本文關鍵詞：基于委托代理理論的政府投資項目激勵監(jiān)督機制研究　出處：《南京財經(jīng)大學》2015年碩士論文　論文類型：學位論文

  更多相關文章： 政府投資項目 融資模式 委托代理理論 公平偏好理論

【摘要】：自2004年國務院提出加快推行和實施政府投資項目以來,經(jīng)過十余年的發(fā)展,政府投資項目已成為國內(nèi)政府投資項目,特別是基礎設施建設的典型模式之一。國內(nèi)學界和實務界關于政府投資項目的概念、內(nèi)涵、不足的認識也經(jīng)歷了由爭論到統(tǒng)一的過程,從國內(nèi)政府投資項目模式管理實踐的現(xiàn)狀來看,激勵機制不完善、監(jiān)管體系不健全是政府投資項目模式長遠發(fā)展所面臨的主要問題。本文在深入研究投融資理論、制度經(jīng)濟理論、公共管理理論、博弈論等理論學科的基礎之上,對政府投資項目的內(nèi)涵、主體關系以及關鍵內(nèi)容進行了界定,并詳細分析其中的委托代理關系和機制機理。在方法上,除了定性的理論闡述,本項目同時注重模型、量化方法的使用,通過構(gòu)建多層級的委托代理模型來對參與主體的利益機制進行分析。本文以國內(nèi)政府投資項目模式實踐中存在的主要問題為背景,把政府部門作為委托人,項目管理公司作為代理人,分別基于完全理性和有限理性的假設構(gòu)建了委托代理框架下的激勵-監(jiān)督模型。從分析的結(jié)果來看,激勵機制和監(jiān)督機制是影響代理人(項目管理公司)行為的重要因素,完善的激勵報酬和較嚴格的監(jiān)督體系能夠促進項目管理公司盡職盡責的按照合同的要求開展管理工作；反之,較低的報酬和松懈的監(jiān)管都有可能導致項目管理公司謀取私利的行為。同時,當政府部門的監(jiān)管較為嚴格時,項目管理公司在和政府部門簽訂代建合同時會要求分享更多比例的提成。當考慮項目管理公司具有追求公平偏好的“互惠性”行為時,政府可以額外給予其更多的優(yōu)惠政策,作為回報,項目管理公司會付出更多的努力行動開展代建工作。另外,相對于傳統(tǒng)委托代理理論框架的監(jiān)督成本,融入公平偏好的模型能夠在一定程度上節(jié)約政府的監(jiān)督成本；同時,與傳統(tǒng)委托代理框架下政府的期望收益相比,考慮公平偏好的條件下,政府能否得到更大的收益取決于項目公司的“互惠性”行為強度,項目公司的“互惠性”心理越強,政府獲得額外收益的可能性也就越大。本文的研究為政府部門和項目管理公司之間的激勵契約設計、監(jiān)管機制提供了新的思路和理論借鑒。
[Abstract]:Since 2004 the State Council put forward to accelerate the implementation of government investment projects, after more than ten years of development, the government investment projects has become the domestic government investment projects, especially one of the typical mode of infrastructure construction. The domestic scholars and practitioners about the concept of government investment project connotation, lack of understanding has undergone a debate to unity the process, from the current situation of management practice of domestic government investment projects, the incentive mechanism is not perfect, imperfect supervision system is the main problem facing the government investment project mode of long-term development. The theory of investment and financing in the in-depth study, theory of institutional economics, public management theory, based on the game theory, the connotation of government investment project, the main contents and key relationships were defined, and a detailed analysis of the principal-agent relationship and the mechanism in the method, In addition to qualitative analysis theory, this project also focused on model, using quantitative methods, through the principal-agent model to multi level benefit mechanism to participate in the main analysis. Based on the main problems existing in domestic practice mode of government investment projects, the government departments as the principal, the Project Manage Company as an agent, were completely and limited rationality hypothesis is constructed under the framework of principal-agent incentive model based on supervision. From the results of the analysis, incentive mechanism and supervision mechanism is the important factor affecting the agent (Project Manage Company) behavior, improve incentives and a strict supervision system can promote the due diligence of the Project Manage Company to carry out management work according to the requirements of the contract on the other hand, low reward; and lax regulation are likely to lead to a Project Manage Company for personal gain Behavior. At the same time, when the government departments more stringent regulation, Project Manage Company and government departments signed agent contracts will be required to share more of the Commission. When considering the Project Manage Company with the pursuit of fairness preference "reciprocal" behavior, the government can give the additional more preferential policies, in return, the Project Manage Company will pay more efforts to carry out on behalf of the building work. In addition, compared with the traditional cost supervision framework of principal-agent theory, fairness theory model can save the government to a certain extent the supervision cost; at the same time, compared with the traditional principal government agency under the framework of the expected revenue, considering the fairness preference under the condition that the government can get bigger income depends on the item company's "reciprocal" behavior strength, item company "reciprocal" mentality is stronger, the government to get extra income The possibility is greater. The research in this paper provides a new idea and theoretical reference for the design of incentive contracts between government departments and Project Manage Company.

【學位授予單位】：南京財經(jīng)大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2015
【分類號】：F281

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本文編號：1386111