本文選題：業(yè)績(jī)型股權(quán)激勵(lì) + 可行權(quán)業(yè)績(jī)條件　； 參考：《中國(guó)管理科學(xué)》2017年03期

【摘要】：本文以2006-2012年期間實(shí)施行股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃的A股上市公司為研究樣本,對(duì)業(yè)績(jī)型股權(quán)激勵(lì)與盈余管理方式選擇之間的關(guān)系進(jìn)行了實(shí)證分析。研究發(fā)現(xiàn),相對(duì)于"非激勵(lì)性"股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃的公司,"激勵(lì)性"股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃的公司實(shí)施真實(shí)活動(dòng)盈余管理和應(yīng)計(jì)項(xiàng)目盈余管理的程度更大;上市公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃所設(shè)定的行權(quán)業(yè)績(jī)條件相對(duì)于公司過去實(shí)際業(yè)績(jī)水平越嚴(yán)格的,管理層實(shí)施真實(shí)活動(dòng)盈余管理和應(yīng)計(jì)項(xiàng)目盈余管理的程度越大;為了達(dá)到行權(quán)業(yè)績(jī)條件,上市公司管理層會(huì)同時(shí)綜合使用真實(shí)活動(dòng)盈余管理和應(yīng)計(jì)項(xiàng)目盈余管理兩種方式。研究結(jié)果意味著,合理設(shè)定行權(quán)業(yè)績(jī)條件對(duì)于股權(quán)激勵(lì)有效性至關(guān)重要,過高或過低的行權(quán)業(yè)績(jī)條件都難以實(shí)現(xiàn)股權(quán)激勵(lì)的預(yù)期效果。本文主要貢獻(xiàn)在于:根據(jù)行權(quán)業(yè)績(jī)條件高低衡量股權(quán)激勵(lì)強(qiáng)度,是基于中國(guó)情景對(duì)股權(quán)激勵(lì)強(qiáng)度度量的一個(gè)創(chuàng)新;從真實(shí)活動(dòng)盈余管理和應(yīng)計(jì)項(xiàng)目盈余管理兩種盈余管理方式選擇的角度豐富有關(guān)股權(quán)激勵(lì)與盈余管理之間關(guān)系方面的文獻(xiàn)。
[Abstract]:This paper makes an empirical analysis of the relationship between the performance equity incentive and the choice of earnings management based on the A-share listed companies that implemented the bank equity incentive plan from 2006 to 2012. Compared with the "non-incentive" equity incentive plan, the "incentive" equity incentive plan has a greater degree of real activity earnings management and accrual item earnings management than the "non-incentive" equity incentive plan. The more strict the performance conditions set by the equity incentive plan of listed companies are relative to the actual performance level of the company in the past, the greater the extent to which the management implements the earnings management of real activities and accrual items; in order to achieve the performance conditions of exercising rights, The management of listed companies will use both real activity earnings management and accrual earnings management. The research result means that it is very important to set the performance conditions of exercise right reasonably for the effectiveness of equity incentive. It is difficult to achieve the expected effect of equity incentive if the performance condition is too high or too low. The main contributions of this paper are as follows: measuring the intensity of equity incentive according to the performance condition of exercise power is an innovation based on the Chinese situation to measure the intensity of equity incentive; From the perspective of real earnings management and accrual earnings management, the paper enriches the literature on the relationship between equity incentive and earnings management.
【作者單位】： 合肥工業(yè)大學(xué)管理學(xué)院;南京審計(jì)大學(xué)會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)院;無錫太湖學(xué)院會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)院;
【基金】：國(guó)家社會(huì)科學(xué)基金一般資助項(xiàng)目(13BJY013) 國(guó)家自然科學(xué)基金面上資助項(xiàng)目(71172190)
【分類號(hào)】：F275.5;F832.51

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