本文關(guān)鍵詞：生命周期視角下股權(quán)激勵對盈余管理影響研究　出處：《遼寧大學(xué)》2016年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 股權(quán)激勵 盈余管理 生命周期

【摘要】：隨著現(xiàn)代經(jīng)濟(jì)的發(fā)展,公司所有權(quán)和經(jīng)營權(quán)相分離,這就產(chǎn)生了委托代理關(guān)系,而所有者與經(jīng)營者追求的目標(biāo)利益是不一致的,所有者追求的股東財富最大化,經(jīng)理人追求自身利益最大化。為了使所有者利益、經(jīng)營者利益同企業(yè)利益結(jié)合起來,在西方率先產(chǎn)生了一種長期激勵機(jī)制——股權(quán)激勵。這種長期激勵制度就是一份激勵合同,這份合同中,標(biāo)明公司高管可以享有一部分公司的股權(quán),參與到公司的重大決策中,并共擔(dān)風(fēng)險,使個人利益與公司利益相同步,以實現(xiàn)公司價值最大化,但隨之也產(chǎn)生了一個新問題。因為股權(quán)激勵行權(quán)會有一定的行權(quán)條件,有一定量化的指標(biāo),比如凈資產(chǎn)收益率需要提高多少等等。高管在股權(quán)激勵的誘惑下,就可能會用某些不正當(dāng)?shù)氖侄芜M(jìn)行盈余管理,以使自己的經(jīng)營業(yè)績達(dá)到行權(quán)指標(biāo)。企業(yè)處于不同的生命周期,其經(jīng)營范圍、盈利能力、償債能力、營運能力、實施的公司戰(zhàn)略、組織結(jié)構(gòu)、監(jiān)管制度等,甚至公司高管所享有的權(quán)力,與公司簽訂的契約都是隨生命周期的不同而變化的。所以本文基于生命周期視角下研究股權(quán)激勵對盈余管理的影響。本文第一部分是緒論。主要介紹選題背景、意義,文獻(xiàn)綜述、及創(chuàng)新點。第二部分是基礎(chǔ)理論。簡單介紹了股權(quán)激勵和盈余管理的的內(nèi)涵和計量方法；生命周期的劃分方法；股權(quán)激勵與盈余管理關(guān)系的基礎(chǔ)理論。第三部分是實證設(shè)計。提出假設(shè),闡述本文生命周期的劃分,定義解釋變量、被解釋變量、調(diào)節(jié)變量、控制變量、以及建立了實證模型。第四部分是實證分析。首先是描述性統(tǒng)計分析,直觀描述各變量的特征；其次進(jìn)行了Pearson相關(guān)分析,避免共線性對線性回歸的影響；然后不區(qū)分生命周期下,對全樣本進(jìn)行回歸分析,以驗證股權(quán)激勵與盈余管理的關(guān)系；并進(jìn)行了層次回歸分析,以驗證生命周期的調(diào)節(jié)作用；再分別對成長期和成熟期階段的樣本進(jìn)行分組回歸分析；最后進(jìn)行了穩(wěn)健性檢驗。第五部分,根據(jù)以上分析給予結(jié)論和建議。通過理論和實證上的分析,驗證了在不區(qū)分企業(yè)生命周期時,股權(quán)激勵與盈余管理呈正相關(guān)。區(qū)分企業(yè)生命周期階段后,成長期的公司,股權(quán)激勵與盈余管理呈顯著正相關(guān)。成熟期,股權(quán)激勵與盈余管理無顯著相關(guān)關(guān)系。企業(yè)生命周期在股權(quán)激勵與盈余管理關(guān)系上起調(diào)節(jié)作用。
[Abstract]:With the development of modern economy, the ownership of the company is separated from the management right, which leads to the principal-agent relationship, and the target interests pursued by the owner and the operator are inconsistent, and the shareholder wealth maximization pursued by the owner. Managers pursue the maximization of their own interests. In order to make the owners' interests, the managers' interests are combined with the enterprises' interests. In the West, a long-term incentive mechanism, equity incentive, was first developed. This kind of long-term incentive system is an incentive contract, which indicates that company executives can enjoy some of the shares of the company. Participate in the major decisions of the company, and share the risks, so that the interests of the company and personal interests synchronize, in order to maximize the value of the company. But then there is a new problem. Because equity incentive exercise will have certain conditions of exercise, there are certain quantitative indicators, such as how much increase in the return on net assets, and so on. May use some improper means of earnings management, in order to make their own business performance to achieve the exercise of the indicators. Enterprises in different life cycles, its business scope, profitability, solvency, operating capacity. Implementation of corporate strategy, organizational structure, regulatory system, and even the power of company executives. The contracts signed with the company vary with the life cycle. Therefore, this paper studies the impact of equity incentive on earnings management from the perspective of life cycle. The first part of this paper is an introduction. Significance, literature review, and innovation. The second part is the basic theory. It briefly introduces the connotation and measurement methods of equity incentive and earnings management; The method of life cycle division; The third part is empirical design. Put forward the hypothesis, explain the life cycle of this paper, define explained variable, explained variable, adjust variable, control variable. And established the empirical model. 4th part is empirical analysis. First, descriptive statistical analysis, intuitively describing the characteristics of each variable; Secondly, Pearson correlation analysis was carried out to avoid the influence of collinearity on linear regression. Then regression analysis is carried out to verify the relationship between equity incentive and earnings management without distinguishing the life cycle. The hierarchical regression analysis was carried out to verify the regulating effect of the life cycle. Then the group regression analysis was carried out on the samples of the growth stage and the mature stage respectively. Finally, the robustness test. Part 5th, according to the above analysis to give conclusions and recommendations. Through theoretical and empirical analysis, we verify that the business life cycle is not differentiated. Equity incentive has a positive correlation with earnings management. After distinguishing the stages of enterprise life cycle, the equity incentive has a significant positive correlation with earnings management in the growing period. There is no significant correlation between equity incentive and earnings management. The life cycle of enterprise plays a regulating role in the relationship between equity incentive and earnings management.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：遼寧大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2016
【分類號】：F275;F272.92

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