發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-01-12 09:17

  本文關(guān)鍵詞：董事多重職位與企業(yè)并購績(jī)效研究　出處：《廣東外語外貿(mào)大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 董事多重職位 兩職合一 連鎖董事 并購績(jī)效

【摘要】：在全球經(jīng)濟(jì)不景氣,國內(nèi)經(jīng)濟(jì)結(jié)構(gòu)急需調(diào)整的大背景下,我國經(jīng)濟(jì)處于產(chǎn)業(yè)升級(jí)與轉(zhuǎn)型的關(guān)鍵時(shí)期。大多行業(yè)處于優(yōu)化資源配置階段,越來越多產(chǎn)業(yè)到了需要通過并購實(shí)現(xiàn)大規(guī)模整合的時(shí)候。2014年我國企業(yè)并購交易金額將近7 000億元,2015年并購交易金額則突破了10 000億元,2016年的并購交易規(guī)模再創(chuàng)新高,達(dá)到13 000億元。新型產(chǎn)業(yè),如互聯(lián)網(wǎng)等,已經(jīng)開始通過并購的方式進(jìn)行行業(yè)整合,如優(yōu)酷和土豆,滴滴出行和Uber等;傳統(tǒng)行業(yè)在近年來的供給側(cè)改革下,也帶來了一些并購整合機(jī)會(huì),我國正處于重組并購和產(chǎn)業(yè)整合的新階段和黃金時(shí)期。并購活動(dòng)作為實(shí)現(xiàn)優(yōu)化資源配置的一種方式,無論是對(duì)宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)層面還是公司個(gè)體層面,都具有重要意義,其中并購績(jī)效尤其受到關(guān)注。而近年來,公司治理與并購績(jī)效的關(guān)系,引起了學(xué)術(shù)界的關(guān)注。本文的研究對(duì)象是董事多重職位與企業(yè)并購績(jī)效的關(guān)系。董事多重職位主要從兩方面進(jìn)行衡量,一是董事長(zhǎng)與總經(jīng)理兩職合一;二是連鎖董事,在兩個(gè)及兩個(gè)以上企業(yè)兼任董事即為連鎖董事。在以往的研究中,一般將兩職合一作為公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)其中一個(gè)衡量變量進(jìn)行研究。而連鎖董事則更多的是從連鎖董事形成的董事聯(lián)結(jié),與企業(yè)行為或企業(yè)績(jī)效方面進(jìn)行研究。本文從公司治理中董事在并購決策中擔(dān)任的角色出發(fā),研究?jī)烧吆推髽I(yè)并購績(jī)效的關(guān)系。本文通過選取2013-2015年滬深A(yù)股1096個(gè)并購事件為樣本,對(duì)董事多重職位與并購績(jī)效方面的關(guān)系進(jìn)行了研究,構(gòu)建了多元線性回歸模型,進(jìn)行了實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)。得出以下結(jié)論:(1)董事長(zhǎng)與總經(jīng)理兩職合一與企業(yè)并購績(jī)效顯著正相關(guān)關(guān)系。(2)連鎖董事與公司并購績(jī)效呈負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系。說明連鎖董事的存在會(huì)減損企業(yè)并購績(jī)效。(3)董事長(zhǎng)與總經(jīng)理兩職合一與連鎖董事對(duì)企業(yè)并購績(jī)效的聯(lián)合作用為負(fù)。(4)存在兩職合一的企業(yè),在并購中,公司治理水平較高的企業(yè)比公司治理水平較低的企業(yè)獲得了更高的超額累積收益率。擁有連鎖董事關(guān)系的并購企業(yè),公司治理水平的提高對(duì)其產(chǎn)生的代理問題沒有顯著緩解作用。同時(shí)存在兩職合一和連鎖董事的企業(yè),公司治理水平對(duì)企業(yè)并購績(jī)效有正面影響,有顯著。基于上述研究發(fā)現(xiàn),本文提出如下建議:(1)企業(yè)在進(jìn)行并購時(shí),應(yīng)繼續(xù)保持謹(jǐn)慎態(tài)度,勿降低并購過程中的盡調(diào)要求。(2)完善公司治理機(jī)制,給予董事合適的激勵(lì),以此緩解代理沖突。(3)提高公司治理水平,提高公司運(yùn)營效率。
[Abstract]:Under the background of the global economic depression and the urgent need to adjust the domestic economic structure, China's economy is in the critical period of industrial upgrading and transformation, and most industries are in the phase of optimizing the allocation of resources. More and more industries need to achieve large-scale integration through mergers and acquisitions. In 2014, the amount of M & A transactions in China was nearly 700 billion yuan. In 2015, the amount of M & A transactions exceeded 1 tillion yuan, and in 2016, the scale of M & A transactions reached a new high of 1.3 tillion yuan. New industries, such as the Internet, etc. Has begun to merge through mergers and acquisitions, such as Youku and Tudou, DiDi and Uber, and so on; Under the supply-side reform in recent years, the traditional industry has also brought some opportunities for merger and acquisition integration. China is in the new and golden stage of restructuring and industrial integration. M & A activities as a way to optimize the allocation of resources, whether on the macroeconomic level or individual level of the company. In recent years, the relationship between corporate governance and M & A performance is very important. The research object of this paper is the relationship between the multiple positions of directors and the performance of corporate mergers and acquisitions. The multiple positions of directors are mainly measured from two aspects: the first is the integration of the positions of chairman and general manager; Second, chain directors, in two or more enterprises concurrently as directors of the chain directors. In previous studies. Generally, the combination of two positions is considered as one of the measurement variables of corporate governance structure, while the chain director is more likely to form a board connection from the chain director. This paper starts from the role of directors in M & A decision in corporate governance. This paper studies the relationship between the two and corporate M & A performance. This paper selects 1096 A-share M & A events from 2013 to 2015 as samples. The relationship between multiple positions of directors and M & A performance is studied, and a multivariate linear regression model is constructed. An empirical test is carried out. The following conclusions are drawn: (1) there is a significant positive correlation between the integration of chairman and general manager and corporate M & A performance. There is a negative correlation between chain directors and M & A performance, which indicates that the existence of chain directors will detract from M & A performance. The combined effect of chairman and general manager and chain director on M & A performance is negative. In M & A, the higher corporate governance level than the lower corporate governance level of enterprises to obtain a higher excess cumulative return. The improvement of corporate governance level has no significant role to alleviate the agency problem. At the same time, there are two positions and chain directors of the enterprises, corporate governance level has a positive impact on corporate M & A performance. Based on the findings of the above research, this paper proposes the following suggestions: 1) Enterprises should continue to be cautious in their M & A, not to reduce the requirement of full regulation in the process of M & A, and to improve the corporate governance mechanism. Give the appropriate incentive to the director, so as to alleviate the agency conflict. 3) improve the level of corporate governance, improve the efficiency of the company operation.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：廣東外語外貿(mào)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F271;F271;F832.51

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