發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-03-07 23:32

  本文選題：資本運(yùn)作　切入點(diǎn)：利益輸送　出處：《廣東工業(yè)大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：2015年以來,我國(guó)政府主動(dòng)適應(yīng)和引領(lǐng)新常態(tài),不斷創(chuàng)新宏觀調(diào)控方式,并在深化經(jīng)濟(jì)體制改革的重點(diǎn)工作中,越來越重視資本市場(chǎng)環(huán)境的改善,在很大程度上提高了我國(guó)資本市場(chǎng)的活躍度,推進(jìn)了資本運(yùn)作的發(fā)展。從而創(chuàng)新出了各種各樣的資本運(yùn)作模式,先收購(gòu)后定增模式是其中的典型。盡管,資本運(yùn)作越來越多樣化,但是,相關(guān)的監(jiān)管措施并沒有完全配套,有效的市場(chǎng)約束機(jī)制還未形成。因此,給了有關(guān)上市公司進(jìn)行利益輸送的可乘之機(jī)。本文旨在綜合借鑒委托代理,信息不對(duì)稱,博弈論等相關(guān)理論,對(duì)典型案例Y公司資本運(yùn)作的過程和動(dòng)因,效果進(jìn)行深入剖析,并結(jié)合《上市公司重大資產(chǎn)重組管理辦法》,研究先收購(gòu)后定增的資本運(yùn)作模式背后是否存在繞行重大資產(chǎn)重組,借殼上市等逃避市場(chǎng)監(jiān)管,給上市公司進(jìn)行輸送利益的行為。同時(shí),挖掘上市公司的具體運(yùn)作細(xì)節(jié),探究利用此模式來進(jìn)行利益輸送的原因和實(shí)施條件。最后,為如何防止該模式的不合規(guī)運(yùn)作,進(jìn)一步規(guī)范資本市場(chǎng)的可能性提供參考建議。本文研究結(jié)果表明,首先,復(fù)雜的委托代理關(guān)系鏈造成了內(nèi)部治理環(huán)境的部分失效,進(jìn)一步導(dǎo)致了委托意愿分化和信息不對(duì)稱的現(xiàn)象,并激化了大股東和中小股東的矛盾,借助各種資本運(yùn)作模式,給利益輸送提供了內(nèi)部滋生的土壤。然后,中小股東群體和監(jiān)管者群體的行為選擇,對(duì)大股東群體進(jìn)行利益輸送行為選擇會(huì)產(chǎn)生影響,中小股東和監(jiān)管層對(duì)制衡大股東利益輸送至關(guān)重要。降低大股東進(jìn)行利益輸送的概率的路徑主要有:減少中小股東的舉報(bào)成本,減少監(jiān)管層的查處成本,提高大股東侵害中小股東利益的成本,提高大股東被查處后所付出的代價(jià)以及提高查處的成功率。最后,從Y公司資本運(yùn)作利益輸送案例分析的過程和結(jié)果,以及搜集的證據(jù)來看,Y公司在先收購(gòu)后定增模式的資本運(yùn)作中,存在對(duì)Y公司收購(gòu)Z公司的收購(gòu)比例進(jìn)行優(yōu)化考量后,搭配合適的運(yùn)作時(shí)機(jī),并通過定向增發(fā)的宣告效應(yīng)以及后續(xù)分紅派息,高轉(zhuǎn)送來給大股東牟利的嫌疑。
[Abstract]:Since 2015, our government has been actively adapting to and leading the new normal, innovating the macro-control mode, and paying more and more attention to the improvement of the capital market environment in the key work of deepening the economic system reform. To a large extent, it has improved the activity of our capital market and promoted the development of capital operation. As a result, a variety of capital operation modes have been innovated, among which the mode of first acquisition and then fixed increase is a typical one. The capital operation is becoming more and more diversified, but the relevant regulatory measures are not fully matched, and an effective market restraint mechanism has not yet been formed. This paper aims to analyze the process, motivation and effect of capital operation in typical case Y company by using the theories of principal-agent, information asymmetry, game theory and so on for reference. And combining with the "measures for the Management of Major assets restructuring of listed companies", to study whether there are any evasion of market supervision behind the capital operation mode of first purchasing and then increasing, such as bypassing major asset restructuring, listing through backdoor listing, etc. At the same time, excavate the specific operating details of the listed company, explore the reasons and conditions of using this model to carry out the benefit transmission. Finally, in order to prevent the irregular operation of the model, The results of this paper show that, first of all, the complex principal-agent relationship chain results in partial failure of the internal governance environment. It further leads to the polarization of willingness to entrust and asymmetric information, and intensifies the contradictions between large and small shareholders, and provides an internal breeding ground for the transmission of benefits by means of various modes of capital operation. The behavior choice of minority shareholder group and regulator group will have an impact on the choice of interest transmission behavior of large shareholder group. The ways to reduce the probability of large shareholders' interest transmission are as follows: reducing the reporting cost of small and medium shareholders, reducing the investigation and punishment costs of supervision level. To increase the cost of large shareholders infringing on the interests of minority shareholders, to increase the costs paid by large shareholders after being investigated and to improve the success rate of investigation and punishment. Finally, the process and results of the case study on the transfer of capital operating benefits from Y Company are analyzed. As well as the evidence collected, we can see that in the capital operation of YY Company in the mode of first acquisition and then fixed increase, there is an optimized consideration of the acquisition ratio of Company Y to Company Z, which matches the appropriate operation opportunity. And through the announcement effect of directional additional issue and subsequent dividend payout, high transfer to the suspicion of making profits for large shareholders.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：廣東工業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F832.51;F426.6

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