本文選題：對(duì)賭協(xié)議　切入點(diǎn)：股權(quán)回購(gòu)制度　出處：《電子科技大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：眾籌(Crowdfunding)是人們、組織以及企業(yè),包括初創(chuàng)企業(yè)通過(guò)在線(xiàn)門(mén)戶(hù)(即眾籌平臺(tái))籌集資本為其活動(dòng)進(jìn)行融資或再融資的一種方式。依據(jù)獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)模式的不同,可以分為捐贈(zèng)眾籌、產(chǎn)品眾籌、債權(quán)眾籌和股權(quán)眾籌。股權(quán)眾籌,顧名思義,就是籌資人通過(guò)在眾籌平臺(tái)上通過(guò)出讓一部分股權(quán)的進(jìn)行籌資,投資人在項(xiàng)目成功后依據(jù)獲得的相應(yīng)股份可以獲得被投公司的股權(quán)分紅作為回報(bào)。股權(quán)眾籌,首先具有私募股權(quán)的特征,被投企業(yè)大部分是未公開(kāi)上市的初創(chuàng)企業(yè),缺乏完整的財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表和可持續(xù)的現(xiàn)金流,投融資雙方存在較為嚴(yán)重的信息不對(duì)稱(chēng)。其次這種信息不對(duì)稱(chēng)在互聯(lián)網(wǎng)眾籌的背景下近一步被放大,因?yàn)橥度谫Y雙方距離較遠(yuǎn),增加了與籌資方面對(duì)面進(jìn)行盡職調(diào)查的困難,且眾籌投資者人數(shù)眾多,容易形成“免費(fèi)搭車(chē)”現(xiàn)象,即個(gè)人進(jìn)行盡職調(diào)查的收益被其他人免費(fèi)分享,成本則自己負(fù)擔(dān),因而沒(méi)有人愿意去采取行動(dòng)。投融資雙方的信息不對(duì)稱(chēng)放大了投資風(fēng)險(xiǎn),投資風(fēng)險(xiǎn)提高了融資方的融資成本,融資成本的提高對(duì)融資群體的造成逆向選擇,最終結(jié)果是好企業(yè)放棄在眾籌平臺(tái)上進(jìn)行股權(quán)融資,壞企業(yè)充斥股權(quán)眾籌平臺(tái),投資者也放棄對(duì)股權(quán)眾籌項(xiàng)目進(jìn)行投資。為了降低投融資雙方的信息不對(duì)稱(chēng),人們從多方面進(jìn)行探索,從最早的Angellist的“領(lǐng)投+跟投”模式,到最近的將“對(duì)賭協(xié)議+股權(quán)回購(gòu)”寫(xiě)入投資協(xié)議,再到360淘金的“遠(yuǎn)期定價(jià)”模式,都是從傳統(tǒng)理論中不斷挖掘適合放在互聯(lián)網(wǎng)融資背景下的辦法,以此實(shí)現(xiàn)弱化信息不對(duì)稱(chēng),達(dá)到激勵(lì)相容的目的。本文的研究正是基于這樣的背景下,對(duì)股權(quán)眾籌投資協(xié)議中“對(duì)賭協(xié)議+回購(gòu)條款”的目的及有效性進(jìn)行探究。本文首先分析了股權(quán)眾籌存在的主要風(fēng)險(xiǎn)點(diǎn),然后從金融契約的角度入手,探討了金融契約的結(jié)構(gòu),并分析了金融契約的眾多權(quán)利(贖回權(quán)、清算權(quán)和控制權(quán))中贖回權(quán)在股權(quán)眾籌行為中實(shí)施的有效性,最后建立簡(jiǎn)單的信號(hào)傳遞模型進(jìn)行推導(dǎo),驗(yàn)證了“對(duì)賭協(xié)議+股權(quán)回購(gòu)”在互聯(lián)網(wǎng)私募股權(quán)眾籌的背景下,可以起到信號(hào)傳遞的作用,從而實(shí)現(xiàn)好企業(yè)和壞企業(yè)的分離均衡。最后通過(guò)收集了京東金融等114個(gè)數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行實(shí)證分析,得到了“回購(gòu)條款”的存在對(duì)籌資人出讓股權(quán)份額存在顯著影響的結(jié)論。
[Abstract]:Crowdfunding is a way for people, organizations and businesses, including start-ups, to raise capital to finance or refinance their activities through online portals, or crowdfunding platforms. Product crowdfunding, creditor's rights crowdfunding and shareholding crowdfunding. Equity crowdfunding, as the name implies, means that the fundraiser raises funds by transferring a portion of the equity on the crowdfunding platform. After the success of the project, the investor can get the dividend of the invested company in return for the corresponding shares. The stock raising, first of all, has the characteristics of private equity, and most of the invested enterprises are not publicly listed startups. In the absence of complete financial statements and sustainable cash flow, there is a serious information asymmetry between the investors and the financiers. Secondly, this information asymmetry is amplified one step further in the context of Internet crowdfunding, because the distance between the investors and the financiers is far away. This increases the difficulty of conducting due diligence face-to-face with the financier, and the large number of investors who raise money, which can easily lead to a "free ride" phenomenon, in which the benefits of due diligence by individuals are shared free of charge by others and the costs are borne by themselves. Therefore, no one is willing to take action. The asymmetric information between the investors and the financiers magnifies the investment risk, which increases the financing costs of the financing parties, and causes adverse selection to the financing groups. The end result is that good companies give up equity financing on crowdfunding platforms, bad companies flood stock crowdfunding platforms, and investors abandon investing in crowdfunding projects. People have explored from many aspects, from the earliest "lead and cast" mode of Angellist, to the recent "share buyback on gambling agreement" written into investment agreements, and to the "forward pricing" model of 360 gold panning. It is always from the traditional theory to excavate the suitable method under the background of Internet financing, so as to weaken the information asymmetry and achieve the purpose of incentive compatibility. The research of this paper is based on this kind of background. This paper probes into the purpose and effectiveness of the repurchase clause of the gambling agreement in the investment agreement of crowdfunding. Firstly, this paper analyzes the main risk points of the crowdfunding, and then discusses the structure of the financial contract from the angle of the financial contract. The paper also analyzes the validity of the implementation of redemption rights in financial contracts (redemption, liquidation and control), and finally establishes a simple signal transfer model to deduce. It is verified that "share buyback on gambling agreement" can play a signalling role in the context of Internet private equity crowdfunding. Finally, by collecting 114 data such as JingDong finance for empirical analysis, the conclusion that the existence of "repurchase clause" has a significant impact on the share of equity transfer by financiers is concluded.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：電子科技大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F832.51

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