本文選題：分析師　切入點：盈利預測　出處：《西南交通大學》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：分析師通過綜合宏觀經濟運行狀況、公司經營狀況以及發(fā)展?jié)摿?發(fā)布盈利預測研究報告,這成為了投資者進行決策的主要依據。然而,分析師同時存在著嚴重的負面作用。在信息不對稱的市場中,分析師起到了信息傳遞的橋梁作用,但是分析師無法避免多種利益沖突,這些利益沖突主要包括了來自管理層、機構投資者、券商經紀、投行以及自營業(yè)務的利益沖突等。本文以上市公司管理層的壓力為研究視角,探討該利益誘導給分析師樂觀偏差造成的影響。管理層作為私有信息的一個重要來源,分析師為獲取更多信息就會與管理層保持良好的私人關系,另一方面,管理層可能會揣摩到分析師的顧慮而利用這點向其誘導,從而使分析師提供有利于該公司的有偏研究報告,這樣會導致分析師預測行為與其天然信息提供者的角色相沖突。因此,研究管理層對分析師的利益誘導對分析師樂觀偏差的作用具有一定意義的。此外,信息透明度代表的是上市公司的公有信息,充足的公有信息能夠降低分析師對私有信息的依賴程度,在這種情況下則會減弱利益沖突對分析師樂觀偏差的正向作用。本文以2012—2014年深圳證券交易所A股主板上市公司的數據為研究樣本,通過建立模型實證檢驗分析師面臨管理層的利益沖突是否對分析師盈利預測樂觀偏差產生影響,并且進一步深入探討了信息透明度對兩者關系的影響。結果表明:(1)利益沖突能促成分析師在盈利預測時產生樂觀偏差的現象,而最佳分析師的利益沖突對其預測的樂觀性的影響較弱;(2)若上市公司具有較高的信息披露考評結果或者業(yè)績預告質量時,會顯著減弱利益沖突對分析師樂觀偏差的影響,這表明信息透明度越高,兩者正向關系會得到減弱。本文借鑒了過去對分析師盈利預測的研究,并根據我國證券市場的特點,進一步深入挖掘分析師樂觀偏差的影響因素。本文從利益沖突、信息透明度兩個維度,探索分析師盈利預測的樂觀偏差行為,并且深入分析這種關系形成的原因,研究結果具有一定的普遍性。本文的研究成果不僅補充了分析師樂觀傾向的理論研究以及相關文獻,更是有助于提高證券市場的有效性以及提高資源配置的效率。本文的研究結果為監(jiān)管相關部門如何規(guī)范引導分析師行為提供有效的建議。
[Abstract]:Analysts report earnings forecasts by synthesizing macroeconomic performance, company performance and growth potential, which has become the main basis for investors to make decisions.However, analysts also have serious negative effects.In the asymmetric information market, the analyst acts as a bridge of information transmission, but the analyst can not avoid a variety of conflicts of interest, including mainly from management, institutional investors, brokers,Investment banking and proprietary business conflicts of interest and so on.From the perspective of management pressure of listed companies, this paper discusses the influence of this interest inducement on analysts' optimistic bias.As an important source of private information, analysts maintain a good personal relationship with management in order to obtain more information. On the other hand, management may take advantage of the concerns of analysts to use this to induce them.This allows analysts to provide biased research reports in favour of the company, which can cause analysts to predict behavior that conflicts with their role as a natural information provider.Therefore, it is meaningful to study the role of managers' interest inducement to analysts' optimistic bias.In addition, information transparency represents the public information of listed companies, sufficient public information can reduce analysts' dependence on private information, in which case, the positive effect of conflicts of interest on analysts' optimistic bias will be weakened.Based on the data of A share main Board listed companies of Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 2012-2014, this paper empirically tests whether the conflicts of interest faced by analysts in management have an impact on the optimistic bias of analysts' earnings forecast through the establishment of a model.Furthermore, the influence of information transparency on the relationship between them is discussed.The results show that: 1) conflicts of interest can lead to an optimistic bias in analysts' earnings forecasts.However, the impact of conflicts of interest of the best analysts on the optimism of their forecasts is weaker. If the listed companies have higher disclosure results or the quality of the performance forecast, the impact of conflicts of interest on the optimistic bias of the analysts will be significantly reduced.This indicates that the more transparent the information, the less positive the relationship will be.This paper draws lessons from the past research on the analyst profit forecast, and according to the characteristics of China's securities market, further excavates the influential factors of the analyst's optimistic deviation.This paper explores the optimistic bias behavior of analyst's profit forecast from two dimensions of conflict of interest and information transparency, and analyzes the reasons for the formation of this relationship in depth. The results of the study are universal to a certain extent.The research results of this paper not only supplement the theoretical research and related literature of analysts' optimistic tendency, but also help to improve the effectiveness of the securities market and the efficiency of resource allocation.The results of this paper provide effective suggestions on how to regulate and guide the behavior of analysts.
【學位授予單位】：西南交通大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F832.51

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本文編號：1702679