本文關(guān)鍵詞：高管薪酬結(jié)構(gòu)、媒體報(bào)道與投資不足　出處：《浙江財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2016年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

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【摘要】：投資決策是企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)管理的重要部分之一,它直接影響企業(yè)的生存和發(fā)展。近幾年來,我國上市公司非效率投資現(xiàn)象越來越嚴(yán)重,這不僅損害了公司價(jià)值還影響企業(yè)的長期發(fā)展。委托代理問題使得企業(yè)的所有者和經(jīng)營者之間存在利益沖突,管理層所做出的一些投資決策往往不是為了增加股東利益和企業(yè)價(jià)值,而是為了其自身利益。由于股東和管理者之間存在信息不對(duì)稱現(xiàn)象,相對(duì)于股東來說處于信息優(yōu)勢方的管理層能夠獲得更多的投資信息,高管很有可能以此獲利,為了其自身利益最大化而損害股東利益。有效的高管激勵(lì)機(jī)制可以緩解由于所有權(quán)和經(jīng)營權(quán)分離所引發(fā)的代理問題,也可以激勵(lì)高管人員為企業(yè)價(jià)值最大化而做出努力。在當(dāng)今信息化產(chǎn)業(yè)高速發(fā)展的互聯(lián)網(wǎng)時(shí)代,媒體發(fā)展十分迅猛,并在社會(huì)、經(jīng)濟(jì)等各個(gè)方面扮演著重要的角色。媒體作為一種重要的信息中介,具有緩解信息不對(duì)稱和公司治理的作用。一方面,媒體可以通過信息的收集、整理與分析傳遞給大眾,從而降低信息使用者的搜集成本,降低信息不對(duì)稱程度。另一方面,媒體可以通過法律、高管聲譽(yù)和公眾形象這三種渠道來發(fā)揮其公司治理作用(Dyck and Zingales,2002)。現(xiàn)有學(xué)者在實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)時(shí)已發(fā)現(xiàn)我國上市公司存在投資不足行為,但是對(duì)投資不足及其影響因素的研究仍相對(duì)較少,所以應(yīng)當(dāng)引起更多的重視(周偉賢,2010)。在高管薪酬方面,已有文獻(xiàn)表明高管薪酬與企業(yè)投資不足呈顯著負(fù)向關(guān)系(辛清泉,2007),但還鮮有文獻(xiàn)從薪酬結(jié)構(gòu)的角度來探究其與投資不足的影響。因此本文從企業(yè)投資不足行為出發(fā),檢驗(yàn)高管薪酬結(jié)構(gòu)與企業(yè)投資不足的關(guān)系,同時(shí)加入媒體報(bào)道這一變量,進(jìn)一步實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)媒體報(bào)道對(duì)高管薪酬結(jié)構(gòu)與投資不足關(guān)系的影響。全文共分六章展開,各章主要內(nèi)容如下:第一章是緒論,本章系統(tǒng)地闡述了本文研究的背景、研究意義、研究內(nèi)容以及研究創(chuàng)新之處。第二章是文獻(xiàn)綜述。本章首先對(duì)投資不足影響因素的文獻(xiàn)進(jìn)行分析,其次總結(jié)高管薪酬對(duì)投資不足影響的研究,同時(shí)分析了媒體對(duì)投資效率影響的文獻(xiàn)。最后對(duì)現(xiàn)有文獻(xiàn)進(jìn)行系統(tǒng)評(píng)述。第三章是理論分析與研究假設(shè)。本章首先對(duì)高管薪酬結(jié)構(gòu)、媒體報(bào)道與投資不足的相關(guān)概念進(jìn)行介紹;其次對(duì)委托代理理論、信息不對(duì)稱理論、激勵(lì)理論以及聲譽(yù)機(jī)制進(jìn)行論述,同時(shí)提出了本文的研究假設(shè)。第四章是研究設(shè)計(jì)。本章主要描述了數(shù)據(jù)的來源及樣本的篩選過程,并構(gòu)建本文的回歸模型,同時(shí)對(duì)于模型所需要的主要變量進(jìn)行說明。第五章是實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)與結(jié)果分析。本章對(duì)樣本數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行計(jì)量分析,包括描述性統(tǒng)計(jì)、相關(guān)性檢驗(yàn)及多元回歸分析,并將實(shí)證結(jié)果結(jié)合實(shí)際情況進(jìn)行分析。第六章是研究結(jié)論、建議與局限。本章全面梳理了文章的研究結(jié)論,并根據(jù)實(shí)際存在的具體問題提出了相應(yīng)的政策建議,同時(shí)也指出本文研究的局限性。本文的研究得出以下結(jié)論:由于委托代理問題的存在,上市公司普遍存在非效率投資現(xiàn)象,其中投資不足的問題更為嚴(yán)重。在職消費(fèi)占總薪酬比重與投資不足呈負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系,而貨幣薪酬對(duì)在職消費(fèi)替代性與投資不足呈正相關(guān)關(guān)系,這說明當(dāng)薪酬一定時(shí)在職消費(fèi)較于貨幣薪酬會(huì)更有利于提高企業(yè)投資效率,但在職消費(fèi)的使用需要受到一定的限制。媒體報(bào)道對(duì)投資不足產(chǎn)生負(fù)向影響,說明媒體監(jiān)督能夠有效改善企業(yè)投資不足現(xiàn)象,并且媒體報(bào)道變量的加入,增強(qiáng)了在職消費(fèi)占總薪酬比重對(duì)投資不足的負(fù)向作用,減弱了貨幣薪酬對(duì)在職消費(fèi)替代性與投資不足的正向關(guān)系。最后,針對(duì)本文得出的研究結(jié)論從三個(gè)角度提出相關(guān)政策建議。第一,完善企業(yè)高管薪酬激勵(lì)機(jī)制的設(shè)計(jì);第二,完善企業(yè)內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu),建立健全監(jiān)督管理機(jī)制;第三,重視媒體的監(jiān)督與公司治理功能。本文的創(chuàng)新之處主要有:第一,現(xiàn)有文獻(xiàn)較多從非效率投資整體出發(fā),而對(duì)投資不足的研究相對(duì)較少,因此本文將投資不足作為研究的切入點(diǎn),考慮各解釋變量對(duì)投資不足的作用;第二,本文將在職消費(fèi)占總薪酬比重與貨幣薪酬對(duì)在職消費(fèi)的替代性作為薪酬結(jié)構(gòu)的變量,衡量其對(duì)投資不足的影響,為投資不足的研究提供新的視角,同時(shí)也可以更加辯證的看待在職消費(fèi),發(fā)揮在職消費(fèi)的積極作用。
[Abstract]:Investment decision-making is an important part of enterprise financial management, it directly affects the survival and development of enterprises. In recent years, China's inefficient investment of listed companies is becoming more and more serious, which not only damages the value of the company but also influence the long-term development of the enterprise. The principal-agent problem makes the conflict of interests between the owner and the operator of the enterprise. Some of the investment decision of management is not to increase shareholder value and enterprise value, but for its own interests. Because of the existence of information asymmetry between shareholders and managers, shareholders in relation to the management information superiority can get more investment information, executives are likely to profit, for their own interests the damage to the interests of shareholders. Effective incentive mechanism can alleviate the caused by the separation of ownership and management agency problem, It can motivate executives to maximize the value of enterprises and efforts. In today's rapid development of information industry in the Internet era, the media development is very rapid, and in the social, economic and other aspects play an important role. The media as an important information intermediary, can alleviate the information asymmetry and the effect of corporate governance on the one hand. The media, through information collection, collation and analysis of transfer to the public, so as to reduce the cost of collecting the information users, reduce the degree of information asymmetry. On the other hand, the media can pass laws, executive reputation and public image of the three channels to play its role in corporate governance (Dyck and Zingales, 2002). The existing scholars have been found there is insufficient investment behavior of Chinese Listed Companies in the empirical test, but the study on the factors of insufficient investment and its influence is still relatively small, so we should pay more Attention (Zhou Weixian, 2010). In the executive pay, the literature shows a significant negative relationship between the lack of executive compensation and corporate investment (Xin Qingquan, 2007), but there is little literature from the salary structure perspective to explore the influence and the lack of investment. So this article from the under investment behavior of the relationship between executive inspection the salary structure and corporate investment, also joined the media coverage of this variable, to test the impact of media on the structure of executive compensation and the lack of investment relations. The paper is divided into six chapters, the main contents of each chapter are as follows: the first chapter is the introduction, this chapter systematically elaborates the research background, research significance, research the content of research and innovation. The second chapter is literature review. This chapter firstly inadequate investment factors analysis of the literature research, secondly summarizes the executive compensation for investment is not enough influence, the same Analysis of the impact of media on investment efficiency. Finally, the literature systematic review of existing literature. The third chapter is the theoretical analysis and research hypothesis. This chapter begins with the structure of executive compensation related concepts are introduced. The lack of media coverage and investment; secondly, the principal-agent theory, information asymmetry theory, incentive theory and reputation mechanism discuss and put forward the hypothesis of this research. The fourth chapter is the research design. This chapter mainly describes the data sources and sample selection process, and constructs the regression model of this paper, at the same time for the main variables required by the model are described. The fifth chapter is the empirical test and analysis results. This chapter on the sample data of measurement the analysis, including descriptive statistics, correlation test and multiple regression analysis, and empirical results are analyzed with the actual situation. The sixth chapter is the conclusion of the study, suggestions and limitations. This chapter comprehensively analyzes the research conclusion, and put forward the corresponding policy recommendations according to the specific practical problems, but also pointed out the limitations of this study. This study draws the following conclusions: due to the existence of principal-agent problem, listed companies generally have the phenomenon of inefficient investment, the investment shortage is more serious the job consumption is less than the total compensation and the proportion of investment is negatively correlated, but the monetary compensation for on-the-job consumption substitution and under investment are positively related, indicating that when the salary when compared with on-the-job consumption monetary compensation will be more conducive to improve the efficiency of business investment, but the use of on-the-job consumption needs is limited. The negative media reports to illustrate the impact on investment, media supervision can effectively improve the phenomenon of insufficient investment, and the media variables added, enhance the on-the-job consumption The proportion of total compensation costs accounted for the lack of investment and negative effect, weakened the positive relationship between monetary compensation for lack of alternative investment and consumption. Finally, according to the conclusion of this article puts forward relevant policy suggestions from three aspects. First, to improve the design of executive compensation incentive mechanism; second, improve the internal governance the structure, establish and improve the supervision and management mechanism; third, pay attention to media supervision and corporate governance function. The main innovations of this article are: first, the existing literature more from the non efficiency investment of the whole research on the shortage of investment is relatively small, so the lack of investment as a starting point, considering the effect of explanatory variables on the insufficient investment; second, the proportion of total compensation on-the-job consumption and monetary compensation for non pecuniary compensation alternative as compensation structure variables, the measure of insufficient investment The influence is to provide a new perspective for the research on underinvestment, and at the same time, it can also take a more dialectical view of the on-the-job consumption and play the active role of on-the-job consumption.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：浙江財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2016
【分類號(hào)】：F272.92;F275

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