發(fā)布時間：2018-03-30 07:34

  本文選題：非國有股的擴大　切入點：股權(quán)分置改革　出處：《浙江大學》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：股權(quán)分置是我國原始股票發(fā)行的遺留問題,這一現(xiàn)象帶來了資本市場定價的扭曲。股權(quán)分置改革消除了流通股與非流通股之間轉(zhuǎn)換的法律和技術(shù)壁壘,給國有股的減持帶來了更加便捷的途徑。本文通過研究改革前后國有股比例的變動,證實了改革后國有企業(yè)實現(xiàn)了部分國有股減持。本文采用雙重差分模型,證明了現(xiàn)階段國有企業(yè)國股減持能帶來經(jīng)營業(yè)績和公司治理水平的提升;然后建立分位數(shù)回歸模型,發(fā)現(xiàn)國有股比例越高的企業(yè),其經(jīng)營業(yè)績提升越大。國有股減持作用下的公司治理水平提升,會促進經(jīng)營業(yè)績的提升。一方面非國有股的擴大使得董事會和股東大會次數(shù)增加,股東和董事參與公司管理的次數(shù)增加,為公司決策作出更多探討。另一方面,非國有股的擴大給董事高管的激勵增加(高管薪酬增加,董事會持股增加),讓董事和高管更加有動力為企業(yè)經(jīng)營發(fā)展努力。但關(guān)聯(lián)交易的增加,被證實為不利于經(jīng)營業(yè)績的提升,這與關(guān)聯(lián)交易阻礙市場競爭的理論一致。同時,本文發(fā)現(xiàn)股東和高管為企業(yè)發(fā)展作出資金投入的行為,也促進了經(jīng)營業(yè)績的提升。股權(quán)分置改革,統(tǒng)一了股東的目標,也使高管評價指標轉(zhuǎn)向股價變動,股東和高管愿意為企業(yè)投入資金支持企業(yè)發(fā)展。這些資金的投入對企業(yè)經(jīng)營帶來了更多投資,提升了經(jīng)營業(yè)績。
[Abstract]:Non tradable shares is an issue left over from the original stock issued in our country, this phenomenon has brought the capital market pricing distortions. Non tradable share reform eliminated between tradable shares and non tradable shares transfer of legal and technical barriers to the reduction of the state-owned shares has brought more convenient approach. Through the study before and after the reform of state-owned shares the proportion of the change, confirmed after the reform of state-owned enterprises to achieve part of the reduction of state-owned shares. This paper adopts double difference model, proved that at this stage of the state-owned shares in the enterprise can bring business performance and enhance the level of corporate governance; then establish quantile regression model found that the higher the proportion of state-owned shares of the company, its business to enhance the performance of the greater. To raise the level of corporate governance under the effect of the reduction of state-owned shares, will promote business performance. On the one hand the expansion of non state-owned shares the board of directors and shareholders to increase the number of shareholders, and The number of directors involved in the management of the company, to make more study for the company decision-making. On the other hand, the expansion of non state-owned shares to directors and senior management incentive increase (executive compensation increase, the board of directors shareholding), let directors and executives have more power for business development efforts. But the increase of the transactions, are proved to be to enhance the performance management theory, which is consistent with the related transaction block market competition. At the same time, this paper found that the shareholders and executives made the investment behavior for the development of enterprises, but also promote the business performance. The equity division reform, unified by the shareholders of the target, the evaluation index of price changes to executives, shareholders and executives of companies willing to invest funds to support the development of enterprises. These funds bring more investment to enterprise management, improve business performance.

【學位授予單位】：浙江大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F271;F832.51

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本文編號：1684940