本文選題：民營企業(yè) + 職工薪酬��； 參考：《華東交通大學(xué)》2016年碩士論文

【摘要】：改革開放以來,我國民營經(jīng)濟發(fā)展迅速,信息傳播速度在不斷加快,在會計領(lǐng)域中信息的不確定性問題也越來越突出。會計的不確定性對會計信息的質(zhì)量有直接影響,尤其是會計信息的穩(wěn)健性。目前的研究成果中,職工薪酬在企業(yè)管理中十分重要,在會計學(xué)領(lǐng)域中對員工工資的研究文獻卻很少。所以,本文以民營企業(yè)的職工薪酬作為研究的切入點,對會計穩(wěn)健性進行研究。本文在已有研究內(nèi)容及成果的基礎(chǔ)上,對契約理論、委托代理理論、信息不對稱理論進行的相關(guān)分析,對職工薪酬與會計穩(wěn)健性間的關(guān)系進行歸納。通過研究發(fā)現(xiàn)由于委托人和代理人信息之間存在信息不對稱的問題將會產(chǎn)生的嚴重的道德風(fēng)險問題甚至?xí)嬖趪乐氐哪嫦蜻x擇的代理問題。在信息不對稱的情況下,薪酬契約可以緩解委托人和代理人之間的利益沖突,但是這種薪酬契約存在固有的缺陷。民營企業(yè)的高管很可能為了自己的利益而粉飾財務(wù)報表,導(dǎo)致員工的利益受到損害。為了緩解這些矛盾,本文在民營企業(yè)內(nèi)部員工工資水平、股權(quán)集中度、職工人數(shù)、薪酬差距方面研究職工薪酬與會計穩(wěn)健性的關(guān)系。在實證分析方面,本文借鑒Basu的盈余——股票報酬計量法,在對前人模型進行研究的基礎(chǔ)上,加入相關(guān)控制變量,構(gòu)建本文需要的模型。通過對數(shù)據(jù)的收集、整理,以我國民營上市公司2012-2014年中國滬深兩市非金融保險行業(yè)的A股上市公司的數(shù)據(jù)為樣本,運用SPSS17.0統(tǒng)計軟件分析了職工工資水平、股權(quán)集中度、職工人數(shù)、薪酬差距對會計穩(wěn)健性的影響。研究分析內(nèi)容主要包括樣本的描述性統(tǒng)計,樣本的相關(guān)性分析,以Wage、First、Employ、Gap為自變量的回歸分析。實證分析結(jié)果驗證:在我國的滬深A(yù)股民營上市公司中職工工資與會計穩(wěn)健性之間為正相關(guān)關(guān)系;股權(quán)集中度與會計穩(wěn)健性負相關(guān);職工人數(shù)與會計穩(wěn)健性之間顯著正相關(guān)。最后,基于上述的理論分析和實證檢驗的結(jié)果,本文從會計準則的制度建設(shè)、對控股股東的監(jiān)管、完善公司內(nèi)部的激勵與約束機制等方面提出了相關(guān)的政策建議。
[Abstract]:Since the reform and opening up, China's private economy has developed rapidly, the speed of information dissemination has been accelerating, and the uncertainty of information has become more and more prominent in the field of accounting. Accounting uncertainty has a direct impact on the quality of accounting information, especially the conservatism of accounting information. In the current research results, the employee compensation is very important in the enterprise management, but the research literature about the employee salary in the accounting field is few. Therefore, this paper studies the accounting conservatism with the employee compensation of private enterprises as the starting point. On the basis of the existing research contents and achievements, this paper analyzes the contract theory, principal-agent theory and information asymmetry theory, and sums up the relationship between employee compensation and accounting conservatism. Through the research, it is found that there will be serious moral hazard problems due to the information asymmetry between principal and agent, and even serious agent problem of adverse selection. In the case of asymmetric information, the compensation contract can alleviate the conflict of interest between the principal and the agent, but the compensation contract has its inherent defects. Private executives are likely to whitewash their financial statements for their own benefit, causing damage to the interests of their employees. In order to alleviate these contradictions, this paper studies the relationship between employee compensation and accounting conservatism in the aspects of employee wage level, equity concentration, number of employees, and salary gap in private enterprises. In the empirical analysis, this paper draws lessons from Basu's earnings-stock return measurement method, on the basis of the study of previous models, adds the relevant control variables, and constructs the model needed in this paper. By collecting and collating the data, taking the data of non-financial and insurance companies in China's Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2012-2014 as a sample, this paper uses SPSS17.0 software to analyze the wage level of workers and the degree of stock concentration. Number of employees, pay gap on the impact of accounting conservatism. The research and analysis mainly include the descriptive statistics of samples, the correlation analysis of samples, and the regression analysis with WageCast first employee Gap as the independent variable. The results of empirical analysis verify: in China, there is a positive correlation between employee wages and accounting conservatism, a negative correlation between ownership concentration and accounting conservatism, and a significant positive correlation between the number of employees and accounting conservatism. Finally, based on the above theoretical analysis and empirical results, this paper puts forward the relevant policy recommendations from the aspects of the system construction of accounting standards, the supervision of controlling shareholders and the improvement of the incentive and restraint mechanism within the company.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華東交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2016
【分類號】：F272.92;F275;F276.5

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