本文選題：民營銀行 + 尋租　； 參考：《上海經(jīng)濟研究》2017年09期

【摘要】：放開銀行牌照,對希望縱深參與綜合性金融業(yè)務(wù)的民營企業(yè)有著劃時代意義,然而當(dāng)監(jiān)管權(quán)力下放地方監(jiān)管部門時,民營企業(yè)為搶占銀行牌照很可能會選擇向地方監(jiān)管部門尋租取得銀行牌照。該文引入尋租理論,以中央監(jiān)管部門監(jiān)管為約束條件,構(gòu)建民營企業(yè)與地方監(jiān)管部門間的演化博弈模型,運用數(shù)值仿真得到民營企業(yè)和地方監(jiān)管部門博弈行為的演化規(guī)律和不同條件下的穩(wěn)定策略,分析民營企業(yè)與地方監(jiān)管部門策略選擇的影響因素。研究結(jié)果表明:在中央監(jiān)管部門的不同監(jiān)管力度下,申辦者和地方監(jiān)管部門的初始狀態(tài)影響演化穩(wěn)定策略,增加尋租成本可以有效阻止尋租行為。由此提出減少或杜絕尋租行為的政策建議是加強監(jiān)管制度建設(shè)、加大懲罰力度以及鼓勵公信力組織加入監(jiān)管等。
[Abstract]:Liberalizing banking licences is epoch-making for private companies that want to engage in comprehensive financial business, but when regulation is decentralized to local regulators, Private companies are likely to choose to rent-seeking from local regulators to secure banking licences. This paper introduces the rent-seeking theory and constructs an evolutionary game model between private enterprises and local regulatory authorities with the supervision of the central regulatory department as the constraint condition. The evolution law of game behavior between private enterprises and local regulatory authorities and the stability strategy under different conditions are obtained by numerical simulation, and the factors influencing the selection of strategies between private enterprises and local regulatory authorities are analyzed. The results show that the initial state of the applicant and the local regulatory department influence the evolutionary stability strategy under the different supervision intensity of the central regulatory department and the increase of the rent-seeking cost can effectively prevent the rent-seeking behavior. Therefore, the policy suggestions to reduce or eliminate rent-seeking behavior are to strengthen the construction of supervision system, to strengthen punishment and to encourage public organizations to join the supervision.
【作者單位】： 上海大學(xué)管理學(xué)院;
【基金】：國家自然科學(xué)基金重點項目“基于RFID的生鮮農(nóng)產(chǎn)品供應(yīng)鏈運作優(yōu)化理論與方法”(編號:71431004) 上海市教委科研創(chuàng)新項目“基于網(wǎng)絡(luò)的非正式學(xué)習(xí)模式研究”(編號:13YS015) 教育部人文社科研究項目“網(wǎng)絡(luò)學(xué)習(xí)動態(tài)過程發(fā)散與收斂狀態(tài)實證研究”(編號:17YJA880014)資助
【分類號】：F224.32;F832.3

【相似文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前8條

1 段吟穎;李宗澤;;民營銀行上市后績效問題研究與啟示——基于民生銀行上市后的業(yè)績走勢分析[J];經(jīng)濟問題探索;2010年05期

2 蔣滿霖;;中國民營銀行公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)的經(jīng)濟學(xué)分析[J];鄭州經(jīng)濟管理干部學(xué)院學(xué)報;2006年03期

3 于謹(jǐn)凱;李畢爭;;我國民營銀行的市場準(zhǔn)入與退出機制:博弈策略分析[J];海南金融;2007年05期

4 ;同業(yè)動態(tài)[J];中國城市金融;2014年02期

5 ;經(jīng)濟新論[J];特區(qū)經(jīng)濟;2003年02期

6 劉相;;淺析現(xiàn)階段我國民間投資存在的問題與對策[J];中國城市經(jīng)濟;2010年09期

7 ;產(chǎn)業(yè)動向[J];中國對外貿(mào)易;2013年11期

8 左小蕾;冷熱兼治 平順調(diào)控[J];w攣胖蕓，

本文編號：2042955