【摘要】：自2015年知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)制度改革被提出以來,“知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)”這一名詞多次在國家的重大和重要會(huì)議上被提及。在打造文化強(qiáng)國和扶持中小企業(yè)發(fā)展兩方面都扮演著重要角色的“知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)”受到越來越多的關(guān)注。在經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展的今天,在我國科技興國的今天,創(chuàng)新是國家進(jìn)步和發(fā)展的靈魂,國家的創(chuàng)新能為經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展注入活力,從而促進(jìn)其發(fā)展。然而,我國的經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展也存在一個(gè)明顯的特點(diǎn),中小企業(yè)數(shù)量龐大,且這類企業(yè)貢獻(xiàn)全國GDP的近67%。由于良莠不齊的中小企業(yè)發(fā)展?fàn)顩r不一,且擴(kuò)大規(guī)模需要的資金渠道難獲取,中小企業(yè)融資難的問題在我國越來越凸顯。尤其是輕資產(chǎn)型的科技型中小企業(yè),由于所等提供的不動(dòng)產(chǎn)抵押物少,要想獲得融資比其他企業(yè)更為困難。“知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)質(zhì)押融資”的模式能解決中小企業(yè)融資難的同時(shí)促進(jìn)創(chuàng)新,因此,這一模式一經(jīng)提出就受到了企業(yè)和政府極大的歡迎。然而,隨著新模式的提出,越來越多的問題也逐漸顯露,知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)質(zhì)押融資的實(shí)踐還有很多問題等著我們?nèi)ソ鉀Q。在知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)質(zhì)押融資的實(shí)踐中,知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)質(zhì)押價(jià)值的確定是一大難題。由于知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)質(zhì)押?jiǎn)栴}的研究處于起步階段,可以參考的理論和實(shí)踐資料都有限,難以形成統(tǒng)一的能同時(shí)讓企業(yè)、銀行、政府都滿意的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。鑒于此,本文借鑒了博弈論的理論,和納什均衡分別從各利益相關(guān)方的角度,對(duì)知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)質(zhì)押融資中利益相關(guān)方的博弈進(jìn)行分析。為了便于分析與理解,本文主要是從企業(yè)和銀行兩個(gè)角度來進(jìn)行分析,并建立企業(yè)和銀行的靜態(tài)和動(dòng)態(tài)博弈模型。通過模型分析知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)質(zhì)押融資中企業(yè)和銀行的博弈關(guān)系,并通過模擬企業(yè)和銀行的博弈的結(jié)果,結(jié)合案例分析對(duì)知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)的質(zhì)押價(jià)值進(jìn)行評(píng)估。通過對(duì)銀企關(guān)系的分析,找出制約知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)質(zhì)押模式發(fā)展的原因,給出相對(duì)合理的知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)質(zhì)押價(jià)值,為化解利益相關(guān)方之間的矛盾,促進(jìn)合作提供一定的參考意見。
[Abstract]:Since the introduction of the reform of the intellectual property system in 2015, the "Intellectual Property" has been mentioned several times in major and important meetings of the State. The "Intellectual Property" that plays an important role in building a cultural power and supporting the development of small and medium-sized enterprises has attracted more and more attention. In the present day of the economic development, the innovation is the soul of the country's progress and development, and the innovation of the country can inject vitality into the economic development, thus promoting its development. However, the economic development of our country also has a clear characteristic, the number of small and medium-sized enterprises is large, and such enterprises contribute nearly 67% of the national GDP. The problems of small and medium-sized enterprises are becoming more and more prominent in our country because of the uneven development of small and medium-sized enterprises, and the difficult access to the capital channels needed for the expansion of the scale. In particular, small and medium-sized small and medium-sized enterprises of light asset type, due to the lack of the real property collateral provided by the company, it is more difficult to obtain the financing than other enterprises. The model of "intellectual property pledge financing" can solve the difficulty of the financing of small and medium-sized enterprises, and promote innovation. Therefore, this model has been greatly welcomed by the enterprises and the government once it is put forward. However, with the development of the new model, more and more problems are gradually revealed, and the practice of the intellectual property pledge financing has many problems waiting for us to solve. In the practice of the pledge financing of intellectual property, the determination of the pledge value of the intellectual property is a big problem. Because the research of the issue of the pledge of intellectual property is in the initial stage, the theoretical and practical information that can be referenced is limited, it is difficult to form a unified standard which can satisfy both the enterprise, the bank and the government at the same time. In view of this, this paper, based on the theory of game theory and Nash equilibrium, analyzes the game of interest-related parties in the intellectual property pledge financing from the angle of the relevant parties. In order to facilitate the analysis and understanding, this paper mainly analyzes the two angles of the enterprise and the bank, and sets up the static and dynamic game model of the enterprise and the bank. Through the model analysis, the game relationship between the enterprise and the bank in the intellectual property pledge financing is analyzed, and the pledge value of the intellectual property is evaluated by combining the result of the game between the enterprise and the bank. Through the analysis of the relationship between the bank and the enterprise, the author finds out the reason for restricting the development of the intellectual property pledge model, and gives the relative reasonable pledge value of the intellectual property right, and provides some reference for resolving the contradiction between the stakeholders and promoting the cooperation.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：云南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F832.4;F276.3;F275

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本文編號(hào)：2511658