【摘要】：隨著社會(huì)主義市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)的確立和發(fā)展,我國(guó)商業(yè)銀行實(shí)現(xiàn)了從無(wú)到有突破,并迅速地成長(zhǎng)和壯大起來(lái),商業(yè)銀行在我國(guó)的國(guó)民經(jīng)濟(jì)中發(fā)揮著著越來(lái)重要的作用。但直到現(xiàn)在,有關(guān)商業(yè)銀行盈余管理的研究還十分匱乏,商業(yè)銀行由于其獨(dú)特的屬性經(jīng)常成為盈余管理研究的盲區(qū)。為了豐富商業(yè)銀行盈余管理的研究成果,促進(jìn)我國(guó)銀行業(yè)的健康發(fā)展,保障利益相關(guān)者的合法權(quán)益,本文在理論分析的基礎(chǔ)上,主要采用了實(shí)證研究的方法對(duì)我國(guó)商業(yè)銀行盈余管理的存在性及影響因素進(jìn)行了檢驗(yàn)。本文選取我國(guó)16家上市商業(yè)銀行2011-2015年的相關(guān)數(shù)據(jù)作為研究樣本,通過(guò)構(gòu)建回歸模型,分層次地實(shí)證了我國(guó)商業(yè)銀行盈余管理的存在性及影響因素,并最終得出了以下結(jié)論:(1)我國(guó)商業(yè)銀行既存在以利潤(rùn)平滑為目的的應(yīng)計(jì)盈余管理,也存在以利潤(rùn)平滑為目的的真實(shí)盈余管理,并且應(yīng)計(jì)盈余管理程度要遠(yuǎn)大于真實(shí)盈余管理程度;(2)商業(yè)銀行盈余管理程度與獨(dú)立董事比例呈負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系,即獨(dú)立董事比例越大商業(yè)銀行盈余管理程度越小;(3)商業(yè)銀行盈余管理程度與監(jiān)事會(huì)會(huì)議次數(shù)呈負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系,即每年召開的監(jiān)事會(huì)會(huì)議次數(shù)越多商業(yè)銀行盈余管理程度越低;(4)商業(yè)銀行盈余管理程度與銀行規(guī)模呈正相關(guān)關(guān)系,即規(guī)模越大商業(yè)銀行的盈余管理程度越大;(5)商業(yè)銀行盈余管理程度與股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、董事會(huì)會(huì)議次數(shù)沒(méi)有顯著的相關(guān)關(guān)系。針對(duì)以上實(shí)證結(jié)果,本文從立法與監(jiān)管角度提出相應(yīng)的政策建議,建議監(jiān)管部門有側(cè)重地對(duì)商業(yè)銀行盈余管理進(jìn)行監(jiān)管,重點(diǎn)關(guān)注商業(yè)銀行的應(yīng)計(jì)盈余管理,重點(diǎn)關(guān)注規(guī)模較大的商業(yè)銀行;建議不斷健全獨(dú)立董事制度,適當(dāng)提高獨(dú)立董事比例,保障獨(dú)立董事的獨(dú)立性;建議充分發(fā)揮監(jiān)事會(huì)的作用,強(qiáng)調(diào)監(jiān)事的會(huì)計(jì)專業(yè)知識(shí),構(gòu)建完善的監(jiān)事責(zé)任制度。
[Abstract]:With the establishment and development of socialist market economy, China's commercial banks have achieved a breakthrough from nothing to a breakthrough, and rapidly grew up. Commercial banks are playing a more and more important role in the national economy of our country. However, until now, the research on earnings management of commercial banks is still very scarce, because of its unique attributes, commercial banks often become a blind spot in earnings management research. In order to enrich the research results of earnings management of commercial banks, promote the healthy development of China's banking industry, and protect the legitimate rights and interests of stakeholders, this paper, on the basis of theoretical analysis, This paper mainly uses the empirical research method to test the existence and influencing factors of earnings management of commercial banks in China. In this paper, 16 listed commercial banks in China from 2011 to 2015 are selected as research samples, and the existence and influencing factors of earnings management of Chinese commercial banks are proved by constructing regression model. Finally, the following conclusions are drawn: (1) there is not only accrual earnings management for the purpose of profit smoothing, but also real earnings management for the purpose of profit smoothing in Chinese commercial banks. The degree of accrual earnings management is much higher than that of real earnings management. (2) there is a negative correlation between the degree of earnings management of commercial banks and the proportion of independent directors, that is, the larger the proportion of independent directors, the smaller the degree of earnings management of commercial banks; (3) the degree of earnings management of commercial banks is negatively related to the number of supervisory meetings, that is, the more the number of supervisory meetings held annually, the lower the degree of earnings management of commercial banks; (4) the degree of earnings management of commercial banks is positively correlated with the size of banks, that is, the larger the size of commercial banks, the greater the degree of earnings management of commercial banks; (5) there is no significant correlation between the degree of earnings management of commercial banks and ownership structure, and the number of board meetings. In view of the above empirical results, this paper puts forward corresponding policy recommendations from the perspective of legislation and regulation, and suggests that the regulatory authorities should focus on the supervision of earnings management of commercial banks, focusing on the accrual earnings management of commercial banks. Focus on large-scale commercial banks; It is suggested that the system of independent directors should be constantly improved, the proportion of independent directors should be raised properly, and the independence of independent directors should be protected, and the role of the board of supervisors should be fully played, the accounting professional knowledge of supervisors should be emphasized, and a perfect system of supervisors' responsibility should be constructed.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：長(zhǎng)安大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F832.33;F830.42

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