本文選題：賣空機(jī)制 + 真實(shí)盈余管理　； 參考：《首都經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：本文以2010年3月我國(guó)融資融券制度的推出為背景,利用上市公司2008年至2015年的相關(guān)數(shù)據(jù),通過(guò)構(gòu)建雙重差分模型檢驗(yàn)了賣空機(jī)制對(duì)上市公司盈余管理行為的作用機(jī)制。本文發(fā)現(xiàn),基于對(duì)應(yīng)計(jì)盈余管理和真實(shí)盈余管理之間的“替代”作用的分析,賣空機(jī)制對(duì)上市公司不同類別的盈余管理行為有不同的影響。其中,賣空機(jī)制對(duì)上市公司的應(yīng)計(jì)盈余管理行為具有抑制作用,但對(duì)上市公司的真實(shí)盈余管理行為具有促進(jìn)作用。這說(shuō)明,賣空機(jī)制目前對(duì)上市公司的盈余管理行為的影響依然是膚淺的,只能對(duì)其表面的盈余管理行為起到約束作用。而對(duì)于更加隱蔽的真實(shí)盈余管理行為卻并沒(méi)有顯著的抑制作用,反而促使上市公司管理層尋求更高水平的真實(shí)盈余管理來(lái)替代應(yīng)計(jì)盈余管理水平降低所帶來(lái)的影響。這也說(shuō)明了上市公司管理層在面對(duì)外部監(jiān)管加強(qiáng)時(shí)其行為的復(fù)雜性。另外,本文通過(guò)對(duì)研究樣本從外部機(jī)構(gòu)投資者和內(nèi)部管理層激勵(lì)機(jī)制兩個(gè)角度進(jìn)行分組,研究了賣空機(jī)制的公司治理效應(yīng)的發(fā)揮所依賴的公司治理環(huán)境。并發(fā)現(xiàn),高機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股比例有助于賣空機(jī)制公司治理效應(yīng)的發(fā)揮,但是即使是機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股比例高的組,上市公司的真實(shí)盈余管理水平依然在賣空機(jī)制推出之后有所增加,這說(shuō)明,機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的公司治理效應(yīng)也比較有限。而上市公司設(shè)計(jì)的管理層薪酬契約在一定程度上增大了管理層進(jìn)行盈余操縱的動(dòng)機(jī),這也是管理層尋求更高水平的真實(shí)盈余管理行為對(duì)應(yīng)計(jì)盈余管理進(jìn)行替代的動(dòng)因之一。
[Abstract]:This paper, based on the introduction of the financial margin system in China in March 2010, uses the related data of the listed companies from 2008 to 2015 to test the mechanism of the effect of short selling mechanism to the earnings management of listed companies through the construction of a dual difference model. The short selling mechanism has different effects on the earnings management behavior of different categories of listed companies. The short selling mechanism has a inhibitory effect on the accrued earnings management behavior of listed companies, but it can promote the real earnings management behavior of listed companies. This shows that the short selling mechanism is currently on the earnings management of listed companies. The effect is still superficial and only restrains the earnings management behavior on its surface, but it has no significant inhibitory effect on the more concealed real earnings management behavior, but on the contrary, it encourages the management of listed companies to seek a higher level of real earnings management to reduce the level of earnings management. This also illustrates the complexity of the behavior of the listed company management in the face of external supervision and strengthening. In addition, by grouping the research samples from two perspectives of the external institutional investors and the internal management incentive mechanism, this paper studies the corporate governance environment that the corporate governance effect of the short selling mechanism is dependent on. The shareholding ratio of high institutional investors contributes to the exertion of the corporate governance effect of short selling mechanism, but even the group with high proportion of institutional investors, the real earnings management level of listed companies is still increasing after the introduction of short selling mechanism, which shows that the corporate governance effect of institutional investors is also limited. The management salary contract has increased the motivation of management in a certain degree, which is one of the reasons for the management to seek a higher level of real earnings management to replace the earnings management.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：首都經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F832.51

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 黃超;;我國(guó)融資融券制度提高公司非財(cái)務(wù)信息披露質(zhì)量了嗎?——基于上市公司社會(huì)責(zé)任報(bào)告的經(jīng)驗(yàn)證據(jù)[J];科學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)社會(huì);2016年04期

2 徐蕊;邱Y，

本文編號(hào)：1785335