【摘要】：隨著一系列財(cái)務(wù)舞弊丑聞及使市場(chǎng)損失慘重的次貸危機(jī)等事件的發(fā)生,廣大投資者對(duì)證券市場(chǎng)失去了信心,隨之投資者保護(hù),尤其是中小股東權(quán)益保護(hù)問(wèn)題引起越來(lái)越廣泛重視。而隨著國(guó)內(nèi)外學(xué)術(shù)界深入研究發(fā)現(xiàn),上市公司中小股東權(quán)益頻受侵害與其內(nèi)部控制失效存在密切聯(lián)系。在內(nèi)部控制體系建設(shè)不斷深入的同時(shí),內(nèi)部控制質(zhì)量經(jīng)濟(jì)后果的研究也倍受關(guān)注�；趦�(nèi)部控制與中小股東權(quán)益保護(hù)之間緊密的聯(lián)系,同時(shí)響應(yīng)黨的十八大大力發(fā)展混合所有制經(jīng)濟(jì),推動(dòng)混合所有制企業(yè)健康良好發(fā)展的大力號(hào)召,為了健全完善混合所有制企業(yè)的內(nèi)控體系以及解決其中小股東權(quán)益頻受侵害的問(wèn)題,本文探究了混合所有制企業(yè)內(nèi)部控制的中小股東權(quán)益保護(hù)作用。本文以2012-2015年符合混合所有制企業(yè)定義的上市公司為研究樣本,運(yùn)用委托代理等相關(guān)理論和文獻(xiàn)研究、文本分析、統(tǒng)計(jì)分析、分析歸納的研究方法,同時(shí)結(jié)合中國(guó)目前的制度背景,通過(guò)實(shí)證研究得出以下成果:1.根據(jù)委托代理理論等三個(gè)相關(guān)理論,并基于上市公司中小股東頻受侵害的四個(gè)主要途徑,剖析了內(nèi)部控制五大要素對(duì)于中小股東權(quán)益保護(hù)的作用機(jī)制,并以此建立了內(nèi)部控制分別與關(guān)聯(lián)擔(dān)保、關(guān)聯(lián)交易、代理成本、資金占用四個(gè)方面的多元回歸模型,結(jié)合現(xiàn)有研究通過(guò)選取最有代表性的變量說(shuō)明中小股東權(quán)益受保護(hù)程度,較好地反映出內(nèi)部控制對(duì)中小股東權(quán)益保護(hù)的作用。2.用實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)了混合所有制企業(yè)中內(nèi)部控制與衡量中小股東權(quán)益保護(hù)四方面的關(guān)系,并對(duì)企業(yè)根據(jù)持股比例進(jìn)行分類對(duì)比分析。3.結(jié)合目前中國(guó)的制度背景,根據(jù)理論與實(shí)證分析結(jié)果,從實(shí)際出發(fā)提出相應(yīng)的政策建議。本文的創(chuàng)新之處在于基于內(nèi)控五大要素的新視角,并綜合考慮了最能影響中小股東權(quán)益保護(hù)的四大方面指標(biāo),探究了混合所有制企業(yè)內(nèi)部控制的中小股東權(quán)益保護(hù)作用,并將企業(yè)按國(guó)有股份比例進(jìn)行分類,進(jìn)行對(duì)比分析。本文研究表明,混合所有制企業(yè)中,高質(zhì)量的內(nèi)部控制有利于降低關(guān)聯(lián)擔(dān)保規(guī)模、關(guān)聯(lián)交易規(guī)模以及代理成本,進(jìn)而起到保護(hù)中小股東權(quán)益的作用,尤其是對(duì)于國(guó)有絕對(duì)控股上市公司,其內(nèi)部控制發(fā)揮的積極作用較國(guó)有參股上市公司更為顯著,然而在資金占用方面的作用還有待研究與改進(jìn)。因此,健全完善混合所有制企業(yè)內(nèi)部控制體系,有利于為企業(yè)吸引更多的投資者,為提高企業(yè)的經(jīng)營(yíng)效率和效果注入更強(qiáng)勁的動(dòng)力,從而在良好的政策環(huán)境下,實(shí)現(xiàn)長(zhǎng)足發(fā)展。
[Abstract]:With the occurrence of a series of financial fraud scandals and the subprime crisis that caused the heavy loss of the market, the majority of investors have lost confidence in the securities market, with the protection of investors, especially the protection of small and medium shareholders, which have been paid more and more attention. At the same time, the research on the economic consequences of internal control quality is also concerned. Based on the close relationship between the internal control and the protection of the rights and interests of the small and medium shareholders, the ten Eighth National Congress of the party will vigorously develop the mixed ownership economy and promote the mixed ownership economy. In order to perfect the internal control system of the mixed ownership enterprises and solve the problem of the infringement of the small shareholders' rights and interests, this paper explores the protection of the rights and interests of the small shareholders in the mixed ownership enterprises. This paper is in accordance with the definition of the mixed ownership enterprise for 2012-2015 years. Listed companies for the study sample, using the principal-agent and other related theories and literature research, text analysis, statistical analysis, analysis and induction of research methods, at the same time, combined with the current institutional background of China, the following results are obtained through empirical research: 1. according to the principal-agent theory and other three related theories, and based on the frequency acceptance of small and medium shareholders of listed companies. The four main ways of infringement, analyze the mechanism of the five major elements of internal control for the protection of the rights and interests of small and medium shareholders, and set up a multiple regression model of four aspects, namely, internal control, related guarantee, related transaction, agency cost, and capital occupation, and select the most representative variables to explain the medium and small size. The protection of shareholders' rights and interests is a better reflection of the role of internal control on the protection of the rights and interests of small and medium shareholders.2. empirically tests the relationship between the internal control and the measurement of the protection of the rights and interests of small and medium shareholders in mixed ownership enterprises, and makes a comparative analysis of the proportion of the enterprises according to the proportion of the shareholding, which is based on the institutional background of the current China, which is based on.3.. According to the theoretical and empirical results, we put forward the corresponding policy suggestions from the actual situation. The innovation of this paper is based on the new angle of view based on the five elements of internal control, and takes into account the four major indexes which can most influence the protection of small and medium shareholders' rights and interests, and explores the protection of the rights and interests of small and medium shareholders in the internal control of the mixed ownership enterprises. The study shows that high quality internal control in mixed ownership enterprises is beneficial to reduce the scale of the related guarantee, the scale of related transactions and the agency cost, and then play a role in protecting the rights and interests of small and medium shareholders, especially for the state-owned absolute holding listed companies. The positive role of the system is more significant than that of the state-owned listed companies. However, the role of the capital occupation still needs to be studied and improved. Therefore, the improvement of the internal control system of the mixed ownership enterprises is conducive to attracting more investors to the enterprise, so as to improve the efficiency and effect of the enterprise, so as to improve the efficiency and effect of the enterprise, so as to improve the efficiency and effect of the enterprise, In a good policy environment, great development has been achieved.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：北京物資學(xué)院
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F832.51

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