本文選題：定向增發(fā) + 大股東認(rèn)購(gòu)��； 參考：《云南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：定向增發(fā)在我國(guó)其實(shí)算是一件新生事物。2005年之前鮮有定向增發(fā)案例,個(gè)別增發(fā)也極不規(guī)范。然而股權(quán)分置改革的推進(jìn)和陸續(xù)出臺(tái)的法律規(guī)范為之后定向增發(fā)在我國(guó)的發(fā)展打下基礎(chǔ)。從2013年開始,我國(guó)上市公司定向增發(fā)呈現(xiàn)井噴式的增長(zhǎng)。2015年全年上市公司實(shí)施定向增發(fā)近900次,較2014年幾乎增長(zhǎng)100%,近似于2008年至2012年的定向增發(fā)總數(shù)。然而伴隨爆發(fā)式增長(zhǎng),隨之而來(lái)的是各種定增亂象。大股東憑借自身對(duì)上市公司的控制權(quán),通過(guò)定向增發(fā)侵蝕上市公司資產(chǎn),擾動(dòng)市場(chǎng)秩序。造成這種現(xiàn)狀的原因有我國(guó)資本市場(chǎng)不成熟、上市公司股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)不合理、公司治理機(jī)制不完善以及缺乏理性的投資者等。但根本原因在于定向增發(fā)中大量存在的套利空間刺激了大股東的逐利動(dòng)機(jī)。因此探究大股東是如何通過(guò)定向增發(fā)攫取上市公司利益具有非常重要的意義。當(dāng)前國(guó)內(nèi)外對(duì)定向增發(fā)的研究主要集中在其對(duì)公司短期股價(jià)表現(xiàn)的宣告效應(yīng)和長(zhǎng)期業(yè)績(jī)影響上,對(duì)大股東侵占中小股東利益的研究主要集中在資產(chǎn)侵蝕和特殊財(cái)務(wù)安排上,把二者結(jié)合在一起,研究大股東通過(guò)定向增發(fā)攫取上市公司利益侵占中小股東利益的研究比較少。而在這些研究中,對(duì)上市公司大股東在定向增發(fā)過(guò)程中起的具體作用研究的結(jié)論又不是很明確。本文在前人研究的基礎(chǔ)上,結(jié)合我國(guó)當(dāng)前現(xiàn)狀,選取2012年至2015年全部滬深A(yù)股定向增發(fā)數(shù)據(jù),剔除數(shù)據(jù)不全的樣本后,共計(jì)1186個(gè)樣本來(lái)研究大股東認(rèn)購(gòu)比例和定向增發(fā)折價(jià)率之間的關(guān)系。研究結(jié)果顯示大股東認(rèn)購(gòu)會(huì)對(duì)定向增發(fā)折價(jià)率有一個(gè)顯著的正向影響,說(shuō)明大股東在上市公司定向增發(fā)過(guò)程中確實(shí)存在通過(guò)自身對(duì)上市公司控制能力,低價(jià)認(rèn)購(gòu)上市公司股份獲取超額收益,侵害中小股東利益的情況。同時(shí)市場(chǎng)對(duì)定向增發(fā)中的大股東逐利動(dòng)機(jī)能夠有所識(shí)別,并對(duì)其認(rèn)購(gòu)行為持消極態(tài)度,使得定向增發(fā)無(wú)法達(dá)到最優(yōu)效率。因此,為了保護(hù)中小股東利益,也為了使定向增發(fā)能夠更好地發(fā)揮作用,有必要制定更嚴(yán)格的相關(guān)規(guī)定,使定向增發(fā)定價(jià)過(guò)程更為公平透明。
[Abstract]:Private placement is a new thing in our country. Before 2005, there are few cases of additional directional issuance, and individual additional issuance is also extremely irregular. However, the promotion of the split share structure reform and the introduction of legal norms lay the foundation for the development of directional additional issuance in China. Since 2013, China's listed companies have shown a blowout growth. In 2015, the listed companies implemented nearly 900 additional directional offerings, almost 100 times more than in 2014, which is similar to the total number of targeted additional offerings from 2008 to 2012. However, with explosive growth, there is a variety of fixed chaos. By virtue of their own control over the listed companies, the majority shareholders erode the assets of the listed companies and disturb the market order. The reasons for this situation are the immature capital market, the unreasonable ownership structure of listed companies, the imperfect corporate governance mechanism and the lack of rational investors. But the fundamental reason is that the large amount of arbitrage space in the directional placement stimulates the profit motive of the large shareholders. Therefore, it is of great significance to explore how large shareholders grab the interests of listed companies through targeted issuance. At present, domestic and foreign researches on directional placement mainly focus on the announcement effect and long-term performance of the company's short-term stock price performance, while the research on the large shareholders' encroachment on the interests of minority shareholders is mainly focused on asset erosion and special financial arrangements. Combining the two, there is less research on the large shareholders grabbing the interests of the listed companies through the directional additional issuance, and the interests of the minority shareholders. In these studies, the conclusion of the research on the role of large shareholders of listed companies in the process of directional placement is not very clear. On the basis of previous studies, this paper selects all the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share directional additional issuance data from 2012 to 2015, combining with the current situation in China, and excludes the incomplete data samples. A total of 1186 samples were used to study the relationship between the subscription ratio of large shareholders and the discount rate of directional additional offering. The results show that the subscription of large shareholders will have a significant positive effect on the discount rate of directional additional offering, which indicates that the majority shareholders do have the ability to control the listed company through their own ability in the process of directional additional offering. Low-priced shares of listed companies to obtain excess income, against the interests of small and medium shareholders. At the same time, the market can recognize the motivation of the large shareholders to pursue the profit, and hold a negative attitude towards their subscription behavior, which makes it impossible to achieve the optimal efficiency. Therefore, in order to protect the interests of minority shareholders, but also to make the placement of additional offerings can play a better role, it is necessary to formulate more stringent relevant regulations, so that the pricing process of directional placement is more fair and transparent.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：云南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F832.51

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本文編號(hào)：1878683