本文關(guān)鍵詞：大股東股權(quán)質(zhì)押、盈余管理和股票回報(bào)率　出處：《深圳大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 股權(quán)質(zhì)押 公司價(jià)值 盈余管理 股價(jià)操縱

【摘要】：隨著我國(guó)資本市場(chǎng)的繁榮發(fā)展,資本市場(chǎng)提供的融資方式多種多樣,股權(quán)質(zhì)押融資越來越為金融機(jī)構(gòu)和公司青睞。根據(jù)Wind數(shù)據(jù)庫統(tǒng)計(jì),2015年共發(fā)生大股東股權(quán)質(zhì)押融資4274次,相比2014年增長(zhǎng)59.66%。股權(quán)質(zhì)押融資呈現(xiàn)爆發(fā)式增長(zhǎng),如今已成為普遍的融資方式,因?yàn)槠湎啾葌鹘y(tǒng)的不動(dòng)產(chǎn)抵押與動(dòng)產(chǎn)抵押具有自身獨(dú)特的的優(yōu)勢(shì),股權(quán)質(zhì)押融資方式拓寬了公司的融資渠道。然而,在肯定股權(quán)質(zhì)押積極作用的同時(shí),也必須認(rèn)識(shí)到股權(quán)質(zhì)押可能產(chǎn)生負(fù)面影響。對(duì)質(zhì)權(quán)人而言,如果沒有選準(zhǔn)優(yōu)良股權(quán),有可能給自身帶來損失。對(duì)于出質(zhì)人來講,最大的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)可能就是股價(jià)下跌。對(duì)于上市公司大股東來講,如果市場(chǎng)對(duì)上市公司沒有信心,股價(jià)出現(xiàn)大幅下跌,甚至跌破平倉線,大股東就需要補(bǔ)倉或提供其他擔(dān)保。大股東為了避免股價(jià)下跌的風(fēng)險(xiǎn),可能會(huì)進(jìn)行盈余管理或股價(jià)操縱。由于調(diào)節(jié)股票市價(jià)的成本相對(duì)較低,因此大股東有動(dòng)機(jī)也有能力調(diào)節(jié)公司發(fā)布的市場(chǎng)信息以避免金融機(jī)構(gòu)“惜貸”行為。另一方面,如果大股東“高位”質(zhì)押所擁有的股權(quán),而在“低位”放棄股權(quán),這會(huì)侵害債權(quán)人及中小股東利益。自從出現(xiàn)股權(quán)質(zhì)押融資方式以來,有很多文獻(xiàn)研究股權(quán)質(zhì)押對(duì)盈余管理的影響,本文在以往研究股權(quán)質(zhì)押對(duì)盈余管理影響的基礎(chǔ)上,對(duì)二者關(guān)系進(jìn)行了進(jìn)一步研究。首先,本文通過動(dòng)態(tài)研究,對(duì)比同一上市公司在股權(quán)質(zhì)押后盈余管理程度的變化,為我國(guó)資本市場(chǎng)中公司股權(quán)質(zhì)押與盈余管理的關(guān)系提供了新的經(jīng)驗(yàn)證據(jù);其次,已有證據(jù)表明,股東為防止股價(jià)下跌帶來的風(fēng)險(xiǎn),有股價(jià)操縱的動(dòng)機(jī)。股東通過股票回購等方式操縱股價(jià),在股市中可能使股票有更高的股票回報(bào)率。目前并未有論文研究股權(quán)質(zhì)押與股票回報(bào)率的關(guān)系,本文研究股權(quán)質(zhì)押與股票回報(bào)率的關(guān)系,可以為股權(quán)質(zhì)押在資本市場(chǎng)產(chǎn)生的影響提供新的經(jīng)驗(yàn)證據(jù)。
[Abstract]:Along with the prosperity and development of China's capital market, the capital market to provide financing ways, equity pledge financing more and more financial institutions and companies favor. According to Wind database statistics, 2015 a total shareholder equity pledge financing 4274 times, compared to 2014 growth of 59.66%. equity pledge financing show explosive growth, has now become a common financing compared with the traditional way, because the mortgage of real estate and chattel mortgage has its own unique advantages, equity pledge financing broaden the financing channel of the company. However, the positive role in the positive equity pledge at the same time, also must be aware of the equity pledge may have a negative impact. The mortgagor, if there is no selection excellent equity, may have to bring their own losses for the quality of people, the biggest risk is probably fell. The major shareholders of listed companies, such as If the market has no confidence in the listed companies, stock prices fell sharply, even below the liquidation line, large shareholders need to cover positions or other security. Large shareholders in order to avoid the risk of falling stock prices, may carry out earnings management and stock price manipulation. The stock price adjustment cost is relatively low, so the large shareholders have the motivation and the ability to regulate the company released market information to avoid financial institutions "credit crunch" behavior. On the other hand, if the shareholder "high" pledge of equity owned, and in the "low" to give up equity, it will infringe the interests of minority shareholders and creditors. Since the equity pledge financing, there are a lot of literature on the equity pledge effect on earnings management, based on previous studies on the basis of equity pledge for the impact of earnings management, the relationship between the two was further studied. Firstly, through the dynamic study , compared to the same degree of earnings management of listed companies changes in equity pledge, pledge of equity relationship for China's capital market and earnings management provides new empirical evidence; secondly, there is evidence that, in order to prevent the shareholders of shares fell the risks of a stock price manipulation motivation. Shareholders through the repurchase of shares stock price manipulation in the stock market, the stock may have higher stock returns. At present there is no research on the relationship between equity pledge and the stock return rate, this paper studies the equity pledge relationship with stock returns, can provide new empirical evidence for the influence of stock right pledge in the capital market.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：深圳大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F832.51;F275

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