基于交易成本的工程變更治理研究
[Abstract]:Engineering change is inevitable in the construction of the project, coupled with the incomplete signing of the contract, which leads to the disputes between the contracting parties caused by the change of the project to have an impact on the duration, quality and price of the contract, thus reducing the performance efficiency of the contract. The main reason for the dispute over project change is that there is no rules to follow after the change occurs due to the lack of agreement or unclear agreement, which provides an opportunity for the speculative behavior of the parties to the contract. The contracting parties scramble to capture the potential value added of the project changes. However, without the existence of engineering change events, engineering change disputes will not occur. As a dynamic adjustment measure for the contractor to perfect the design and build the environmental adaptability project, the engineering change can not be completely denied because of its controversy and uncertainty. In view of this, this paper explores how to reduce the transaction cost of project change from two aspects: optimizing engineering change and improving the efficiency of post negotiation of project change. On the one hand, it avoids the blind change that changes with change. On the other hand, it improves the efficiency of solving things that have to be changed. First of all, the deblurring research is carried out on the disputes caused by unclear contracting in the project change clause. This paper puts forward two items that often cause disputes about project quantity change and construction project change, and selects 07 edition of "Standard Construction bidding document", 13 edition of "valuation Standard of Construction quantity list", 99 edition of FIDIC "Construction contract conditions" as the object. By comparing and analyzing the concept that is often confused in practice, the paper defines the precondition that the change of engineering quantity and the change of construction scheme can be compensated according to the terms of engineering change, and removes the ambiguity in the agreement. Reduce the resulting increase in transaction costs. Secondly, this paper explores the incentive factors of the cooperative negotiation mechanism of engineering change, puts forward the conception of risk sharing and reference point contract inducement to cooperative negotiation, and gives some practical guidance suggestions. The project change is greatly affected by the subjective and natural environment of the contracting parties. The contract cannot agree on all possible changes and the ambiguity in the project change cannot be completely removed. Depending on the contract agreement completely can not realize the effective control of the project change. To explore the incentive contract parties to deal with the project change according to the spirit of cooperation is to solve the problem of high transaction cost and low performance efficiency of the project change fundamentally. Finally, from the point of view of reducing unnecessary change, the idea of optimizing engineering change is explored. On the one hand, the internal control path of engineering change is established, and an effective change control path is designed so that both parties have to comply with the procedure to fulfill the contract. On the other hand, the change control strategy based on revenue sharing is put forward, and the profit sharing of the cost saving part of the project is carried out on the part of optimizing the cost of engineering change proposed by the contractor and the reasonable suggestion made by the contractor. Encourage the contractor to exercise active control over engineering changes and improve the efficiency of engineering change control. To sum up, this paper analyzes the essential reasons of engineering change through incomplete contract theory, puts forward the measures to reduce the transaction cost of the change, and explores the way to realize the effective control of the change, which is helpful to reduce the transaction cost of the project change. Improve the value of engineering changes, and ultimately achieve the efficiency of contract performance.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:天津理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2015
【分類號】:TU723.3
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