本文選題：創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司 + 股權(quán)激勵(lì)　； 參考：《廣東工業(yè)大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：伴隨著日益激烈的市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng),科技創(chuàng)新正逐漸成為提高國(guó)家綜合競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力和經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展的重要手段,作為微觀經(jīng)濟(jì)主體的企業(yè),研發(fā)投入活動(dòng)是技術(shù)創(chuàng)新和技術(shù)進(jìn)步的重要前提,是企業(yè)核心競(jìng)爭(zhēng)能力的重要來(lái)源。但在現(xiàn)代企業(yè)制度下,企業(yè)的所有權(quán)和經(jīng)營(yíng)權(quán)相分離,企業(yè)所有者與管理者的利益不一致產(chǎn)生了委托—代理問(wèn)題。由于研發(fā)創(chuàng)新活動(dòng)具有較高的不確定性以及投資風(fēng)險(xiǎn)性,作為代理人的企業(yè)管理者很可能基于自利的目的而做出放棄企業(yè)長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)利益的短視行為,從而選擇走穩(wěn)健路線(xiàn)而不去參與研發(fā),在市場(chǎng)中做一個(gè)追隨者,以盡量減少研發(fā)投入。因此,設(shè)計(jì)出使管理層與股東利益目標(biāo)相一致的高管激勵(lì)機(jī)制是企業(yè)創(chuàng)新成功的必要條件。本文首先對(duì)國(guó)內(nèi)外企業(yè)技術(shù)創(chuàng)新影響因素、高管股權(quán)激勵(lì)對(duì)企業(yè)研發(fā)投入影響的相關(guān)文獻(xiàn)進(jìn)行回顧;接著對(duì)相關(guān)的概念進(jìn)行界定和衡量,并介紹了本研究的理論基礎(chǔ)和我國(guó)創(chuàng)業(yè)板公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)現(xiàn)狀和研發(fā)投入現(xiàn)狀;然后選擇了我國(guó)創(chuàng)業(yè)板2010年-2015年間實(shí)行股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案的220家上市公司作為樣本,從其年度財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告、股權(quán)激勵(lì)公告中手工搜集、整理、匯總其披露的股權(quán)激勵(lì)信息,并通過(guò)描述性統(tǒng)計(jì)分析、相關(guān)性分析、多元回歸分析,分別研究高管股權(quán)激勵(lì)契約結(jié)構(gòu)對(duì)企業(yè)研發(fā)投入的影響。實(shí)證研究的結(jié)果表明,對(duì)高管實(shí)行股權(quán)激勵(lì)會(huì)對(duì)企業(yè)研發(fā)投入產(chǎn)生正向積極影響;且實(shí)施限制性股票對(duì)企業(yè)研發(fā)投入的影響效果比股票期權(quán)的效果更好;而股權(quán)激勵(lì)期限方面,激勵(lì)期限越長(zhǎng),激勵(lì)效果越好,而且股權(quán)激勵(lì)期限對(duì)高管股權(quán)激勵(lì)比例與RD投入的關(guān)系產(chǎn)生正向調(diào)節(jié)作用。最后本文結(jié)合前面章節(jié)的理論基礎(chǔ)和研究結(jié)果,針對(duì)性地從政府層面和企業(yè)層面提出改進(jìn)的對(duì)策建議,希望能對(duì)我國(guó)創(chuàng)業(yè)板公司完善高管股權(quán)激勵(lì)機(jī)制,提升企業(yè)技術(shù)創(chuàng)新水平,實(shí)現(xiàn)公司價(jià)值最大化的目標(biāo)。
[Abstract]:With the increasingly fierce market competition, scientific and technological innovation is gradually becoming an important means to improve the national comprehensive competitiveness and economic development. As a microeconomic main body of enterprises, R & D investment is an important prerequisite for technological innovation and technological progress.It is an important source of core competence.However, under the modern enterprise system, the ownership and management of the enterprise are separated, and the interests of the owner and the manager are not consistent, which leads to the principal-agent problem.Because of the high uncertainty and investment risk of R & D innovation activities, corporate managers as agents are likely to abandon the long-term interests of enterprises based on self-interest short-sighted behavior.So choose to take a steady path rather than participate in R & D, in the market as a follower to minimize R & D investment.Therefore, it is a necessary condition for the success of enterprise innovation to design an executive incentive mechanism which is consistent with the interests of management and shareholders.At first, this paper reviews the influence factors of technology innovation and the influence of executive equity incentive on R & D investment of enterprises at home and abroad; then defines and measures the related concepts.It also introduces the theoretical basis of this study and the current situation of equity incentive and R & D investment of gem companies in China, and then selects 220 listed companies that implemented equity incentive schemes in the gem from 2010 to 2015 as samples.From its annual financial report, equity incentive announcement manually collected, collated, summarized its disclosed equity incentive information, and through descriptive statistical analysis, correlation analysis, multiple regression analysis,The influence of executive equity incentive contract structure on R & D investment is studied.The results of the empirical study show that the executive equity incentive will have a positive impact on enterprise R & D investment; and the impact of restrictive stocks on R & D investment is better than that of stock option; and the duration of equity incentive.The longer the incentive period, the better the incentive effect, and the positive effect of equity incentive period on the relationship between executive equity incentive ratio and R D input.Finally, combining the theoretical basis and research results of the previous chapters, this paper puts forward countermeasures and suggestions for improvement from the government and enterprise level, hoping to improve the incentive mechanism of executive equity for gem companies in China.Improve the level of technological innovation and achieve the goal of maximizing the value of the company.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：廣東工業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F832.51;F272.92;F273.1

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