【摘要】：中小企業(yè)在日趨發(fā)展的國民經(jīng)濟中有著舉足輕重的地位和作用,但是中小企業(yè)都是小資產(chǎn)規(guī)模經(jīng)濟,且都具有信息不對稱及企業(yè)外部風險防范和內(nèi)部風險控制機制不健全等方面的特點,這些直接導致了銀行與中小企業(yè)合作困難。在20世紀初開始,我國逐漸重視中小企業(yè)發(fā)展并積極探索支持其發(fā)展的金融融資途徑,同時不遺余力構建中小企業(yè)信用擔保體系,通過信用擔保公司介入搭建與銀行的信任之橋,希望使得中小企業(yè)成功獲取銀行貸款的渠道更暢通順利。但是在實際中,銀行與擔保機構之間總是處于不對等關系中,銀行獲取大部分利益而擔保機構承擔大部分甚至于全部的風險。長此以往,這種不對等關系會磨滅信用擔保機構發(fā)展業(yè)務的主動性,擔保機構的擔保職能無法有效發(fā)揮,其生存也會受到威脅。因此,在銀保之間建立“風險共擔、利益共享”的平等合作關系尤為重要,了解其利益分配關系、風險分擔比例會是緩解中小企業(yè)融資困難和完善中小企業(yè)信用擔保體系的關鍵�；诖�,本文希望通過分析合作銀行與擔保機構之間利益關系,求解銀保之間擔保風險的合理分擔比例幫助擔保機構分散風險,激勵擔保機構發(fā)展,實現(xiàn)我國中小企業(yè)信用擔保業(yè)的可持續(xù)發(fā)展。本文通過從信息經(jīng)濟學視角出發(fā),討論信息不對稱在金融市場中的問題和由其所導致的逆向選擇及所產(chǎn)生的道德風險,通過構建模型闡述信息不對稱與信貸配給之間理論關系,解釋逆向選擇和道德風險是如何導致信貸配給產(chǎn)生;通過研究影響銀保合作中利益關系的兩類指標,分析阻礙銀保合作的因素;然后嘗試建立合作銀行與中小企業(yè)信用擔保機構兩方合作博弈模型,運用Shapley值法求解合理風險分擔比例,進而為中小企業(yè)信用擔保貸款融資體系形成并可持續(xù)發(fā)展提供理論和實踐支持。主要貢獻在于:一方面,從信息經(jīng)濟學視角分析了銀行與擔保機構風險形成原因,并提出應建立銀行與擔保機構的內(nèi)、外部協(xié)作機制,來實現(xiàn)我國中小企業(yè)信用擔保的風險內(nèi)、外部分散目標;另一方面,在創(chuàng)新視角下運用Shapley值分析得出銀行與擔保機構合作的風險分擔比例,提出基于可持續(xù)性合作下銀行與擔保機構的合作方式。不僅將發(fā)展和完善中小企業(yè)信用擔保風險理論,而且對于提升我國中小企業(yè)信用擔保業(yè)在擔保實踐中的風險防御能力,加快推進我國中小企業(yè)信用擔保業(yè)的科學化發(fā)展進程,實現(xiàn)我國中小企業(yè)信用擔保業(yè)的可持續(xù)發(fā)展,具有非常重要的理論指導與現(xiàn)實意義。
[Abstract]:Small and medium-sized enterprises play an important role in the growing national economy, but small and medium-sized enterprises are all small assets economies of scale. All of them have the characteristics of asymmetric information and imperfect external risk prevention and internal risk control mechanism, which directly lead to the difficulty of cooperation between banks and SMEs. Since the beginning of the 20th century, China has gradually attached importance to the development of small and medium-sized enterprises and actively explored financial financing ways to support their development, while sparing no effort to build a credit guarantee system for small and medium-sized enterprises. Through the credit guarantee company intervention to build the bridge of trust with the bank, it is hoped that the channel of obtaining bank loan will be more smooth and smooth for small and medium-sized enterprises. In practice, however, there is always an unequal relationship between the bank and the guarantee agency, in which the bank obtains most of the benefits and the guarantee institution bears most or all of the risks. In the long run, this kind of non-reciprocal relationship will extinguish the initiative of the credit guarantee institutions to develop their business, and the guarantee function of the guarantee agencies will not be effectively brought into play, and their survival will also be threatened. Therefore, it is particularly important to establish an equal and cooperative relationship between banks and insurers of "risk-sharing and benefit-sharing". The risk-sharing ratio will be the key to alleviate the financing difficulties of SMEs and improve the credit guarantee system of SMEs. Based on this, this paper hopes that by analyzing the relationship between cooperative bank and guarantee institution, we can solve the reasonable proportion of guarantee risk between bank and insurance to help guarantee organization disperse risk and encourage the development of guarantee institution. To realize the sustainable development of credit guarantee industry of small and medium-sized enterprises in China. From the perspective of information economics, this paper discusses the problem of information asymmetry in financial market, the adverse selection caused by it and the moral hazard caused by it, and expounds the theoretical relationship between information asymmetry and credit rationing by constructing a model. Explain how adverse selection and moral hazard lead to credit rationing; By studying the two kinds of indexes which affect the benefit relationship in the bancassurance cooperation, the paper analyzes the factors that hinder the bancassurance cooperation. Then we try to establish the cooperative game model between cooperative bank and SME credit guarantee organization, and use Shapley value method to solve the reasonable risk sharing ratio. Then it provides theoretical and practical support for the formation and sustainable development of credit guarantee loan financing system for SMEs. The main contributions are as follows: on the one hand, from the perspective of information economics, this paper analyzes the causes of the risk formation of banks and guarantee institutions, and puts forward that the internal and external cooperative mechanism between banks and guarantee institutions should be established to realize the risk of credit guarantee of SMEs in China. External decentralized objectives; On the other hand, from the perspective of innovation, the risk sharing ratio between banks and guarantee institutions is obtained by using Shapley value analysis, and the cooperation mode between banks and guarantee institutions based on sustainable cooperation is put forward. It will not only develop and perfect the theory of credit guarantee risk of small and medium-sized enterprises, but also promote the risk defense ability of credit guarantee industry of small and medium-sized enterprises in our country, and accelerate the scientific development process of credit guarantee industry of small and medium-sized enterprises in our country. It is of great theoretical and practical significance to realize the sustainable development of credit guarantee industry of small and medium-sized enterprises in China.
【學位授予單位】：湘潭大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F832.4

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