本文選題：影子銀行 + 土地財(cái)政�。� 參考：《上海外國(guó)語(yǔ)大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：本文旨在分析探究地方政府的土地財(cái)政和影子銀行之間的關(guān)系及其影響路徑。土地財(cái)政模式的發(fā)展不僅為地方政府帶來(lái)了土地出讓金和土地相關(guān)稅收收入,也通過(guò)土地抵押融資的方式為地方基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施建設(shè)提供了額外資金。然而,在當(dāng)前傳統(tǒng)銀行信貸對(duì)地方融資平臺(tái)收縮的情況下,地方政府的土地財(cái)政依賴使其不得不轉(zhuǎn)向影子銀行尋求資金支持,從而變相加大了地方政府債務(wù)負(fù)擔(dān)。影子銀行參與地方政府債務(wù)通常經(jīng)由具有政府背景的地方融資平臺(tái)實(shí)現(xiàn),具體來(lái)看,則表現(xiàn)為城投債,政信合作和委托貸款等方式。土地財(cái)政對(duì)影子銀行產(chǎn)生影響的另一條可能途徑是通過(guò)房地產(chǎn)市場(chǎng)實(shí)現(xiàn)的。地方政府的土地財(cái)政對(duì)房企融資規(guī)模和房?jī)r(jià)上漲有貢獻(xiàn)作用,而房?jī)r(jià)的上漲又會(huì)吸引銀行、信托在內(nèi)的金融機(jī)構(gòu)資金通過(guò)表外運(yùn)作的形式間接進(jìn)入房地產(chǎn)市場(chǎng)。這類資金由于受到監(jiān)管較少,資金募集對(duì)象和投向不明晰,因此具備一定的影子銀行特征。本文在以上分析的基礎(chǔ)上對(duì)土地財(cái)政和影子銀行的關(guān)系進(jìn)行了實(shí)證檢驗(yàn),采用影子銀行規(guī)模對(duì)土地財(cái)政、房?jī)r(jià)回歸,以及房?jī)r(jià)對(duì)土地財(cái)政規(guī)模進(jìn)行回歸的多元回歸方法,來(lái)檢驗(yàn)上述理論假說(shuō)。實(shí)證結(jié)果表明:(1)土地財(cái)政規(guī)模與影子銀行規(guī)模的確存在正相關(guān)關(guān)系,且土地財(cái)政規(guī)模每增加1%,影子銀行規(guī)模就增加0.3281%。(2)土地財(cái)政通過(guò)政府主動(dòng)負(fù)債對(duì)影子銀行產(chǎn)生的直接影響系數(shù)為0.2706,通過(guò)房地產(chǎn)企業(yè)融資產(chǎn)生的間接影響系數(shù)為0.057,直接影響約為間接影響的4.7倍。進(jìn)一步可以得到,土地財(cái)政規(guī)模每增加一個(gè)單位,地方融資對(duì)影子銀行規(guī)模產(chǎn)生的直接效應(yīng)占總效應(yīng)比重為82.5%,通過(guò)房地產(chǎn)企業(yè)融資產(chǎn)生的間接效應(yīng)占總效應(yīng)比重為17.5%,地方政府融資的直接效應(yīng)占據(jù)主導(dǎo)地位。立足土地財(cái)政對(duì)影子銀行的影響途徑,筆者提出了相應(yīng)的政策建議:(1)轉(zhuǎn)變土地經(jīng)營(yíng)模式,提高土地真實(shí)現(xiàn)金流;(2)加快推進(jìn)房產(chǎn)稅制改革,完善保障房建設(shè);(3)強(qiáng)化信息披露,加強(qiáng)協(xié)調(diào)監(jiān)管。
[Abstract]:The purpose of this paper is to explore the relationship between local government land finance and shadow banking and its influence path. The development of the land finance model not only brings the land transfer fee and the land related tax revenue to the local government, but also provides the extra funds for the local infrastructure construction through the land mortgage financing. However, under the circumstances that the traditional bank credit is shrinking to the local financing platform, the local government has to turn to the shadow bank for financial support because of the land finance dependence, thus increasing the debt burden of the local government. Shadow banks' participation in local government debt is usually realized through local financing platforms with government background. Another possible way for land finance to have an impact on shadow banking is through the real estate market. The land finance of the local government contributes to the financing scale of housing enterprises and the rise of house prices, and the rise of house prices will attract banks, trust and other financial institutions to indirectly enter the real estate market through the form of off-balance-sheet operation. This kind of fund has certain shadow banking characteristic because it is less regulated, and the object and direction of raising funds are not clear. Based on the above analysis, this paper makes an empirical test on the relationship between land finance and shadow banking, and adopts the multiple regression method of shadow bank scale to return land finance, house price, and house price to land finance scale. To test the theoretical hypothesis. The empirical results show that there is a positive correlation between the scale of land finance and the size of shadow banks. And for each increase in the scale of land finance, the scale of shadow banks will increase by 0.3281.Qu2) the direct impact coefficient of land finance on shadow banks through active government debt is 0.2706, and the indirect impact coefficient of financing through real estate enterprises is 0.057. The grafting effect was about 4.7 times of the indirect effect. Further, for every additional unit of land finance, The direct effect of local financing on the scale of shadow bank accounts for 82.5% of the total effect, the indirect effect of financing through real estate enterprises accounts for 17.5%, and the direct effect of local government financing occupies a dominant position. Based on the influence of land finance on shadow bank, the author puts forward the corresponding policy suggestion: 1) to change the land management mode, to improve the real land cash flow and 2) to speed up the reform of the real estate tax system, and to perfect the indemnificatory apartment construction to strengthen the information disclosure. Strengthen coordination and supervision.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：上海外國(guó)語(yǔ)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F301.2;F812;F832.3

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