本文選題：媒體監(jiān)督　切入點(diǎn)：法律環(huán)境　出處：《西南交通大學(xué)》2016年碩士論文

【摘要】：高管薪酬同企業(yè)績(jī)效不匹配的現(xiàn)象在國(guó)內(nèi)外都屢見不鮮。我國(guó)高管的薪酬水平在中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)飛躍發(fā)展的同時(shí)也進(jìn)入了快速增長(zhǎng)時(shí)期,高管薪酬問題之所以受到廣大投資者、乃至普通老百姓的高度關(guān)注,是因?yàn)橐恍╆P(guān)乎國(guó)計(jì)民生的社會(huì)熱點(diǎn)如社會(huì)公平、公司治理與腐敗現(xiàn)象與之有著諸多聯(lián)系。而“天價(jià)薪酬”、“零薪酬”等不合理現(xiàn)象的頻繁出現(xiàn)也刺激著公眾情緒,媒體作為這一現(xiàn)象的傳播載體,其信息的傳播與擴(kuò)散職能異常突出,放大了社會(huì)影響效應(yīng)�；谖覈�(guó)當(dāng)前社會(huì)發(fā)展階段和經(jīng)濟(jì)狀況考慮,學(xué)者們多肯定了媒體在高管薪酬治理中起到的重要作用,但對(duì)行政機(jī)制、制度等因素等到底是如何同時(shí)影響高管薪酬的較少。在我國(guó)當(dāng)下,各地區(qū)法律環(huán)境水平不統(tǒng)一的國(guó)情之下,本文認(rèn)為法律環(huán)境這一因素同樣是高管薪酬治理走向完善的重要方面,這更加宏觀,也不可忽略。因此本文將驗(yàn)證不同法律環(huán)境水平中對(duì)高管薪酬合理水平也不同,從而肯定了法律環(huán)境的重要性。本章根據(jù)相關(guān)理論和研究成果進(jìn)行實(shí)證研究,以2013年違規(guī)的上市公司為研究對(duì)象,對(duì)各變量進(jìn)行全面的描述性統(tǒng)計(jì)分析,對(duì)樣本有一個(gè)全面的了解,然后再進(jìn)行相關(guān)性分析,了解各個(gè)變量之間的相關(guān)性,再在前文構(gòu)建模型之上對(duì)假設(shè)進(jìn)行實(shí)證驗(yàn)證。先通過回歸結(jié)果分別證明了媒體監(jiān)督度越高,高管薪酬水平下降越大,法律環(huán)境越好,高管薪酬水平下降越大。但是在不同法律環(huán)境之下,媒體監(jiān)督對(duì)高管薪酬的影響驗(yàn)證并沒有得到驗(yàn)證,所以本文為將按照法律環(huán)境指數(shù)的高低將樣本公司分為兩個(gè)樣本,從實(shí)證結(jié)果分析得出,在法律環(huán)境好的地方,負(fù)面媒體報(bào)道對(duì)高管薪酬影響是較為偏大的,在法律環(huán)境不好的地方,就算有負(fù)面媒體報(bào)道的情況出現(xiàn)高管薪酬影響也不是非常明顯,從而證實(shí)了本文的假設(shè)。
[Abstract]:Executive compensation and corporate performance do not match the phenomenon is common at home and abroad.China's executive compensation level has also entered a period of rapid growth while China's economy is developing rapidly. The issue of executive compensation has been highly concerned by the majority of investors and even ordinary people.This is because some social hotspots such as social equity, corporate governance and corruption have many links.However, the frequent appearance of unreasonable phenomena such as "sky-high salary" and "zero salary" also stimulates public sentiment. As the communication carrier of this phenomenon, the information dissemination and diffusion function of the media is extremely prominent, amplifying the social influence effect.Based on the current stage of social development and economic situation in China, scholars have affirmed the media play an important role in executive compensation governance, but how the administrative mechanism, system and other factors affect executive compensation at the same time is less.At present, the level of legal environment in different regions is not uniform. This paper holds that the legal environment is also an important aspect of executive compensation governance towards perfection, which is more macro and can not be ignored.Therefore, this paper will verify that the reasonable level of executive compensation is different in different legal environment level, thus affirming the importance of legal environment.This chapter carries on the empirical research according to the related theory and the research result, takes the listed company which violates the regulations in 2013 as the research object, carries on the comprehensive descriptive statistical analysis to each variable, has a comprehensive understanding to the sample, then carries on the correlation analysis.To understand the correlation between the variables, and then build a model above the hypothesis empirical verification.First, the regression results show that the higher the media supervision, the bigger the executive compensation level falls, the better the legal environment, the greater the executive compensation level decline.However, under different legal circumstances, the impact of media supervision on executive compensation has not been verified, so this paper will be based on the legal environment index will be divided into two samples, from the empirical results analysis,Where the legal environment is good, negative media reports have a relatively large impact on executive compensation. Where the legal environment is not good, even if there are negative media reports, the impact of executive compensation is not very obvious.Thus, the hypothesis of this paper is confirmed.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2016
【分類號(hào)】：F272.92

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