發(fā)布時(shí)間：2017-12-31 15:20

  本文關(guān)鍵詞：利用期權(quán)合同協(xié)調(diào)具有公平關(guān)切行為的供應(yīng)鏈　出處：《中國(guó)科學(xué)技術(shù)大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類(lèi)型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 供應(yīng)鏈 報(bào)童模型 期權(quán)合同 公平關(guān)切

【摘要】：盡管大多經(jīng)濟(jì)模型認(rèn)為決策者只會(huì)被自身利益所驅(qū)動(dòng),但是在最近幾年,越來(lái)越多的證據(jù)表明很多人會(huì)被他們的偏好所驅(qū)動(dòng),并且在社交活動(dòng)中人類(lèi)對(duì)于公平的關(guān)切行為無(wú)法被忽視。在行為運(yùn)作管理研究中這種現(xiàn)象表現(xiàn)地尤為突出。決策者在做決策時(shí),不僅關(guān)注自身利益的最大化,而且還將自身的利潤(rùn)和供應(yīng)鏈中其他成員的利潤(rùn)作比較,這種行為即為公平關(guān)切。公平關(guān)切行為普遍存在于人們的日常生活中,對(duì)人們的行為產(chǎn)生重要的影響。在供應(yīng)鏈管理領(lǐng)域有關(guān)成員公平關(guān)切行為的現(xiàn)有文獻(xiàn)中,研究決策者的公平關(guān)切行為對(duì)于供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)的影響是一個(gè)很重要的研究課題。本文的研究重點(diǎn)是公平關(guān)切行為及其在運(yùn)作管理領(lǐng)域的應(yīng)用。本文在傳統(tǒng)報(bào)童模型和斯坦克爾伯格博弈模型基礎(chǔ)上提出了考慮公平關(guān)切行為的新的博弈模型。在此模型中,我們認(rèn)為制造商和零售商在做決策時(shí),不僅會(huì)考慮到要使自己收益最大化,同時(shí)會(huì)考慮與對(duì)方相比,自己的收益是否公平。如果他們感覺(jué)不公平便會(huì)選擇能使自己效用最大的決策方案。其次,我們重點(diǎn)探究了期權(quán)合同能否協(xié)調(diào)具有公平關(guān)切行為的供應(yīng)鏈。具體來(lái)說(shuō),我們考慮一個(gè)由制造商和零售商組成的供應(yīng)鏈,其中兩個(gè)成員可以是理性的或者公平的,并且進(jìn)而給出供應(yīng)鏈可以通過(guò)期權(quán)合約進(jìn)行協(xié)調(diào)的條件。我們的研究結(jié)果表明,當(dāng)兩個(gè)成員中的任何一個(gè)理性時(shí),期權(quán)合約可以協(xié)調(diào)供應(yīng)鏈。當(dāng)兩個(gè)成員都是非理性的時(shí),即都具有公平關(guān)切行為時(shí),期權(quán)合約只能在某些具體條件下協(xié)調(diào)供應(yīng)鏈。此外,我們研究了兩位成員是否會(huì)遭受不利或有利不公平,并得出了一些有趣的結(jié)果。最后,本文在總結(jié)已有研究結(jié)果的基礎(chǔ)上,對(duì)未來(lái)研究方向進(jìn)行了一些展望。
[Abstract]:Although most economic models assume that policymakers are driven only by their own interests, in recent years there has been growing evidence that many people are driven by their preferences. And in social activities, human concern for fairness can not be ignored. In the study of behavioral operation management, this phenomenon is particularly prominent. Decision makers not only pay attention to the maximization of their own interests when making decisions. It also compares its profits with those of other members of the supply chain. This behavior is called equity concern, which generally exists in people's daily life. Has a significant impact on people's behaviour. In the field of supply chain management, members are concerned about the fair behavior of the existing literature. It is an important research topic to study the impact of fair concern behavior of decision makers on supply chain coordination. This paper focuses on fair concern behavior and its application in the field of operation management. This paper is based on the traditional newsboy model. A new game model considering the behavior of fair concern is proposed on the basis of the Stackelberg game model. We think that when manufacturers and retailers make decisions, they not only consider maximizing their own profits, but also consider comparing with each other. Whether their income is fair. If they feel unfair, they will choose a decision that will make them the most effective. Secondly. We focus on whether options contracts can coordinate supply chains with fair concerns. Specifically, we consider a supply chain composed of manufacturers and retailers. Two of the members can be rational or fair and then give the conditions under which the supply chain can be coordinated through option contracts. Our results show that when any one of the two members is rational. The option contract can coordinate the supply chain. When both members are irrational, that is, both have fair concern behavior, the option contract can only coordinate the supply chain under some specific conditions. We have studied whether the two members will suffer unfavorable or favorable injustice, and have obtained some interesting results. Finally, on the basis of summarizing the existing research results, we have made some prospects for the future research direction.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：中國(guó)科學(xué)技術(shù)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F274;F830.9

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前2條

1 杜少甫;杜嬋;梁j;劉天卓;;考慮公平關(guān)切的供應(yīng)鏈契約與協(xié)調(diào)[J];管理科學(xué)學(xué)報(bào);2010年11期

2 王小龍;劉麗文;;Coordination by Option Contracts in a Retailer-Led Supply Chain with Demand Update[J];Tsinghua Science and Technology;2008年04期

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本文編號(hào)：1360334