本文選題：農(nóng)戶 + 信用社��； 參考：《社會(huì)科學(xué)戰(zhàn)線》2017年07期

【摘要】：農(nóng)戶小額信用貸款在解決農(nóng)民貸款融資難的同時(shí),由于信息不對(duì)稱和核查成本過高,導(dǎo)致道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)日益突出,成為農(nóng)戶小額信用貸款健康發(fā)展的瓶頸。文章基于博弈理論,構(gòu)建了農(nóng)戶和信用社之間的博弈矩陣,分析了因農(nóng)戶謊報(bào)項(xiàng)目收益及惡意賴賬的違約行為形成的事后道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的析出因素。研究結(jié)果顯示,適當(dāng)控制好貸款利率、貸款額度、貸款期限,加大對(duì)違約行為的處罰力度,控制好農(nóng)戶自有資金和貸款資金比例,加強(qiáng)對(duì)違約行為的核查力度可有效抑制農(nóng)戶事后道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn),并從強(qiáng)化農(nóng)戶信用意識(shí)、構(gòu)建信用擔(dān)保機(jī)制、加強(qiáng)信用社內(nèi)部制度建設(shè)、建立農(nóng)業(yè)生產(chǎn)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)轉(zhuǎn)移機(jī)制等方面給出控制農(nóng)戶事后道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的宏觀政策建議。
[Abstract]:At the same time, because of the asymmetry of information and the high cost of verification, the moral hazard is becoming more and more prominent, which becomes the bottleneck of the healthy development of farmers' small credit loans. Based on the game theory, this paper constructs a game matrix between farmers and credit cooperatives, and analyzes the precipitating factors of moral hazard caused by farmers' false reporting of project income and maliciously defaulting behavior. The results show that the appropriate control of loan interest rates, loan quotas, loan duration, increase penalties for violations of the law, control the proportion of farmers' own funds and loan funds, To strengthen the verification of breach of contract can effectively restrain the subsequent moral hazard of farmers, and strengthen the credit consciousness of farmers, construct the credit guarantee mechanism, and strengthen the internal system construction of credit cooperatives. The macro policy suggestions on controlling farmers' afterwards moral hazard are put forward in the aspects of establishing agricultural production risk transfer mechanism and so on.
【作者單位】： 吉林大學(xué)商學(xué)院;
【基金】：教育部人文社會(huì)科學(xué)研究一般項(xiàng)目(15YJC79152) 吉林省教育廳“十二五”社會(huì)科學(xué)研究規(guī)劃項(xiàng)目(2014B004)
【分類號(hào)】：F832.43
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本文編號(hào)：2111387