本文選題：股價(jià)崩盤(pán)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)　切入點(diǎn)：CEO任期　出處：《華東師范大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：2008年的爆發(fā)的全球金融危機(jī),以及2015年以來(lái)出現(xiàn)的千股跌停、千股漲停,千股跌停又漲停和熔斷的發(fā)生,都嚴(yán)重地干擾了資本市場(chǎng)有序運(yùn)行,給投資者造成巨大的心理恐慌,股價(jià)"暴跌"現(xiàn)象引起了投資界、國(guó)家政策制定相關(guān)部門(mén)以及學(xué)術(shù)界的廣泛關(guān)注。但是,到目前為止關(guān)于股價(jià)崩盤(pán)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的研究大都集中于公司內(nèi)外部特征進(jìn)行闡述,鮮有學(xué)者深入挖掘管理者特征的崩盤(pán)效應(yīng)。基于委托代理理論、信息不對(duì)稱理論、高層梯隊(duì)理論等理論基礎(chǔ),依托CSMAR數(shù)據(jù)庫(kù)選取中國(guó)A股上市公司2008-2015年的相關(guān)數(shù)據(jù),本文主要研究在CEO任職的不同階段,股價(jià)崩盤(pán)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)是否會(huì)有顯著的差異,并探索CEO任期是如何影響股價(jià)崩盤(pán)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的。因此,本文引入盈余管理、會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性與非效率投資,來(lái)分析其是否在CEO任期與股價(jià)崩盤(pán)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的關(guān)系中存在中介傳導(dǎo)作用。此外,本文引入內(nèi)部控制效率來(lái)探索其對(duì)CEO任期崩盤(pán)效應(yīng)是否存在治理機(jī)制。本文研究發(fā)現(xiàn):(1)CEO任期與股價(jià)崩盤(pán)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)呈U型關(guān)系,隨著CEO任期的延伸,股價(jià)崩盤(pán)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)會(huì)逐漸降低,但在臨近CEO離任時(shí)股價(jià)崩盤(pán)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)會(huì)升高。(2)在CEO任期與股價(jià)崩盤(pán)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的U型關(guān)系中,會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性發(fā)揮了完全的中介效應(yīng),非效率投資發(fā)揮了部分中介效應(yīng),盈余管理并未發(fā)揮中介作用;(3)高效率的內(nèi)部控制能夠有效降低公司股價(jià)崩盤(pán)風(fēng)險(xiǎn),緩和CEO任期與股價(jià)崩盤(pán)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)之間的U型關(guān)系;(4)相比于國(guó)有企業(yè),非國(guó)有企業(yè)CEO任期與股價(jià)崩盤(pán)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的U型關(guān)系更強(qiáng)。本文的主要貢獻(xiàn)在于:(1)豐富了關(guān)于CEO任期崩盤(pán)效應(yīng),會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性與非效率投資在其中發(fā)揮中介效應(yīng),高效的內(nèi)部控制發(fā)揮治理效應(yīng)等方面的相關(guān)文獻(xiàn);(2)有助于上市公司董事會(huì)、監(jiān)事會(huì)、股東大會(huì)及證券監(jiān)管部門(mén)從CEO任期、會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性與非效率投資方面加強(qiáng)治理和監(jiān)管,以穩(wěn)定資本市場(chǎng)秩序;(3)能夠促進(jìn)政策制定部門(mén)完善內(nèi)部控制制度的建設(shè),降低資本市場(chǎng)運(yùn)作風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。
[Abstract]:The global financial crisis that broke out in 2008, as well as the thousands of stocks that have fallen since 2015, the price limits of thousands of stocks, and the occurrence of price limits and breakers of thousands of shares, have seriously disrupted the orderly operation of the capital markets, causing great psychological panic to investors. The stock price "plummeting" phenomenon has attracted extensive attention from the investment community, relevant departments of national policy making and academia. However, so far, most of the research on the risk of stock price collapse has focused on the internal and external characteristics of the company. Based on the principal-agent theory, information asymmetry theory, high-level echelon theory and so on, based on the CSMAR database, this paper selects the relevant data of China A-share listed companies from 2008 to 2015. This paper mainly studies whether there are significant differences in the risk of stock price collapse in different stages of CEO tenure, and explores how the tenure of CEO affects the risk of stock price collapse. Therefore, this paper introduces earnings management, accounting conservatism and inefficient investment. To analyze whether there is an intermediary transmission in the relationship between CEO tenure and the risk of a stock price collapse. This paper introduces the efficiency of internal control to explore whether there is a governance mechanism for the effect of CEO tenure collapse. This paper finds that there is a U-shaped relationship between the tenure of CEO and the risk of stock price collapse. With the extension of the tenure of CEO, the risk of stock price collapse decreases gradually. However, near the departure of CEO, the risk of stock price collapse will increase. 2) in the U-shaped relationship between the tenure of CEO and the risk of stock price collapse, accounting conservatism plays a complete intermediary effect, and inefficient investment plays a part of intermediary effect. Earnings Management does not play an intermediary role) efficient internal controls can effectively reduce the risk of a company's share price crash and ease the U-shaped relationship between CEO tenure and the risk of a stock crash. The main contribution of this paper is to enrich the effect of CEO tenure collapse, accounting conservatism and non-efficiency investment play an intermediary role in the relationship between the tenure of non-state-owned enterprises and the risk of stock price collapse, the main contribution of this paper lies in the enrichment of the effect of CEO tenure collapse, in which accounting conservatism and non-efficiency investment play an intermediary role. The effective internal control exerts the governance effect and so on the related literature is helpful to the listed company board of directors, the board of supervisors, the shareholder general meeting and the securities supervision department from the CEO term of office, the accounting conservatism and the inefficient investment aspect strengthens the governance and the supervision, In order to stabilize the order of capital market, it can promote the establishment of internal control system and reduce the risk of capital market operation.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華東師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F832.51;F272.91

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