cost-benefit model of commercial fraud and the evolutionary game matrix between fraudster and government are constructed. In the cost-benefit analysis, the formula of single fraud net income and the fraud radius extremum of multiple fraud are obtained. It is considered that victim tolerance and fraudster reputation are the key factors to reduce the scope of commercial fraud. In the evolutionary game analysis of fraudsters and regulators, the replicating dynamic equation is established through the game matrix between the government and the fraudster. Combined with the actual situation analysis of the fraudster and the government between the three strategic stability points and the significance of regulatory status. According to the current situation of commercial fraud prevention in China, we find that there are still many problems. For example, the main body of supervision lacks the enforcement of functions, and the supervision field is chaotic; Lack of information sharing platform, low efficiency of information transmission mechanism; The relative legislation of anti-commercial fraud is not perfect; Lack of motivation to counter commercial fraud; Based on the conclusion of the model, the author thinks that the supervision department should establish the fraud information base, classify the various types of fraud, and set up the punishment standard; Increase the supervision cost in the short term, reduce and maintain the stable supervision cost in the long run; Restrain the behavior of the supervisor, establish the incentive mechanism, and the market power should lay stress on, clear the property right system, mold the credit economy; Enhance the reputation mechanism and expand the credit transfer effect; Improving reputation benefit and optimizing supervision strategy; At the same time, market traders should reduce their tolerance to fraud and enhance their awareness of victimization and protection. The theoretical study of commercial fraud is to better understand the motives of commercial fraud, the current situation and how to prevent commercial fraud. This paper hopes to analyze the economic essence of commercial fraud from a new angle of view through the normative analysis method of economic theory and provide some suggestions for the path of anti-commercial fraud.
【學位授予單位】：陜西師范大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：D922.294;F203

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