本文選題：銀行貸款渠道 + 風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)渠道��； 參考：《中國(guó)科學(xué)技術(shù)大學(xué)》2017年博士論文

【摘要】：本文探討了金融中介的三大領(lǐng)域,即銀行貸款渠道、risk-taking渠道和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)-競(jìng)爭(zhēng)關(guān)系。前兩個(gè)領(lǐng)域(銀行貸款渠道和risk-taking渠道)探討貨幣政策在中國(guó)銀行業(yè)的作用。而風(fēng)險(xiǎn)-競(jìng)爭(zhēng)關(guān)系則是考察銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)與競(jìng)爭(zhēng)之間的聯(lián)系。此外,本文還探討了影響銀行貸款渠道的各種因素和貨幣政策傳導(dǎo)的risk-taking渠道的作用。本論文所使用的數(shù)據(jù)由2000年至2013的年度不平衡面板組成。應(yīng)用動(dòng)態(tài)面板模型系統(tǒng)和差分GMM。本文的研究結(jié)果表明,銀行貸款渠道既不通過(guò)資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表的特點(diǎn),也不通過(guò)銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)進(jìn)行操作。然而,本文提供了大量的證據(jù)證明貸款渠道通過(guò)市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)運(yùn)作。市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)削弱了貨幣政策對(duì)銀行放貸的影響。研究結(jié)果對(duì)我國(guó)銀行業(yè)的制度建設(shè)具有重要的政策意義。結(jié)果表明,更高的市場(chǎng)力量削弱了貨幣政策的傳導(dǎo),從而降低了銀行放貸渠道。在考慮到市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)之前,個(gè)人的貨幣政策可能不起作用。雖然更高的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)引發(fā)了人們對(duì)金融穩(wěn)定的擔(dān)憂,但在這種情況下,更高的市場(chǎng)力量對(duì)銀行放貸渠道和貨幣政策的傳導(dǎo)產(chǎn)生了不利影響。這樣的結(jié)果可能會(huì)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)中國(guó)銀行業(yè)市場(chǎng)的政策,從而達(dá)到預(yù)期的貨幣政策目標(biāo)。本文的實(shí)證結(jié)果也表明,低貨幣政策利率會(huì)增加銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。與以往的研究不同,本文的結(jié)果表明,銀行特定因素(規(guī)模、流動(dòng)性和資本化)在risk-taking渠道中沒(méi)有起到重要作用。然而,市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)具有穩(wěn)定效應(yīng)的銀行risk-taking渠道。更高的市場(chǎng)力量削弱了貨幣政策傳導(dǎo)的risk-taking渠道。從政策的角度來(lái)看,較低的貨幣政策誘使銀行承擔(dān)過(guò)度的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。不過(guò),在銀行市場(chǎng)上鼓勵(lì)適當(dāng)?shù)氖袌?chǎng)力量,可以減輕這種影響。此外,本文的研究結(jié)果表明,采用不同的市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)測(cè)度方法對(duì)銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)(不同代理量)的反應(yīng)是不同的。研究支持競(jìng)爭(zhēng)穩(wěn)定性、競(jìng)爭(zhēng)脆弱性假說(shuō)和U型關(guān)系,以銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)的各種測(cè)度為條件。通常認(rèn)為,更高的市場(chǎng)力量會(huì)增加信貸風(fēng)險(xiǎn),但是,如果銀行使用更多的資本和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)緩解技術(shù)來(lái)降低總體銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn),銀行整體風(fēng)險(xiǎn)可能不會(huì)增加。我通過(guò)探討銀行資本化比率與市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)之間的關(guān)系來(lái)檢驗(yàn)這種論點(diǎn)。實(shí)證發(fā)現(xiàn)本文不支持這種論點(diǎn)。風(fēng)險(xiǎn)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)是一個(gè)復(fù)雜的問(wèn)題。在銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)單一測(cè)度的基礎(chǔ)上得出結(jié)論是過(guò)于草率的。本研究強(qiáng)烈認(rèn)為,銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)與市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)應(yīng)采取多種措施,以穩(wěn)健的方式探索風(fēng)險(xiǎn)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)
[Abstract]:This paper discusses three fields of financial intermediation, namely, bank lending channel and risk-taking channel and risk- competition relationship. The first two areas (bank lending channel and risk-taking channel) discuss the role of monetary policy in Chinese banking. The relationship between risk and competition is to examine the relationship between bank risk and competition. In addition, this paper also discusses the influence of various factors on bank lending channels and the role of the risk-taking channel of monetary policy transmission. The data used in this paper consist of an annual unbalanced panel from 2000 to 2013. Application of dynamic panel model system and differential GMM. The results show that the bank loan channel is not operated by the characteristics of balance sheet or bank risk. However, this paper provides a great deal of evidence to prove that the loan channels operate through the market structure. Market structure weakened the impact of monetary policy on bank lending. The research results have important policy significance to the institution construction of China's banking industry. The results show that higher market forces weaken the transmission of monetary policy, thus reducing bank lending channels. Individual monetary policy may not work until market structure is considered. While higher competition has raised concerns about financial stability, higher market forces have had a negative impact on banks' lending channels and the transmission of monetary policy. Such an outcome could rival policy in China's banking market, thus achieving the desired monetary policy objectives. The empirical results of this paper also show that low monetary policy interest rate will increase bank risk. In contrast to previous studies, the results show that the specific factors (scale, liquidity and capitalization) do not play an important role in the risk-taking channel. However, the market structure has the stable effect bank risk-taking channel. Higher market forces weaken the risk-taking channel for monetary policy transmission. From a policy point of view, lower monetary policy induces banks to take excessive risks. However, encouraging appropriate market forces in the banking market can mitigate this impact. In addition, the results show that different market structure measurement methods have different responses to bank risk (different agency volumes). The research supports competition stability, competition vulnerability hypothesis and U-type relationship, which is conditioned by various measures of bank risk and market structure. Higher market forces are thought to increase credit risk, but if banks use more capital and risk mitigation technology to reduce overall bank risk, the overall risk may not increase. I test this argument by exploring the relationship between the capitalization ratio of banks and the structure of the market. It is found that this thesis does not support this argument. Risk competition is a complex problem. It is too hasty to draw a conclusion on the basis of a single measure of bank risk and market structure. This study strongly believes that bank risk and market structure should take a variety of measures to explore risk competition in a robust manner.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：中國(guó)科學(xué)技術(shù)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F832
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本文編號(hào)：1901044