股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、控制權(quán)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)與債務(wù)期限結(jié)構(gòu)——基于中國(guó)民營(yíng)上市公司的實(shí)證研究
發(fā)布時(shí)間:2018-10-17 17:03
【摘要】:本文采用2008—2014年中國(guó)民營(yíng)上市公司的的數(shù)據(jù),驗(yàn)證了企業(yè)在多重大股東機(jī)制下的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與控制權(quán)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)關(guān)系對(duì)債務(wù)期限結(jié)構(gòu)的影響。研究發(fā)現(xiàn):大股東控制權(quán)與企業(yè)債務(wù)期限結(jié)構(gòu)正相關(guān),大股東傾向于合謀侵害其他利益相關(guān)者,進(jìn)而提高長(zhǎng)期債務(wù)的比例。
[Abstract]:Based on the data of Chinese private listed companies from 2008 to 2014, this paper verifies the influence of the ownership structure and the competition of control rights on the debt maturity structure under the multi-significant shareholder mechanism. It is found that the control right of large shareholders is positively related to the maturity structure of corporate debt, and the majority shareholders tend to conspire against other stakeholders to increase the proportion of long-term debt.
【作者單位】: 浙江工商大學(xué);
【分類號(hào)】:F224;F271;F275;F832.51
[Abstract]:Based on the data of Chinese private listed companies from 2008 to 2014, this paper verifies the influence of the ownership structure and the competition of control rights on the debt maturity structure under the multi-significant shareholder mechanism. It is found that the control right of large shareholders is positively related to the maturity structure of corporate debt, and the majority shareholders tend to conspire against other stakeholders to increase the proportion of long-term debt.
【作者單位】: 浙江工商大學(xué);
【分類號(hào)】:F224;F271;F275;F832.51
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