本文關(guān)鍵詞：基于投資者保護(hù)視角的博元投資財(cái)務(wù)舞弊博弈分析　出處：《黑龍江八一農(nóng)墾大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

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【摘要】：多年來,上市公司財(cái)務(wù)舞弊的現(xiàn)象一直存在,屢禁不止。各類上市公司的舞弊案例也經(jīng)常在學(xué)術(shù)界引發(fā)深入的探討和研究,希望能夠分析上市公司舞弊動(dòng)機(jī),更好的預(yù)防上市公司財(cái)務(wù)舞弊,為財(cái)務(wù)舞弊的識(shí)別提供理論依據(jù),但是財(cái)務(wù)舞弊一直存在。2014年11月,《關(guān)于改革完善并嚴(yán)格實(shí)施上市公司退市制度的若干意見》出臺(tái)后,第一家退市的公司,就是號(hào)稱A股“不死鳥”的博元投資,其主要退市原因就是財(cái)務(wù)造假與信息披露違規(guī)。然而博元投資退市整理期間依舊有很多散戶懷抱著投機(jī)的心態(tài),瘋狂炒作,進(jìn)而導(dǎo)致股票退市前的30個(gè)交易日,股票換手率高達(dá)368.72%,而造成這一現(xiàn)象的99%因素是個(gè)人投資者。而當(dāng)大幕落下,受損的投資者依然需要為自己的沖動(dòng)買單。為什么一個(gè)財(cái)務(wù)造假的公司依然能夠受到投資者追捧?個(gè)人投資者的投資理念與投資習(xí)慣是否能夠遏制上市公司的財(cái)務(wù)造假行為?本文在此背景下運(yùn)用了案例分析法分析了博元投資的財(cái)務(wù)舞弊手段、以及信息披露違法行為,而后通過博弈論模型建立了投資者和博元投資的均衡分析,研究了在舞弊發(fā)生過程中,探討投資者的專業(yè)分析是否會(huì)對(duì)于博元投資舞弊產(chǎn)生影響。最后文章分析得出了四點(diǎn)結(jié)論:博元投資的造假成本越高,其造假的可能性越小;投資者對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)信息進(jìn)行專業(yè)分析的可能性越高,博元投資造假的可能性越小;如果博元投資因造假行為產(chǎn)生的收益越高,造假的可能性越大;投資者進(jìn)行專業(yè)投資分析的成本越低,博元投資造假的可能性越小。并且提出了五點(diǎn)可行性建議和意見,希望可以有助于保護(hù)中小投資者的利益也可以進(jìn)一步預(yù)防上市公司企業(yè)造假的問題。針對(duì)這些結(jié)論,筆者認(rèn)為應(yīng)該一方面進(jìn)一步加大對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)造假公司的處罰,增加企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)舞弊的成本;另一方面致力于提高投資者的投資分析能力與專業(yè)辨別技巧,通過“互聯(lián)網(wǎng)+”教育的方式更好的普及投資理財(cái)知識(shí)。同時(shí),應(yīng)進(jìn)一步嚴(yán)格和完善相關(guān)的監(jiān)管制度與退市制度,也提高上市公司財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表的信息透明度。從外界形成治理合力,讓審計(jì)師切實(shí)的為保護(hù)投資者權(quán)益發(fā)揮作用。
[Abstract]:For many years, the phenomenon of financial fraud of listed companies has been existing, repeated prohibition. All kinds of fraud cases of listed companies also often lead to in-depth discussion and research in academia, hoping to be able to analyze the motives of fraud in listed companies. Better prevention of financial fraud of listed companies to provide theoretical basis for the identification of financial fraud, but financial fraud has always existed. November 2014. "on the reform and perfection and strict implementation of the delisting system of listed companies" after the introduction of the first delisting company, is known as A shares "undead bird" Bo Yuan investment. Its main reason for delisting is financial fraud and information disclosure violations. However, during the period of investment delisting, there are still a lot of retail investors with speculative mentality, crazy speculation. In the 30 trading days before the stock delisting, the stock turnover rate was as high as 368.72, and the 99% factor that caused this phenomenon was the individual investor. And when the curtain fell. Hurt investors still have to pay for their impulses. Why can a financial fraud still be sought after by investors? Can the investment ideas and habits of individual investors deter the financial fraud of listed companies? Under this background, this paper analyzes the financial fraud means and illegal behavior of information disclosure by using the case analysis method, and then establishes the equilibrium analysis of the investor and the Bo Yuan investment through the game theory model. This paper studies whether the professional analysis of investors will have an impact on the fraud in the process of fraud. Finally, the paper concludes that the higher the cost of fraud is, the higher the cost of fraud is. The less likely it is to fake; The higher the possibility of professional analysis of financial information, the smaller the possibility of investment fraud; If Boyuan investment because of counterfeiting behavior the higher the income, the greater the possibility of counterfeiting; The lower the cost of professional investment analysis, the smaller the possibility of investment fraud. And put forward five feasible suggestions and suggestions. I hope it can help protect the interests of small and medium-sized investors but also can further prevent the problem of corporate fraud listed companies. In view of these conclusions the author believes that on the one hand we should further increase the punishment of financial fraud companies. Increase the cost of financial fraud; On the other hand, it is committed to improve investors' investment analysis ability and professional discrimination skills, through "Internet" education to better popularize the knowledge of investment and finance. At the same time. It is necessary to improve the relevant supervision system and delisting system, and to improve the information transparency of the financial statements of listed companies, so as to make auditors play an important role in protecting investors' rights and interests.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：黑龍江八一農(nóng)墾大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F832.39;F830.42

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